Narrative:

We were inbound crew night before and an ACARS message was sent to dispatch enroute concerning two write ups that we were going to have on the ground. On the ground I wrote up in the logbook; right-hand land light inoperative and loud air noise in mid cabin as described by flight attendants. This was the second time a write up concerning the air noise was in the logbook. A contract maintenance mechanic met the aircraft on arrival and we then went to the hotel. The next day I received a call from crew scheduling advising that outbound flight was going to be delayed and that contract maintenance might need some help with a procedure. At the gate met the contract maintenance guy. The right-hand land light had been deferred from the night before but the air noise had not been signed off. He needed to perform a pressurization test on the aircraft and it required three personnel to complete the test. I skimmed through the procedure that was described in the aircraft maintenance manual which was many pages provided by the contractor. At this point I was very hesitant to work through this procedure; as my first officer and I are not employed by the company to perform maintenance functions. I called my domicile chief pilot and explained my hesitation. Wanting to try and maintain some type of schedule integrity we initially started the task as described in amm 21-31-00 at the gate. I also called maintenance control. They wanted to have all three of us in the cockpit first; and then do another pressurization with the mechanic outside the aircraft. Right away; I again had hesitation with the procedure as; one person was supposed to be outside the aircraft and two inside the aircraft away from other personnel and equipment as described in the procedure. In the cockpit; we were supposed to pressurize the aircraft up to 4.5 psi differential; at about 1 psi differential I did not feel comfortable with this operation and shut it down; called operations and said that we would have to be pushed to a remote area with stairs for access to the aircraft. It was worked out through the airport operations to be pushed to a taxiway and the pressurization test could be done there.we started the test again; the three of us in the cockpit. At the point that one person was supposed to be doing one thing and the other person was supposed to be doing something else; and reading the procedure that if things were not done correctly physical injury could result; the first officer and I conferred that this is something that we should not be doing. We are pilots and not mechanics employed by the company and that if we suffered physical harm during this procedure it was our careers/health as pilots at stake. We terminated the operation and were towed back to the gate.I called my domicile chief pilot and explained in further detail what the procedure entailed and that we were not going to do it. He concurred with our assessment. I called maintenance control to get an update. In the conversation I reminded him that the aircraft was at the gate and that the procedure called for three persons. This maintenance controller thought the flight crew was going to help with the procedure; I informed him that we were the same crew from the am and we were not going to do the procedure. Later in the day; another contract mechanic was supposed to come on duty. I believe it was two mechanics that arrived by truck at the gate. One mechanic came up to the gate and informed us the procedure was done and the aircraft was ready to go. The aircraft never left the gate. My crew and I boarded the aircraft and prepared it for flight as we were now told that we were a ferry flight. The discrepancy was signed off per the pressurization test as required in amm 21-31-00. I suspect that the procedure may not have been done appropriately as described in amm 21-31-00. The company needs to employ the necessary maintenance personnel; and not rely on flight crews for maintenance functions. If this write up was taken care of over the downtime; which there was approximately 9.5 hours; the flight crew would not have been involved with this and a subsequent injury to one of my flight attendants; described in another report; would most likely not have transpired.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An EMB170 flight crew was asked to participate in a maintenance procedure that involved pressurizing the aircraft on the ground to check for air leaks. After initially accepting the assignment the crew decided that the procedure was dangerous and they were not qualified to preform it. Eventually enough mechanics show up to perform the procedure and the flight departed as a ferry.

Narrative: We were inbound crew night before and an ACARS message was sent to Dispatch enroute concerning two write ups that we were going to have on the ground. On the ground I wrote up in the logbook; right-hand land light inoperative and loud air noise in mid cabin as described by flight attendants. This was the second time a write up concerning the air noise was in the logbook. A contract maintenance mechanic met the aircraft on arrival and we then went to the hotel. The next day I received a call from crew scheduling advising that outbound flight was going to be delayed and that contract maintenance might need some help with a procedure. At the gate met the contract maintenance guy. The right-hand land light had been deferred from the night before but the air noise had not been signed off. He needed to perform a pressurization test on the aircraft and it required three personnel to complete the test. I skimmed through the procedure that was described in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual which was many pages provided by the contractor. At this point I was very hesitant to work through this procedure; as my First Officer and I are not employed by the company to perform maintenance functions. I called my Domicile Chief Pilot and explained my hesitation. Wanting to try and maintain some type of schedule integrity we initially started the task as described in AMM 21-31-00 at the gate. I also called Maintenance Control. They wanted to have all three of us in the cockpit first; and then do another pressurization with the mechanic outside the aircraft. Right away; I again had hesitation with the procedure as; one person was supposed to be outside the aircraft and two inside the aircraft away from other personnel and equipment as described in the procedure. In the cockpit; we were supposed to pressurize the aircraft up to 4.5 PSI differential; at about 1 PSI differential I did not feel comfortable with this operation and shut it down; called Operations and said that we would have to be pushed to a remote area with stairs for access to the aircraft. It was worked out through the Airport Operations to be pushed to a taxiway and the pressurization test could be done there.We started the test again; the three of us in the cockpit. At the point that one person was supposed to be doing one thing and the other person was supposed to be doing something else; and reading the procedure that if things were not done correctly physical injury could result; the First Officer and I conferred that this is something that we should not be doing. We are pilots and not mechanics employed by the company and that if we suffered physical harm during this procedure it was our careers/health as pilots at stake. We terminated the operation and were towed back to the gate.I called my Domicile Chief Pilot and explained in further detail what the procedure entailed and that we were not going to do it. He concurred with our assessment. I called Maintenance Control to get an update. In the conversation I reminded him that the aircraft was at the gate and that the procedure called for three persons. This Maintenance Controller thought the flight crew was going to help with the procedure; I informed him that we were the same crew from the AM and we were not going to do the procedure. Later in the day; another contract mechanic was supposed to come on duty. I believe it was two mechanics that arrived by truck at the gate. One mechanic came up to the gate and informed us the procedure was done and the aircraft was ready to go. The aircraft never left the gate. My crew and I boarded the aircraft and prepared it for flight as we were now told that we were a ferry flight. The discrepancy was signed off per the pressurization test as required in AMM 21-31-00. I suspect that the procedure may not have been done appropriately as described in AMM 21-31-00. The company needs to employ the necessary maintenance personnel; and not rely on flight crews for maintenance functions. If this write up was taken care of over the downtime; which there was approximately 9.5 hours; the flight crew would not have been involved with this and a subsequent injury to one of my flight attendants; described in another report; would most likely not have transpired.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.