Narrative:

I was the pilot flying to dfw and we were deviating to the left of stonz intersection on north flow to dfw. We were level at 11;000 ft heading about 210 when both first officer and I heard our callsign and instructions to descend to 6;000 ft and head 190. We were instructed to contact approach on 119.4 and told of traffic at 1 o'clock and 10;000 ft. I stated to the first officer 'I wonder why they would give us that clearance with traffic over there.' I had barely started down when the first officer told me to level as she was looking at the TCAS and I was searching outside. I actually climbed the aircraft before getting the RA. People were deviating from lit all the way in and also in the terminal area. The ATC manager said those instructions were for another flight and that the controller had issued them twice. We evidentially responded on the second call but we were blocked by the other flight responding. This was the second 84 plus hour month in a row for me having just completed a 4 day trip and flying 25.30 hours on that trip. I was assigned this trip in the evening and confirmed the deadhead out with crew scheduling. I had to sit in the jumpseat out because the dead head was made on an oversold flight and could not check in early for a seat. The agent said it was either the jumpseat or not at all. Crew tracking could not be reached (did not answer my call to resolve issue) I took the jumpseat and headed out. It was either that or not get there in time for the flight I was working out. Fatigue does cause one to lose that edge especially needed in the terminal area. I even question myself now as to why I would have even begun such a descent. If my game was on it would not have happened. With 4 days of early get ups it is not surprising that this could have happened. With manning the way it is I expect more of these types of deviations to affect the pilots at our company. Just look at how much flying reserve pilots did at my base and you'll get my point. I guess some would say that was perfect utilization of the reserves. Pilots on reserve know better. We are pretty much beat.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier flight crew reports accepting a clearance to descend intended for another aircraft which results in a TCAS RA. Fatigue was cited as a factor.

Narrative: I was the pilot flying to DFW and we were deviating to the left of Stonz Intersection on north flow to DFW. We were level at 11;000 FT heading about 210 when both First Officer and I heard our callsign and instructions to descend to 6;000 FT and head 190. We were instructed to contact Approach on 119.4 and told of traffic at 1 o'clock and 10;000 FT. I stated to the First Officer 'I wonder why they would give us that clearance with traffic over there.' I had barely started down when the First Officer told me to level as she was looking at the TCAS and I was searching outside. I actually climbed the aircraft before getting the RA. People were deviating from LIT all the way in and also in the terminal area. The ATC Manager said those instructions were for another flight and that the Controller had issued them twice. We evidentially responded on the second call but we were blocked by the other flight responding. This was the second 84 plus hour month in a row for me having just completed a 4 day trip and flying 25.30 hours on that trip. I was assigned this trip in the evening and confirmed the deadhead out with crew scheduling. I had to sit in the jumpseat out because the dead head was made on an oversold flight and could not check in early for a seat. The agent said it was either the jumpseat or not at all. Crew tracking could not be reached (did not answer my call to resolve issue) I took the jumpseat and headed out. It was either that or not get there in time for the flight I was working out. Fatigue does cause one to lose that edge especially needed in the terminal area. I even question myself now as to why I would have even begun such a descent. If my game was on it would not have happened. With 4 days of early get ups it is not surprising that this could have happened. With manning the way it is I expect more of these types of deviations to affect the pilots at our company. Just look at how much flying reserve pilots did at my base and you'll get my point. I guess some would say that was perfect utilization of the reserves. Pilots on reserve know better. We are pretty much beat.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.