Narrative:

I gave the full company standard takeoff briefing prior to departure. During the normal thrust takeoff just prior to 100K; I looked at EICAS just in time to see a rud limit fault message disappear; and since it was gone; continued takeoff. A second or two after the 100-knot call out; noticed the rud limit and splr stabilizer faults. Concerned about a multiple failures; I began to retard the thrust levers to abort; then in a split-second; realized/remembered we were above 100kts; therefore shouldn't abort for low-level faults such as these; and immediately advanced the thrust levers back to toga detent and continued takeoff; which went without further incident. In hindsight; I wish that I had taken another second to evaluate the messages before initiating an abort; or after having started to abort; should have carried through with it. I realize that with a shorter runway; the momentary thrust reduction could have made for a very different outcome. Perhaps there could be more discussion of what messages we abort for below/above 100K. It might be a good time for another handout regarding rejected takeoff's and making the go; no-go decision to reinforce our training. In the future; during the takeoff briefing; I will re-emphasize that above 100kts we will only abort for engine failure; fire; or something that makes the aircraft unsafe to fly. Will also consider a review of the listed 'nuisance' messages with my first officer as well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-700 Flight Crew critiqued their response to (later to be determined nuisance) EICAS messages received at and above 100K on their takeoff roll.

Narrative: I gave the full Company Standard Takeoff Briefing prior to departure. During the normal thrust takeoff just prior to 100K; I looked at EICAS just in time to see a RUD LIMIT FAULT message disappear; and since it was gone; continued takeoff. A second or two after the 100-knot call out; noticed the RUD LIMIT and SPLR STAB faults. Concerned about a multiple failures; I began to retard the thrust levers to abort; then in a split-second; realized/remembered we were above 100kts; therefore shouldn't abort for low-level faults such as these; and immediately advanced the thrust levers back to TOGA DETENT and continued takeoff; which went without further incident. In hindsight; I wish that I had taken another second to evaluate the messages before initiating an abort; or after having started to abort; should have carried through with it. I realize that with a shorter runway; the momentary thrust reduction could have made for a very different outcome. Perhaps there could be more discussion of what messages we abort for below/above 100K. It might be a good time for another handout regarding RTO's and making the go; no-go decision to reinforce our training. In the future; during the takeoff Briefing; I will re-emphasize that above 100kts we will only abort for engine failure; fire; or something that makes the aircraft unsafe to fly. Will also consider a review of the listed 'nuisance' messages with my First Officer as well.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.