Narrative:

After working albany/ashburn for some time; I was asked to give the sector to the talahasse controller. We combined those sectors because our staffing was critically low. Upon completing the transfer to the tlh sector; I was asked to relieve the radar controller at sector 30. There was a line of precipitation extending from the gulf of mexico up over the state of florida; then up into the carolinas and into the atlantic ocean. There was a small approximate 20NM break in the precipitation. At the time I assumed the sector; the traffic was busy but manageable. Shortly after I had more aircraft than I could keep track of. I did not take some hand offs; but that did not prevent them from flying into my sector. My airspace was violated multiple times; and I am fairly certain that I violated other airspace multiple times as well; though I cannot remember enough to cite details. During this time I also had at least two aircraft incidents where separation was almost lost. One involved an air carrier that I assigned fl 290; I recall nothing about the other aircraft. The other was an air canada and an airtran. I am not sure what specifically happened with the airtran; but my d-side says we took a point out on him but sector 17 then decided to hand him off to us. Upon taking the hand off; the aircraft was never switched to our frequency. The air canada flight was at FL320; northbound; and on our frequency. The airtran began a decent right in the face of the air canada flight. Upon seeing the conflict alert; I assigned the air canada flight a 270 heading and used the word 'immediately' in the clearance. I do not think separation was lost; but it was close. Over the course of the 36 minutes I was sitting at this sector I cannot say how many times I told the supervisor that I needed a tracker; that the sector was unsafe; and that something needed to be done to temper the flow of aircraft heading for the gap in the precipitation. No help was given; no tracker provided; no flow was put out to help us. I also cannot say how many times my airspace was violated; how many times I violated others. Nor can I say how many near misses occurred with aircraft to aircraft separation. If conflict alert had not gone off; I am fairly sure that I would have missed the above incident with the air canada and airtran flights. The entire situation was completely unsafe. I do not know how or why this was allowed to occur; but the system totally failed in this case. Recommendation; I would first recommend that our staffing issues be addressed. If we are critically staffed; safety should not be compromised like it was in this instance. We need to have overtime called in when we take as many sick outs as we did. Our staffing; or lack thereof; was definately a contributing factor in this incident. By the end of my session; I had been on position for over 3 hours. I was fatigued beyond what mere words can describe. Secondly; I would recommend that the eastern portion of this sector be designated as a separate sector; with separate frequencies. The north east corner of this sector gets so congested at certain times; that this seems like it would be an obvious fix. It would allow us to zoom in more to see all the aircraft that are transitioning the area; rather than being forced to work on a 175 mile range. Thirdly; I would recommend that our tmu be investigated and/or retrained. They did nothing to help us; so I can only assume that it was that they did not know what to do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZJX Controller described a very busy/complex traffic period when only a small transitioning corridor was available for enroute aircraft; the reporter listing TMU inaction and lack of staffing as contributing factors in this event.

Narrative: After working Albany/Ashburn for some time; I was asked to give the sector to the Talahasse controller. We combined those sectors because our staffing was critically low. Upon completing the transfer to the TLH sector; I was asked to relieve the RADAR Controller at Sector 30. There was a line of precipitation extending from the Gulf of Mexico up over the state of Florida; then up into the Carolinas and into the Atlantic Ocean. There was a small approximate 20NM break in the precipitation. At the time I assumed the sector; the traffic was busy but manageable. Shortly after I had more aircraft than I could keep track of. I did not take some hand offs; but that did not prevent them from flying into my sector. My airspace was violated multiple times; and I am fairly certain that I violated other airspace multiple times as well; though I cannot remember enough to cite details. During this time I also had at least two aircraft incidents where separation was almost lost. One involved an Air Carrier that I assigned FL 290; I recall nothing about the other aircraft. The other was an Air Canada and an Airtran. I am not sure what specifically happened with the Airtran; but my D-Side says we took a point out on him but Sector 17 then decided to hand him off to us. Upon taking the hand off; the aircraft was never switched to our frequency. The Air Canada flight was at FL320; Northbound; and on our frequency. The Airtran began a decent right in the face of the Air Canada flight. Upon seeing the Conflict Alert; I assigned the Air Canada flight a 270 heading and used the word 'immediately' in the clearance. I do not think separation was lost; but it was close. Over the course of the 36 minutes I was sitting at this sector I cannot say how many times I told the supervisor that I needed a tracker; that the sector was UNSAFE; and that something needed to be done to temper the flow of aircraft heading for the gap in the precipitation. No help was given; no tracker provided; no flow was put out to help us. I also cannot say how many times my airspace was violated; how many times I violated others. Nor can I say how many near misses occurred with aircraft to aircraft separation. If Conflict Alert had not gone off; I am fairly sure that I would have missed the above incident with the Air Canada and Airtran flights. The entire situation was completely unsafe. I do not know how or why this was allowed to occur; but the system totally failed in this case. Recommendation; I would first recommend that our staffing issues be addressed. If we are critically staffed; safety should not be compromised like it was in this instance. We need to have overtime called in when we take as many sick outs as we did. Our staffing; or lack thereof; was definately a contributing factor in this incident. By the end of my session; I had been on position for over 3 hours. I was fatigued beyond what mere words can describe. Secondly; I would recommend that the Eastern portion of this sector be designated as a separate sector; with separate frequencies. The North East corner of this sector gets so congested at certain times; that this seems like it would be an obvious fix. It would allow us to zoom in more to see all the aircraft that are transitioning the area; rather than being forced to work on a 175 mile range. Thirdly; I would recommend that our TMU be investigated and/or retrained. They did nothing to help us; so I can only assume that it was that they did not know what to do.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.