Narrative:

We were cleared via the RNG4 arrival; simply over fly the VOR; turn southeast; at 7 DME fix make right turn to intercept the ILS; very simple maintain 10;000 until the VOR; then ILS to runway 36. Upon passing the VOR outbound; there was heavy rain just off our nose so we deviated slightly west from published to avoid the heavy rain. We were auto pilot on; FMS lrn [rang navigation] went to heading to deviate around the weather. As we began making our right turn to intercept the ILS (glideslope out of service) we encountered more heavy rain. The aircraft intercepted the localizer at about three miles from the VOR (final approach fix) we broke out of a ragged broken cloud deck and had runway in sight; and ground in sight beneath us which is a mountain with a higher peak to the east side of the localizer. We left altitude and; as I was about to call field in sight; the controller asked our altitude. I replied 9;300 field in sight. We had the runway; and we had the ground beneath us. Controller immediately told us to pull up [and] maintain 10;000; and I again told him we were visual. This continued through out the approach. We continued to tell him we had the field. After landing we went to ground frequency and again we were told we were to have maintained 10;000 until passing the VOR. I again responded that we had the field. We go into skrg several times a year. It is not unknown to us; nor are the approaches SID's or STAR's. I am capable of reading an approach plate and the aircraft is totally capable of flying a coupled approach. I understand the situation; but if I have the field in sight and the terrain beneath me; as I reported continually through out the approach and landing; why would I climb back up to 10;000? If the tower was getting a low altitude warning from their equipment I understand; but after reporting we were visual for countless times; the conversation became a major annoyance during our checklists and final approach call outs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Lear 60 flight crew reportd descending below the published segment altitude with the field in sight during the LOC36 approach to SKRG. The crew was repeatedly advised to climb back to 10;000 FT by ATC but the crew rejected this clearance as unnecessary due to visual conditions.

Narrative: We were cleared via the RNG4 arrival; simply over fly the VOR; turn southeast; at 7 DME fix make right turn to intercept the ILS; very simple maintain 10;000 until the VOR; then ILS to Runway 36. Upon passing the VOR outbound; there was heavy rain just off our nose so we deviated slightly west from published to avoid the heavy rain. We were auto pilot on; FMS LRN [rang NAV] went to heading to deviate around the weather. As we began making our right turn to intercept the ILS (glideslope out of service) we encountered more heavy rain. The aircraft intercepted the localizer at about three miles from the VOR (final approach fix) we broke out of a ragged broken cloud deck and had runway in sight; and ground in sight beneath us which is a mountain with a higher peak to the east side of the localizer. We left altitude and; as I was about to call field in sight; the Controller asked our altitude. I replied 9;300 field in sight. We had the runway; and we had the ground beneath us. Controller immediately told us to pull up [and] maintain 10;000; and I again told him we were visual. This continued through out the approach. We continued to tell him we had the field. After landing we went to Ground frequency and again we were told we were to have maintained 10;000 until passing the VOR. I again responded that we had the field. We go into SKRG several times a year. It is not unknown to us; nor are the approaches SID's or STAR's. I am capable of reading an approach plate and the aircraft is totally capable of flying a coupled approach. I understand the situation; but if I have the field in sight and the terrain beneath me; as I reported continually through out the approach and landing; why would I climb back up to 10;000? If the Tower was getting a low altitude warning from their equipment I understand; but after reporting we were visual for countless times; the conversation became a major annoyance during our checklists and final approach call outs.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.