Narrative:

After departing la guardia; we were level at 12;000 feet and accelerating in anticipation of a clearance for a continued climb to 17;000. We were heading southwest and were east of the white intersection. I was flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. The autopilot was off. A traffic advisory from departure control advised there was VFR traffic at 10 miles and 12 o'clock at 11;500 feet. The aircraft was not on TCAS. I engaged the autopilot so that we were both able to focus as much attention as possible in visually acquiring the VFR aircraft. The aircraft appeared on TCAS around 8 miles and showed 500 feet below but climbing. The aircraft continued to climb. After a very brief discussion the captain tried queried ATC who confirmed the situation but did not appear to understand the severity of what was happening. They initially did not issue a new altitude or heading clearance. We still did not have a visual on the VFR aircraft and never would. The captain requested a new clearance and at the same time we were given a new heading clearance of 180 or maybe 160 degree. TCAS issued an RA with a climb command. At this point I would say the VFR aircraft was approximately 3 miles at our 12 o'clock; approximately 300 feet below and still climbing. I had anticipated the RA and immediately advanced the thrust and initiated the commanded climb. We leveled at 15;000 feet and the captain advised ATC of the RA and our current altitude and requested a new clearance. After a long delay; and if memory serves ATC made radio calls to at least one other aircraft; he finally got back to us and cleared us to 17;000 feet and direct to white. In hindsight; a critique of my performance would include two issues. First; I probably was a little aggressive on the controls when initiating and achieving the desired climb. Secondly; after leveling at 15;000 feet and not immediately getting a new clearance from ATC; I should have started a descent back to our clearance altitude of 12;000 feet.there are three things that I would suggest. First; ATC should have instinctively understood the severity of situation and immediately issued a new heading and/or altitude clearance. When two aircraft are on a head on collision course; it should immediately raise some red flags. Secondly; I personally feel that; considering the saturation of the nyc airspace with commercial traffic; there are too many VFR aircraft in the area. I'm not sure of a proper solution; but it is not safe. Lastly; I would suggest continued training for TCAS ras. Not only how to follow the TCAS commands; but what to do after clearing the conflict.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-90 Flight Crew complied with a TCAS RA due to VFR traffic at their 12 O'clock position 500 feet below them and climbing.

Narrative: After departing La Guardia; we were level at 12;000 feet and accelerating in anticipation of a clearance for a continued climb to 17;000. We were heading southwest and were East of the WHITE intersection. I was flying and the Captain was the pilot monitoring. The autopilot was off. A traffic advisory from departure control advised there was VFR traffic at 10 miles and 12 o'clock at 11;500 feet. The aircraft was not on TCAS. I engaged the autopilot so that we were both able to focus as much attention as possible in visually acquiring the VFR aircraft. The aircraft appeared on TCAS around 8 miles and showed 500 feet below but climbing. The aircraft continued to climb. After a very brief discussion the Captain tried queried ATC who confirmed the situation but did not appear to understand the severity of what was happening. They initially did not issue a new altitude or heading clearance. We still did not have a visual on the VFR aircraft and never would. The Captain requested a new clearance and at the same time we were given a new heading clearance of 180 or maybe 160 degree. TCAS issued an RA with a climb command. At this point I would say the VFR aircraft was approximately 3 miles at our 12 o'clock; approximately 300 feet below and still climbing. I had anticipated the RA and immediately advanced the thrust and initiated the commanded climb. We leveled at 15;000 feet and the Captain advised ATC of the RA and our current altitude and requested a new clearance. After a long delay; and if memory serves ATC made radio calls to at least one other aircraft; he finally got back to us and cleared us to 17;000 feet and direct to WHITE. In hindsight; a critique of my performance would include two issues. First; I probably was a little aggressive on the controls when initiating and achieving the desired climb. Secondly; after leveling at 15;000 feet and not immediately getting a new clearance from ATC; I should have started a descent back to our clearance altitude of 12;000 feet.There are three things that I would suggest. First; ATC should have instinctively understood the severity of situation and immediately issued a new heading and/or altitude clearance. When two aircraft are on a head on collision course; it should immediately raise some red flags. Secondly; I personally feel that; considering the saturation of the NYC airspace with commercial traffic; there are too many VFR aircraft in the area. I'm not sure of a proper solution; but it is not safe. Lastly; I would suggest continued training for TCAS RAs. Not only how to follow the TCAS commands; but what to do after clearing the conflict.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.