Narrative:

We were en-route to jfk; and were re-cleared bkw to mol via J42; J24 to hcm; the 098 radial to sawed intersection; then J121 to sie to join the arrival to jfk. The pilot not flying reprogrammed the FMS; and I as the pilot flying verified the information and we executed the change. Just past sawed intersection we were issued holding instructions to hold 50 NM south of sie (sea isle) on the 180 degree radial with right turns. We were cruising at 35;000 ft. The pilot not flying began to input the hold into the FMS. The FMS was not accepting the fix required for us to hold. ATC queried us as to whether we were proceeding to the hold. Utilizing the two 'fix' pages on the FMS I was able to show the 180 degree radial off of sie; and create a 50 mile ring showing me where the point was supposed to be. Using heading mode I initiated a turn toward that point in space. I also went to green needles on my side; tuned the sie VOR frequency in my rtu and dialed in the 180 degree radial. Intending to perform a direct entry and fly the hold in green needles if we were unable to make the appropriate entry into the FMS. With the airplane under control and headed toward the fix I pulled out my pilot operating manual (pom) to determine why we could not get the fix loaded into the FMS. It turns out we were entering the fix incorrectly. We had been trying several variations of sie/180/50. To appropriately enter this fix it needed to be inputted at SIE180/50. I quickly entered the fix; had the pilot not flying verify it; and then I executed it in the FMS. At this point we were crossing over the 180 degree radial at 50 NM. I initiated a turn back to 360 degrees utilizing the heading bug; and the pilot not flying called that we were entering the hold. The pilot not flying attempted to build the hold using the newly created fix. The FMS however would not accept the point. We did not realize that because we were so close to the fix that the point had sequenced behind us (cyan) and therefore the FMS would not accept that point as a holding fix. We re-sequenced the fix so that the FMS was navigating to the fix (magenta); and rebuilt the hold. It appeared to be built correctly holding south on the 180 degree radial at 50 NM with right hand turns. What we failed to notice was that because we were still south of the fix when the hold was built that the FMS was planning a teardrop entry. I reengaged the navigation function of the auto pilot and the FMS began flying the hold. I did not realize until the aircraft initiated a left hand turn that the FMS was reentering the hold (I had my mfd zoomed out too far). At the same time ATC inquired as to whether or not we were doing left hand turns because we had been cleared to do right hand turns. The pilot not flying was briefing the passengers so I answered ATC. I informed him that we had mistakenly called the hold entry at the wrong time and we were executing a teardrop entry into the hold. He responded with what we had been cleared with for the hold and that we had not caused a conflict but that we easily could have. He also told another aircraft to stop their decent; and gave us a heading for further delay vectors to rejoin the arrival. At this point I also started to wonder if either our point issued by ATC; or our own flying had put us any further than 50 NM from land at any point in time. We rejoined the arrival to jfk and completed the flight without further incident.I believe this event occurred for several reasons. We were issued a hold that was nowhere on our current routing which required us to enter a waypoint into the FMS in a manner that is not normal or standard. Additionally because both of us were unsure as to how to enter the new waypoint we tried to 'remember' how to do it and we were doing it incorrectly. I believe that I failed to take appropriate action in either asking for a different set of holding instructions; or more quickly taking action to reference the pom and enter the fix. Once we didhave the fix entered I did not account for the fact that the FMS builds the hold predicated on the aircraft position when the hold it built. This led us to entering the hold incorrectly and created a potential separation issue for ATC. While I believe good CRM led us to a safe outcome of the flight; great CRM would have had us knowing how to enter the fix correctly the first time; or immediately referencing the pom; or asking for different holding instructions. Also; I should have queried ATC to determine that we were in fact going to be no further than 50 miles from land.I need to always continue reviewing items in the pom to make sure that I am capable of all of the functions of the FMS to be an effective crew member. Perhaps additional training on non-standard things such as this can be incorporated into simulator sessions and or spot training. (I had just completed spot training and a company line check in the last two weeks.) as a crew we need to rely on each other and not hesitate to rapidly pull out a manual to verify information when necessary; we also need to not hesitate to ask ATC for alternative instructions if we are unable to conform with a clearance in an expeditious manner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ flight crew was given holding at a fix not on their flight plan; and they were incorrectly entering it into the FMS. After consulting the manual and figuring out the input issue; ATC offered a new heading and delay vector to join the arrival.

Narrative: We were en-route to JFK; and were re-cleared BKW to MOL via J42; J24 to HCM; the 098 radial to SAWED Intersection; then J121 to SIE to join the arrival to JFK. The pilot not flying reprogrammed the FMS; and I as the pilot flying verified the information and we executed the change. Just past SAWED Intersection we were issued holding instructions to hold 50 NM south of SIE (Sea Isle) on the 180 degree radial with right turns. We were cruising at 35;000 FT. The pilot not flying began to input the hold into the FMS. The FMS was not accepting the fix required for us to hold. ATC queried us as to whether we were proceeding to the hold. Utilizing the two 'fix' pages on the FMS I was able to show the 180 degree radial off of SIE; and create a 50 mile ring showing me where the point was supposed to be. Using heading mode I initiated a turn toward that point in space. I also went to green needles on my side; tuned the SIE VOR frequency in my RTU and dialed in the 180 degree radial. Intending to perform a direct entry and fly the hold in green needles if we were unable to make the appropriate entry into the FMS. With the airplane under control and headed toward the fix I pulled out my Pilot Operating Manual (POM) to determine why we could not get the fix loaded into the FMS. It turns out we were entering the fix incorrectly. We had been trying several variations of SIE/180/50. To appropriately enter this fix it needed to be inputted at SIE180/50. I quickly entered the fix; had the pilot not flying verify it; and then I executed it in the FMS. At this point we were crossing over the 180 degree radial at 50 NM. I initiated a turn back to 360 degrees utilizing the heading bug; and the pilot not flying called that we were entering the hold. The pilot not flying attempted to build the hold using the newly created fix. The FMS however would not accept the point. We did not realize that because we were so close to the fix that the point had sequenced BEHIND us (cyan) and therefore the FMS would not accept that point as a holding fix. We re-sequenced the fix so that the FMS was navigating TO the fix (magenta); and rebuilt the hold. It appeared to be built correctly holding south on the 180 degree radial at 50 NM with right hand turns. What we failed to notice was that because we were still south of the fix when the hold was built that the FMS was planning a teardrop entry. I reengaged the NAV function of the auto pilot and the FMS began flying the hold. I did not realize until the aircraft initiated a left hand turn that the FMS was reentering the hold (I had my MFD zoomed out too far). At the same time ATC inquired as to whether or not we were doing left hand turns because we had been cleared to do right hand turns. The pilot not flying was briefing the passengers so I answered ATC. I informed him that we had mistakenly called the hold entry at the wrong time and we were executing a teardrop entry into the hold. He responded with what we had been cleared with for the hold and that we had not caused a conflict but that we easily could have. He also told another aircraft to stop their decent; and gave us a heading for further delay vectors to rejoin the arrival. At this point I also started to wonder if either our point issued by ATC; or our own flying had put us any further than 50 NM from land at any point in time. We rejoined the arrival to JFK and completed the flight without further incident.I believe this event occurred for several reasons. We were issued a hold that was nowhere on our current routing which required us to enter a waypoint into the FMS in a manner that is not normal or standard. Additionally because both of us were unsure as to how to enter the new waypoint we tried to 'remember' how to do it and we were doing it incorrectly. I believe that I failed to take appropriate action in either asking for a different set of holding instructions; or more quickly taking action to reference the POM and enter the fix. Once we didhave the fix entered I did not account for the fact that the FMS builds the hold predicated on the aircraft position when the hold it built. This led us to entering the hold incorrectly and created a potential separation issue for ATC. While I believe good CRM led us to a safe outcome of the flight; GREAT CRM would have had us knowing how to enter the fix correctly the first time; or immediately referencing the POM; or asking for different holding instructions. Also; I should have queried ATC to determine that we were in fact going to be no further than 50 miles from land.I need to always continue reviewing items in the POM to make sure that I am capable of all of the functions of the FMS to be an effective crew member. Perhaps additional training on non-standard things such as this can be incorporated into simulator sessions and or spot training. (I had just completed spot training and a company Line Check in the last two weeks.) As a crew we need to rely on each other and not hesitate to rapidly pull out a manual to verify information when necessary; we also need to not hesitate to ask ATC for alternative instructions if we are unable to conform with a clearance in an expeditious manner.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.