Narrative:

The lch specialty was severely impacted with weather; controllers were on position over 3 hours at a time without a break; aircraft were deviating in to sectors up to 100 miles off course with no reroutes in the machine and flow control never would issue a reroute or prevent a sector from going red by issuing in trail; the uret cannot probe an aircraft not on a route; the frequencies were totally congested and full of static preventing accurate hear back/read back; and aircraft that were not over water qualified; were over 130 miles out into the gulf of mexico. Aircraft were not being handed off; accepted by the next controller; and the d-side was saying keep them coming and when you looked they were still flashing and at the next sectors boundary. Safety is supposed to be paramount; this was a total ATC system meltdown. Recommendation; we have something called flow control who is supposed to prevent sectors from going red and provide reroutes and in trail restrictions; so why don't we get them to do their job?! Supervisors are supposed to make sure that both flow control and the sectors are doing their job and that safety is not compromised. As a controller; there is a time to put an end to aircraft continuing into an unsafe environment and insist on reroutes and in trail restrictions even if it causes additional delays.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZHU Controller expressed concern regarding the lack of TMU intervention during a severely weather impacted period; noting with deviations and vectors off the route; URET conflict probes were of no use.

Narrative: The LCH Specialty was severely impacted with weather; controllers were on position over 3 hours at a time without a break; aircraft were deviating in to sectors up to 100 miles off course with no reroutes in the machine and Flow Control never would issue a reroute or prevent a sector from going RED by issuing in trail; the URET cannot probe an aircraft not on a route; the frequencies were totally congested and full of static preventing accurate hear back/read back; and aircraft that were not over water qualified; were over 130 miles out into the Gulf of Mexico. Aircraft were not being handed off; accepted by the next controller; and the D-Side was saying keep them coming and when you looked they were still flashing and at the next sectors boundary. Safety is supposed to be paramount; this was a total ATC system meltdown. Recommendation; we have something called Flow Control who is supposed to prevent sectors from going RED and provide reroutes and in trail restrictions; so why don't we get them to do their job?! Supervisors are supposed to make sure that both Flow Control and the sectors are doing their job and that safety is not compromised. As a controller; there is a time to put an end to aircraft continuing into an unsafe environment and insist on reroutes and in trail restrictions even if it causes additional delays.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.