Narrative:

I had just got relieved for a break; and was walking by sector 3. I overheard the d-side making what seemed to be a fairly hurried manual hand off to whidbey approach control. I observed that the aircraft was a F18 on a hi-TACAN approach into nuw. I didn't think too much of it until I was notified a little later that the supervisor at whidbey approach called our supervisor and told him we violated their airspace without a hand off. The weather that day was overcast; raining; with many reports of icing. When we get these conditions; because of the seriousness of the icing to the F18's; they want to stay up high as long as possible; then execute a high rate of descent into whidbey island naval base. Because of the high rate of descent into nuw approach controls airspace; we must perform an approval request for the hi-TACAN approach. The approval request was accomplished. The audio and eram playback all appeared normal. The data block for aircraft X was flashed to nuw in sufficient time for them to take an automated hand off. The d- side was taking care of manual coordination; when they all realized the automated hand off had not been accepted. The d-side then immediately called nuw on the land line and executed a manual hand off. Hearing the recording; it sounded strange as the nuw controller was asking way too many questions about an aircraft that on our scope was flashing normal at them; ie. Position; beacon code. By the time the actual manual hand off was accomplished the aircraft was in nuw's airspace. Due to the icing conditions the F18 descended at 15;000+/minute rate of descent. The aircraft's mode-C indicated FL300; the next mode-C we got showed FL204; and then FL088; in nuw's airspace. My position is; the reason for the approval request is because of the high rate of descent into their airspace; the approach control must protect for this aircraft in case something were to go wrong with a hand off. We all agreed with that assessment. We then started to investigate why the approach controller did not take the automated hand off as it appeared on radar data that he was not even remotely busy. After further investigation; it was found that the eram software that we are testing did an uncommanded remove strips of aircraft X. In a recorded conversation between a ZSE supervisor and the nuw supervisor; the nuw supervisor said that his controller saw the data block flash one time then disappear and they got a remove strips. With all of this information; management and I agreed that the controllers on position was not to blame. If eram had performed correctly; the hand off would have been accomplished because the nuw controller was looking for the aircraft. Nuw did not agree that we had permission to enter their airspace. That is not what we believe; and that is being sorted out now with our airspace office. I was told that this operational deviation would be filed under a systems deviation because of the fact that eram removed the flight plan from the system; even though everything appeared normal from our end. I believe that if eram would have performed correctly; I would not be filling out this report right now. The causal factor in this deviation was eram. The controllers working the position were told they were all good and not to worry about the situation. The next day; I was advised that this would be filed as a systems deviation; with eram as the causal factor. Our area operations manager put out a bulletin in our eram hot sheet booklet that described the event; and warned the workforce to be diligent about the hand offs to nuw. The uncommanded remove strips happened again about ten minutes after this incident; and has happened since then. 8 flying the hi-tacan approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZSE Controllers described an airspace incursion event involving a HI-TACAN Approach to NUW that was indicating it was in hand off status to NUW when in fact ERAM had removed the data block from the NUW RADAR displays.

Narrative: I had just got relieved for a break; and was walking by Sector 3. I overheard the D-Side making what seemed to be a fairly hurried manual hand off to Whidbey Approach Control. I observed that the aircraft was a F18 on a HI-TACAN Approach into NUW. I didn't think too much of it until I was notified a little later that the supervisor at Whidbey Approach called our supervisor and told him we violated their airspace without a hand off. The weather that day was overcast; raining; with many reports of icing. When we get these conditions; because of the seriousness of the icing to the F18's; they want to stay up high as long as possible; then execute a high rate of descent into Whidbey Island Naval base. Because of the high rate of descent into NUW Approach Controls airspace; we must perform an approval request for the HI-TACAN Approach. The approval request was accomplished. The audio and ERAM playback all appeared normal. The Data Block for Aircraft X was flashed to NUW in sufficient time for them to take an automated hand off. The D- Side was taking care of manual coordination; when they all realized the automated hand off had not been accepted. The D-Side then immediately called NUW on the land line and executed a manual hand off. Hearing the recording; it sounded strange as the NUW controller was asking way too many questions about an aircraft that on our scope was flashing normal at them; ie. position; beacon code. By the time the actual manual hand off was accomplished the aircraft was in NUW's airspace. Due to the icing conditions the F18 descended at 15;000+/minute rate of descent. The aircraft's Mode-C indicated FL300; the next Mode-C we got showed FL204; and then FL088; in NUW's airspace. My position is; the reason for the approval request is because of the high rate of descent into their airspace; the approach control must protect for this aircraft in case something were to go wrong with a hand off. We all agreed with that assessment. We then started to investigate why the approach controller did not take the automated hand off as it appeared on RADAR data that he was not even remotely busy. After further investigation; it was found that the ERAM software that we are testing did an uncommanded remove strips of Aircraft X. In a recorded conversation between a ZSE supervisor and the NUW supervisor; the NUW supervisor said that his controller saw the Data Block flash one time then disappear and they got a remove strips. With all of this information; management and I agreed that the controllers on position was not to blame. If ERAM had performed correctly; the hand off would have been accomplished because the NUW controller was looking for the aircraft. NUW did not agree that we had permission to enter their airspace. That is not what we believe; and that is being sorted out now with our airspace office. I was told that this operational deviation would be filed under a systems deviation because of the fact that ERAM removed the flight plan from the system; even though everything appeared normal from our end. I believe that if ERAM would have performed correctly; I would not be filling out this report right now. The causal factor in this deviation was ERAM. The controllers working the position were told they were all good and not to worry about the situation. The next day; I was advised that this would be filed as a systems deviation; with ERAM as the causal factor. Our area operations manager put out a bulletin in our ERAM hot sheet booklet that described the event; and warned the workforce to be diligent about the hand offs to NUW. The uncommanded remove strips happened again about ten minutes after this incident; and has happened since then. 8 flying the Hi-Tacan approach.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.