Narrative:

On the visual approach I called for 'gear down.' upon completion of the gear extension sequence both I and the first officer noted that the nose gear down (green light) was not illuminated. There was no unsafe indication or gear door amber light and the panel lights were selected to bright. The first officer opened the alternate gear extension panel on the floor of the cockpit and verified the floor 'three green' lights were illuminated--they were. The first officer also performed an anti-skid test to further confirm gear extension. At this time the first officer and I briefly discussed our situation and we elected to cancel our landing clearance in order to run the proper QRH checklists. Tower told us to continue the approach and that they would get back to us with further instructions in a moment. We flew the localizer at 1;000 ft MSL until tower issued us missed approach instructions at approximately the runway numbers. I executed the missed approach and called flaps 0. We climbed to 2;000 ft and turned left to 190 degrees per tower instructions while maintaining 200 KTS. The tower stated the nose gear 'appeared to be partially extended.' we were then handed off to approach who then climbed us to 5;000 ft and vectored us to the west of the airport. Once level at 5;000 ft I called for autopilot in order to focus more attention on our situation. We performed the climb checklist and left the props at 900 for cruise. I called for QRH 'landing gear indicator malfunction' checklist which had us basically verify gear extension in the same manner that we had previously done. After the checklist we informed ATC that we would like to land. ATC issued vectors for sequence. We then ran a full descent checklist. Approach advised us that they would be rolling the trucks and that they needed souls on board and fuel. We then acknowledged and gave them that information. I then exchanged controls with the first officer and briefed the flight attendants and passengers as to our situation. Once that was complete I switched back to the number one radio just as we received a TA on a VFR cessna passing 500 ft below us. This aircraft was instructed by approach to inspect our gear as he passed underneath. The first officer stated that approach had informed him of this while I was off. The cessna pilot stated again that the nose gear seemed to be partially extended. We were approximately 7 miles out established on the localizer at the time of this report. At this point I elected to perform an alternate landing gear extension per QRH in order to make doubly sure that we had done everything possible to ensure landing gear extension. The first officer agreed and we slowed to 185 KTS and completed the checklist. This required further delay vectors which were once again done to the west. The first officer and I discussed our landing plan at this point since we knew that we would have no operable nosewheel steering and would need ground lock pins installed as soon as possible after landing. He sent an ACARS message to dispatch at this point requesting maintenance; a tug and ground locks to meet us once clear of the runway. He also coordinated with operations. We then asked to return for landing once again. I had the first officer get flaps 35 nnp speeds in order to conduct a slower approach and reduce landing forces on the gear. We were then re-sequenced and conducted a normal flaps 35 landing. We exited the runway and cleared the hold short line on a high speed taxiway where we were met by the port authority; fire trucks; maintenance and a super tug. We started the APU; brought the generator online and shutdown both engines. Maintenance installed ground locks and we were towed to the gate where passengers deplaned. It may be important to note also that an FAA maintenance inspector was riding in the jumpseat on this flight. Both bulbs were burned out in the nose gear down green light indicator.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Q400 flight crew had no nose gear indication after gear extension during approach. Alternate indications show the nose gear is extended but visual inspection by the Tower and a passing aircraft indicate it may not be. An uneventful landing ensues with a tow to the gate; where maintenance discovers two burned out nose gear indicator light bulbs.

Narrative: On the visual approach I called for 'gear down.' Upon completion of the gear extension sequence both I and the First Officer noted that the nose gear down (green light) was not illuminated. There was no unsafe indication or gear door amber light and the panel lights were selected to bright. The First Officer opened the alternate gear extension panel on the floor of the cockpit and verified the floor 'three green' lights were illuminated--they were. The First Officer also performed an anti-skid test to further confirm gear extension. At this time the First Officer and I briefly discussed our situation and we elected to cancel our landing clearance in order to run the proper QRH checklists. Tower told us to continue the approach and that they would get back to us with further instructions in a moment. We flew the localizer at 1;000 FT MSL until Tower issued us missed approach instructions at approximately the runway numbers. I executed the missed approach and called flaps 0. We climbed to 2;000 FT and turned left to 190 degrees per Tower instructions while maintaining 200 KTS. The Tower stated the nose gear 'appeared to be partially extended.' We were then handed off to Approach who then climbed us to 5;000 FT and vectored us to the west of the airport. Once level at 5;000 FT I called for autopilot in order to focus more attention on our situation. We performed the climb checklist and left the props at 900 for cruise. I called for QRH 'Landing Gear Indicator Malfunction' checklist which had us basically verify gear extension in the same manner that we had previously done. After the checklist we informed ATC that we would like to land. ATC issued vectors for sequence. We then ran a full descent checklist. Approach advised us that they would be rolling the trucks and that they needed souls on board and fuel. We then acknowledged and gave them that information. I then exchanged controls with the First Officer and briefed the flight attendants and passengers as to our situation. Once that was complete I switched back to the number one radio just as we received a TA on a VFR Cessna passing 500 FT below us. This aircraft was instructed by Approach to inspect our gear as he passed underneath. The First Officer stated that Approach had informed him of this while I was off. The Cessna pilot stated again that the nose gear seemed to be partially extended. We were approximately 7 miles out established on the localizer at the time of this report. At this point I elected to perform an alternate landing gear extension per QRH in order to make doubly sure that we had done everything possible to ensure landing gear extension. The First Officer agreed and we slowed to 185 KTS and completed the checklist. This required further delay vectors which were once again done to the west. The First Officer and I discussed our landing plan at this point since we knew that we would have no operable nosewheel steering and would need ground lock pins installed ASAP after landing. He sent an ACARS message to Dispatch at this point requesting Maintenance; a tug and ground locks to meet us once clear of the runway. He also coordinated with Operations. We then asked to return for landing once again. I had the First Officer get flaps 35 NNP speeds in order to conduct a slower approach and reduce landing forces on the gear. We were then re-sequenced and conducted a normal flaps 35 landing. We exited the runway and cleared the hold short line on a high speed taxiway where we were met by the port authority; fire trucks; Maintenance and a super tug. We started the APU; brought the generator online and shutdown both engines. Maintenance installed ground locks and we were towed to the gate where passengers deplaned. It may be important to note also that an FAA Maintenance Inspector was riding in the jumpseat on this flight. Both bulbs were burned out in the nose gear down green light indicator.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.