Narrative:

I asked the first officer to start the #2 engine and I believe we had received the updated takeoff information at that point. Taxiing was at a normal; not rushed pace. The first officer loaded all of the data and I asked him to use flaps 2; not 3 data; as the flex temperature was only 1 degree different (38 vs. 37) for 2 and flaps 2 was a more normal configuration. I asked for a taxi checklist. Holding short of runway 9 we were cleared into position awaiting an arrival on runway 4. Once he cleared the intersection we were cleared for takeoff. We had in excess of 3 minutes on the engine warm up and I applied power and called for takeoff/go-around [power setting] (toga). The first officer responded; 'toga set;' and we proceeded to accelerate normally. The first officer called V1 at approximately 126 KTS (V1 131; vr 133; V2 136 for ramp weight 91660). I rotated normally and with a positive rate; we retracted the gear. Since it was an RNAV departure; at 400 ft AGL I called for autopilot and navigation to engage the automation for the departure. At 1;000 ft I called for flight level change 210 to have the aircraft pitch over and start accelerating so I could retract the flaps. Shortly thereafter I called for flaps 1. It was at that point that the departure became non-normal. The first officer responded; 'flaps 1;' but suddenly the EICAS/chime alert showed something like; 'no landing speeds;' the F speed on the speed tape disappeared; [the] green dot on the speed tape disappeared; and the speed tape suddenly displayed a amber caution/limit range just above our current speed. The aircraft was continuing to quickly accelerate toward the caution range on the speed tape; which I couldn't understand why it was even there. I was very concerned about a flap [overspeed] given our continuing acceleration. I believed I exclaimed at this point; 'what's going on;' or something similar to which I got no response from the first officer. I decided to disconnect the autopilot as the airplane was rapidly closing the gap to the flap caution range and was not pitching up to stay within limits. I raised the nose manually and rapidly tried to find out what was the cause. I looked over at the flap lever and noticed it appeared to be not at 1; but in what I thought was 4. I commanded loudly; 'flaps up;' and I pulled up the nose. The speed at this point was somewhere around 180 [KTS] and I was hoping I was safely near the flaps 1 retract speed. The airplane continued to accelerate and at about 195 [KTS] the caution range on the speed tape disappeared indicating the flaps were in fact on the way up. I asked for the autopilot to be reconnected and we continued to fly the departure/flight without further issue. We did not stray off of the RNAV departure path during this event.as I commanded flaps up after the uncertainty of what had transpired the first officer stated that he had made a mistake and selected a greater flap setting. Upon later discussion; he thought that he had not moved the handle correctly supposedly 'hooking' it on something (shirt perhaps?); but he hadn't caught it. It seemed counter intuitive to me for him to move the flaps down rather than up and he did not catch it. This selection made a normal takeoff into a difficult and possibly unsafe situation. I was grateful I have been flying the E190 for nearly 3 years and made the mental connection to determine that perhaps it was a flap selection that had caused the speed tape caution/warning coupled with the chime caution/message. We did not have a flap [overspeed] as it seemed more appropriate to control the speed rather than comply with autopilot use on an RNAV departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB190 Captain reports the First Officer inadvertently selecting flaps to 3 instead of flaps 1 as requested after takeoff; resulting in an EICAS chime and the speed tape limit closing rapidly on the current airspeed. Autopilot is disengaged and the nose quickly raised at the same time the cause of the anomaly is determined and quickly corrected. Flight continues to destination.

Narrative: I asked the First Officer to start the #2 engine and I believe we had received the updated takeoff information at that point. Taxiing was at a normal; not rushed pace. The First Officer loaded all of the data and I asked him to use flaps 2; not 3 data; as the flex temperature was only 1 degree different (38 vs. 37) for 2 and flaps 2 was a more normal configuration. I asked for a taxi checklist. Holding short of Runway 9 we were cleared into position awaiting an arrival on Runway 4. Once he cleared the intersection we were cleared for takeoff. We had in excess of 3 minutes on the engine warm up and I applied power and called for takeoff/go-around [power setting] (TOGA). The First Officer responded; 'TOGA set;' and we proceeded to accelerate normally. The First Officer called V1 at approximately 126 KTS (V1 131; Vr 133; V2 136 for ramp weight 91660). I rotated normally and with a positive rate; we retracted the gear. Since it was an RNAV departure; at 400 FT AGL I called for autopilot and NAV to engage the automation for the departure. At 1;000 FT I called for flight level change 210 to have the aircraft pitch over and start accelerating so I could retract the flaps. Shortly thereafter I called for flaps 1. It was at that point that the departure became non-normal. The First Officer responded; 'Flaps 1;' but suddenly the EICAS/chime alert showed something like; 'No Landing Speeds;' the F speed on the speed tape disappeared; [the] green dot on the speed tape disappeared; and the speed tape suddenly displayed a amber caution/limit range just above our current speed. The aircraft was continuing to quickly accelerate toward the caution range on the speed tape; which I couldn't understand why it was even there. I was very concerned about a flap [overspeed] given our continuing acceleration. I believed I exclaimed at this point; 'What's going on;' or something similar to which I got no response from the First Officer. I decided to disconnect the autopilot as the airplane was rapidly closing the gap to the flap caution range and was not pitching up to stay within limits. I raised the nose manually and rapidly tried to find out what was the cause. I looked over at the flap lever and noticed it appeared to be not at 1; but in what I thought was 4. I commanded loudly; 'Flaps up;' and I pulled up the nose. The speed at this point was somewhere around 180 [KTS] and I was hoping I was safely near the flaps 1 retract speed. The airplane continued to accelerate and at about 195 [KTS] the caution range on the speed tape disappeared indicating the flaps were in fact on the way up. I asked for the autopilot to be reconnected and we continued to fly the departure/flight without further issue. We did not stray off of the RNAV departure path during this event.As I commanded flaps up after the uncertainty of what had transpired the First Officer stated that he had made a mistake and selected a greater flap setting. Upon later discussion; he thought that he had not moved the handle correctly supposedly 'hooking' it on something (shirt perhaps?); but he hadn't caught it. It seemed counter intuitive to me for him to move the flaps down rather than up and he did not catch it. This selection made a normal takeoff into a difficult and possibly unsafe situation. I was grateful I have been flying the E190 for nearly 3 years and made the mental connection to determine that perhaps it was a flap selection that had caused the speed tape caution/warning coupled with the chime caution/message. We did not have a flap [overspeed] as it seemed more appropriate to control the speed rather than comply with autopilot use on an RNAV departure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.