Narrative:

During the number one engine start; it was reported from the tug driver that excessive smoke was coming out from the bottom of the engine with fluid as well. We performed the immediate action items to abort the start and followed the QRH. After shutting down the number two engine which was started normally; we were towed back to the gate. Dispatch and duty control were contacted. Duty control recommended contract maintenance be contacted and arrived to find that an oil line came loose and that the aircraft was out of service. A logbook entry was completed and given to contract maintenance. Return to gate times were given to the agent and the logbook entry times were completed. ACARS was verified. Operations did a very good job coordinating an aircraft swap as did the tug driver who advised the crew of the abnormal start. The aircraft swap was coordinated at the same gate while we off loaded a full aircraft within 15 minutes. A subsequent tug driver requested that I ride the brakes to reposition the aircraft to a different gate which is to the south. Company was already holding out on taxiway alpha ready to come in for the swap and allowed enough room for the reposition. I asked the tug driver numerous times if he had contacted ground control for the pushback out of the side window. My first officer also heard me ask this of the tug driver as he was standing in the jetway. I thought I had heard him say yes so the brakes were released and the aircraft was repositioned to our gate as I rode the brakes. Once off the aircraft; I was met by an operations supervisor to call the tower as they did not hear any communication for the reposition of the aircraft. I called immediately and explained our miscommunication and apologized for the confusion. They accepted the debrief from me as the gate was next door with company holding out. I also talked to the tug driver who stated he did not contact ground control. Due to the coordination process; a previous immediate action shutdown of the number one engine; a hurry-up state existed when led to the miscommunication with ground control for the reposition of the aircraft. We were trying to save some time for the swap with the first officer meeting the arriving aircraft. A sense of urgency existed as company was holding out for the gate and we were returning after two more legs with curfew restrictions in effect. I realize now that headset communication by me would have prevented this from happening or having the first officer in the cockpit as well. Have adequate ground personnel to ride the brakes as needed. Slow down the operation to allow adequate communications.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A replacement B737 was repositioned to a SNA gate without ATC clearance because the Captain thought the Tug Driver had received tow clearance after the first aircraft had a mechanical.

Narrative: During the number one engine start; it was reported from the Tug Driver that excessive smoke was coming out from the bottom of the engine with fluid as well. We performed the immediate action items to abort the start and followed the QRH. After shutting down the number two engine which was started normally; we were towed back to the gate. Dispatch and Duty Control were contacted. Duty Control recommended Contract Maintenance be contacted and arrived to find that an oil line came loose and that the aircraft was out of service. A logbook entry was completed and given to Contract Maintenance. Return to gate times were given to the Agent and the logbook entry times were completed. ACARS was verified. Operations did a very good job coordinating an aircraft swap as did the Tug Driver who advised the Crew of the abnormal start. The aircraft swap was coordinated at the same gate while we off loaded a full aircraft within 15 minutes. A subsequent Tug Driver requested that I ride the brakes to reposition the aircraft to a different gate which is to the south. Company was already holding out on Taxiway Alpha ready to come in for the swap and allowed enough room for the reposition. I asked the Tug Driver numerous times if he had contacted Ground Control for the pushback out of the side window. My First Officer also heard me ask this of the Tug Driver as he was standing in the jetway. I thought I had heard him say yes so the brakes were released and the aircraft was repositioned to our gate as I rode the brakes. Once off the aircraft; I was met by an Operations Supervisor to call the Tower as they did not hear any communication for the reposition of the aircraft. I called immediately and explained our miscommunication and apologized for the confusion. They accepted the debrief from me as the gate was next door with Company holding out. I also talked to the Tug Driver who stated he did not contact Ground Control. Due to the coordination process; a previous immediate action shutdown of the number one engine; a hurry-up state existed when led to the miscommunication with Ground Control for the reposition of the aircraft. We were trying to save some time for the swap with the First Officer meeting the arriving aircraft. A sense of urgency existed as Company was holding out for the gate and we were returning after two more legs with curfew restrictions in effect. I realize now that headset communication by me would have prevented this from happening or having the First Officer in the cockpit as well. Have adequate Ground personnel to ride the brakes as needed. Slow down the operation to allow adequate communications.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.