Narrative:

At XA45; a fighter jet; landed runway 25 and deployed the drag parachute. After taxiing off the runway a ground vehicle (maintenance for one of the FBO's) alerted the local controller that the parachute was not found. At that same time; a DH8/a was on take off roll on runway 25. When the DH8 rotated; he reported unknown FOD on the runway. As the controller in charge; I told the ground and local controllers to suspend operations on runway 25 until we could get a runway sweep from the airport authority; as per our local directive. A front line manager who was working ground control said it was unnecessary and sent the FBO ground vehicle down the runway to retrieve the parachute. As controller in charge; I called the airport to go out for a runway sweep. In that time; several air carriers; general aviation; and military aircraft continued to use runway 25 for departures and arrivals before and after the parachute was retrieved without warnings of possible FOD on the runway and prior to the runway sweep. The airport authority did not complete a runway sweep until XB26. Recommend remedial training of local procedures for suspending and reinstating operations on a runway due to unsafe conditions for all the controllers in the facility; to include the management team; remedial training of safety standards as pertaining to FOD on the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower Controller CIC reported that when a fighter aircraft lost it's parachute on the runway; a Front Line manager working Ground Control; after the chute was recovered by an FBO; overrode the decision to suspend operations on the Runway pending a runway sweep for FOD by the Airport Authority.

Narrative: At XA45; a fighter jet; landed Runway 25 and deployed the drag parachute. After taxiing off the runway a ground vehicle (maintenance for one of the FBO's) alerted the Local Controller that the parachute was not found. At that same time; a DH8/A was on take off roll on Runway 25. When the DH8 rotated; he reported unknown FOD on the runway. As the CIC; I told the Ground and Local Controllers to suspend operations on Runway 25 until we could get a runway sweep from the airport authority; as per our local directive. A Front Line Manager who was working Ground Control said it was unnecessary and sent the FBO ground vehicle down the runway to retrieve the parachute. As CIC; I called the airport to go out for a runway sweep. In that time; several air carriers; general aviation; and military aircraft continued to use Runway 25 for departures and arrivals before and after the parachute was retrieved without warnings of possible FOD on the runway and prior to the runway sweep. The airport authority did not complete a runway sweep until XB26. Recommend remedial training of local procedures for suspending and reinstating operations on a runway due to unsafe conditions for all the controllers in the facility; to include the management team; remedial training of safety standards as pertaining to FOD on the runway.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.