Narrative:

Per note on our flight plan; the tsa directive had been complied with regarding the removal of oxygen generators in all aircraft lavatories. Aircraft refused for flight based on unsafe condition of no oxygen available in the aircraft lavatories for crew in the event of a depressurization during bathroom breaks. No O2 available for passenger use either. Reference: far part 25 airworthiness standards: transport category airplanes; far 25.1447 (c) (1). This aircraft certification requirement states that: (1). There must be an oxygen dispensing unit connected to oxygen supply terminals immediately available to each occupant; wherever seated; and at least two oxygen dispensing units connected to oxygen terminals in each lavatory. Refusal [was] done in accordance with flight operations manuel; fom; maintenance-fuel-loading; MEL; far 121.533; 121.535; coordinated with dispatch; maintenance; maintenance supervisor; and the duty manager. All agreed that dispatching the aircraft without oxygen generators in the lavatories were unsafe; but in compliance with the FAA-tsa directive. Discussed possible options for a safe dispatch with all parties: 1. Flight plan flight at FL190 to minimize time required for emergency decent in the event of a rapid depressurization. Flight planning computer was not capable of coming up with a fuel plan on the current tracks at FL190. 2. Have maintenance add an extra O2 walk around bottle in the cockpit for pilot use to take in the lavatories during bathroom breaks; however; this does not address the passenger O2 requirements. 3. Use an existing O2 walk around bottle on the aircraft during bathroom breaks. This is what we did. The B757 has an MEL requirement for a minimum of 7 O2 walk around bottles. We carry 8 bottles in the cabin. Therefore; as long as the other bottles are present and properly serviced; we can use one of them for pilot use during bathroom breaks. In my view; all bottles are now required for dispatch because of the lavatory O2 generator deactivation issue. We moved one of the aft cabin bottles up to the cockpit and strapped it down with the crew bags when not in use. No one in flight operations seems to have a workable plan to safely dispatch our aircraft with the lavatory oxygen generators removed. This is an unsafe condition and is an unacceptable risk. Flight crew can use a work-around by taking the walk-around bottle into the lavatory for our use; but passengers are now at grave risk for permanent brain damage during a depressurization with no O2 available in the lavatories. The new flight attendant procedure states: ***FAA directive-removal of lavatory oxygen*** the FAA has directed us carriers to remove the emergency oxygen system from us aircraft lavatories. The systems are being removed as a security precaution. There is no specific threat to any us carrier. Removal of the emergency oxygen does not change current procedures during a cabin decompression. Effective immediately; in the event of a cabin decompression; flight attendants must move promptly to check the lavatories as part of their cabin checks once the captain has advised the crew members it is safe to remove their oxygen masks. This procedure is unworkable; unrealistic; and contradicts itself. Flight attendants will eventually get to checking the lavatories; but not in any kind of meaningful timeliness. The time of useful consciousness during a rapid decompression from above FL350 is about 9 seconds. Anyone caught in the lavatory will not make it out in time to a place where O2 is available; and the flight attendant's will not be able to make the lavatory check until after the rapid decompression event. Conservatively; a rapid decompression from altitude; based on 6-7;000 ft/min decent to 10;000 might take as long as 3 minutes. It will be quite chaotic in the cabin and figuring the flight attend checks might take an additional 3-5 minutes; that is 8 minutes without adequate oxygen. It is an almostcertainty that brain damage will occur. This is safe? Also; the briefing statement contradicts itself. It says that there is no change in procedure; but to promptly check the lavatories. This is not realistic; nor is it safe. The company has not planned a viable work around; and in my opinion; we are risking passenger lives every time we takeoff with no O2 in the lavatories for passengers. One possible solution; the addition of an extra O2 walk-around bottle in the cockpit; has no legal procedure for adding more equipment to the plane. The other solution; taking a cabin bottle; would now require that all remaining bottles be available and properly serviced. This needs to be addressed now; and should have been addressed last week when the tsa directive came out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 Captain laments the TSA directive to remove all oxygen generators from the lavatories of U.S. registered passenger aircraft; which is unsafe and in violation of FAR's.

Narrative: Per note on our flight plan; the TSA directive had been complied with regarding the removal of Oxygen generators in all aircraft lavatories. Aircraft refused for flight based on unsafe condition of no oxygen available in the aircraft lavatories for crew in the event of a depressurization during bathroom breaks. No O2 available for passenger use either. Reference: FAR PART 25 AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES; FAR 25.1447 (c) (1). This aircraft certification requirement states that: (1). There must be an oxygen dispensing unit connected to oxygen supply terminals immediately available to each occupant; wherever seated; and at least two oxygen dispensing units connected to oxygen terminals in each lavatory. Refusal [was] done in accordance with Flight Operations Manuel; FOM; Maintenance-Fuel-Loading; MEL; FAR 121.533; 121.535; coordinated with Dispatch; Maintenance; Maintenance Supervisor; and the Duty Manager. All agreed that dispatching the aircraft without oxygen generators in the lavatories were unsafe; but in compliance with the FAA-TSA directive. Discussed possible options for a safe dispatch with all parties: 1. Flight plan flight at FL190 to minimize time required for emergency decent in the event of a rapid depressurization. Flight planning computer was not capable of coming up with a fuel plan on the current tracks at FL190. 2. Have Maintenance add an extra O2 walk around bottle in the cockpit for pilot use to take in the lavatories during bathroom breaks; however; this does not address the passenger O2 requirements. 3. Use an existing O2 walk around bottle on the aircraft during bathroom breaks. This is what we did. The B757 has an MEL requirement for a minimum of 7 O2 walk around bottles. We carry 8 bottles in the cabin. Therefore; as long as the other bottles are present and properly serviced; we can use one of them for pilot use during bathroom breaks. In my view; all bottles are now required for dispatch because of the lavatory O2 generator deactivation issue. We moved one of the aft cabin bottles up to the cockpit and strapped it down with the crew bags when not in use. No one in flight operations seems to have a workable plan to safely dispatch our aircraft with the lavatory oxygen generators removed. This is an unsafe condition and is an unacceptable risk. Flight crew can use a work-around by taking the walk-around bottle into the lavatory for our use; but passengers are now at grave risk for permanent brain damage during a depressurization with no O2 available in the lavatories. The new flight attendant procedure states: ***FAA directive-Removal of Lavatory Oxygen*** The FAA has directed U.S. carriers to remove the emergency oxygen system from U.S. aircraft lavatories. The systems are being removed as a security precaution. There is no specific threat to any U.S. carrier. Removal of the Emergency Oxygen does not change current procedures during a cabin decompression. Effective immediately; in the event of a cabin decompression; flight attendants must move promptly to check the lavatories as part of their cabin checks once the Captain has advised the crew members it is safe to remove their oxygen masks. This procedure is unworkable; unrealistic; and contradicts itself. Flight attendants will eventually get to checking the lavatories; but not in any kind of meaningful timeliness. The time of useful consciousness during a rapid decompression from above FL350 is about 9 seconds. Anyone caught in the lavatory will not make it out in time to a place where O2 is available; and the flight attendant's will not be able to make the lavatory check until after the rapid decompression event. Conservatively; a rapid decompression from altitude; based on 6-7;000 FT/MIN decent to 10;000 might take as long as 3 minutes. It will be quite chaotic in the cabin and figuring the flight attend checks might take an additional 3-5 minutes; that is 8 minutes without adequate oxygen. It is an almostcertainty that brain damage will occur. This is safe? Also; the briefing statement contradicts itself. It says that there is no change in procedure; but to promptly check the lavatories. This is not realistic; nor is it safe. The Company has not planned a viable work around; and in my opinion; we are risking passenger lives every time we takeoff with no O2 in the lavatories for passengers. One possible solution; the addition of an extra O2 walk-around bottle in the cockpit; has no legal procedure for adding more equipment to the plane. The other solution; taking a cabin bottle; would now require that all remaining bottles be available and properly serviced. This needs to be addressed now; and should have been addressed last week when the TSA directive came out.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.