Narrative:

I was approximately 25nm southeast of natchez VOR (hez) on V570 at 2000 feet destined to hez in rain and continuous moderate turbulence. Weather was deteriorating toward hez with a cold front just west with much better weather to the east. I selected the airway route in order to fly at 2000 below the floor of an icing airmet and temperatures were hovering around 5C. There was no radar coverage in the area so I was reporting progress along the airway. About 25nm from hez I had a confusing exchange with a controller who appeared to be in training. The controller told me to continue on V570 and to 'hold short of the VOR.' I asked him to say again; and he replied that I should 'hold short of the VOR and expect further clearance from the next controller.' I asked what he meant by 'hold short of the VOR.' his supervisor (apparently) replied that I should 'just continue along the airway and I would get further clearance from the next controller.' I asked her to read my entire clearance since this was not a legitimate clearance. She responded that I would get further clearance from the next controller. I said 'in that case if we lose communication I will hold at the VOR but what is my efc?' she responded with a hand off to the next controller and I let it pass knowing we could sort it out if need be. I was bouncing around quite a bit in rain and IMC at this time and had slowed to below maneuvering speed; was listening to ASOS which was reporting near minimums; low visibility and gusty winds; and the confusing exchange added to the tension. I checked in with the next controller now about 20 nm southeast of the VOR and he immediately gave me the approach clearance 'maintain 2000 until established on a published segment; clear approach natchez.' I knew this meant the approach was my choosing but since weather was bad and I expected to miss I responded 'we'll shoot RNAV 31; 2000 until established on a segment; clear approach natchez.' I was near the IAF wegra at this time and proceeded westerly direct to it. Nearing wegra he called and requested my position southeast of the VOR. I replied that I was about 15 southeast of the VOR and 3 nm outside wegra. He responded that I was supposed to be on V570. I replied that he had cleared me for the approach. He replied the MSA in that area was 2300 and to maintain 2300. I climbed instantly and responded that I was at 2300 and asked 'what do you need me to do?' then without a response I said 'I am 2 east of wegra; can I get RNAV 31 from here?' he responded 'clear RNAV 31; change to advisory and report cancellation with me.' I completed the approach normally and landed; called and canceled with nothing further about the mix up. Replaying the event after the flight I believe I was under an altitude restriction and cleared for any approach with segments at or below 2000. I had told him I would do RNAV 31 so he may have expected me to fly to the VOR and proceed outbound to wegra from there; however the published hold is at 2600 ft and hez is not an IAF for the approach. With the clearance I may have only been authorized to fly VOR 18 since only it includes hez as an IAF. When he gave me the approach clearance and I began toward wegra I thought for a moment that the published altitude at wegra is 2600 and I am at 2000; but dismissed it since he had given me the approach clearance and knew I was headed to wegra. I was thinking primarily about weather and a potential missed approach; thinking about options since weather was worse west of the airport along the missed approach course; and I thought I understood my approach clearance. In retrospect I should have asked about the altitude restriction when I saw that wegra should be crossed at 2600 ft. A better option would have been to fly V212 from mcb and shoot RNAV 36 from setta which has 1900 ft segments. The confusion with the prior controller had distracted and annoyed me a bit. I was not hung up on the exchange but thought; here in bad weather that's getting worse and these controllers are consuming my attention with a nonsense clearance. The controllers were probably stressed since they had no radar and were holding a departure off mcb since I had the airspace. After the mix up near wegra I thought I might have blown my clearance and was about to be read the riot act or worse; but that controller handled it perfectly and probably understood I was in a tense situation with the weather and did not want to make it worse. I do not know how much (if any) sensitivity training controllers receive regarding handling pilots in bad weather; but I know some controllers understand it better than others; probably through experience; and the controller at wegra unwound the situation in a few seconds with clear instructions. I am sure the situation would have been total confusion had I still been talking to the prior controller when the mix up occurred. Had it gone on for more that 15 seconds I probably would have declared an emergency and turned east toward the better weather.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SR22 pilot at 2000 FT for icing avoidance; is cleared for an approach at HEZ (non Radar) but does not question the clearance or climb to comply with the initial approach segment minimum altitude.

Narrative: I was approximately 25nm SE of Natchez VOR (HEZ) on V570 at 2000 feet destined to HEZ in rain and continuous moderate turbulence. Weather was deteriorating toward HEZ with a cold front just west with much better weather to the east. I selected the airway route in order to fly at 2000 below the floor of an icing AIRMET and temperatures were hovering around 5C. There was no radar coverage in the area so I was reporting progress along the airway. About 25nm from HEZ I had a confusing exchange with a controller who appeared to be in training. The controller told me to continue on V570 and to 'hold short of the VOR.' I asked him to say again; and he replied that I should 'hold short of the VOR and expect further clearance from the next controller.' I asked what he meant by 'hold short of the VOR.' His supervisor (apparently) replied that I should 'just continue along the airway and I would get further clearance from the next controller.' I asked her to read my entire clearance since this was not a legitimate clearance. She responded that I would get further clearance from the next controller. I said 'in that case if we lose communication I will hold at the VOR but what is my EFC?' She responded with a hand off to the next controller and I let it pass knowing we could sort it out if need be. I was bouncing around quite a bit in rain and IMC at this time and had slowed to below maneuvering speed; was listening to ASOS which was reporting near minimums; low visibility and gusty winds; and the confusing exchange added to the tension. I checked in with the next controller now about 20 nm southeast of the VOR and he immediately gave me the approach clearance 'maintain 2000 until established on a published segment; clear approach Natchez.' I knew this meant the approach was my choosing but since weather was bad and I expected to miss I responded 'We'll shoot RNAV 31; 2000 until established on a segment; clear approach Natchez.' I was near the IAF WEGRA at this time and proceeded westerly direct to it. Nearing WEGRA he called and requested my position SE of the VOR. I replied that I was about 15 SE of the VOR and 3 nm outside WEGRA. He responded that I was supposed to be on V570. I replied that he had cleared me for the approach. He replied the MSA in that area was 2300 and to maintain 2300. I climbed instantly and responded that I was at 2300 and asked 'what do you need me to do?' then without a response I said 'I am 2 east of WEGRA; can I get RNAV 31 from here?' He responded 'Clear RNAV 31; change to advisory and report cancellation with me.' I completed the approach normally and landed; called and canceled with nothing further about the mix up. Replaying the event after the flight I believe I was under an altitude restriction and cleared for any approach with segments at or below 2000. I had told him I would do RNAV 31 so he may have expected me to fly to the VOR and proceed outbound to WEGRA from there; however the published hold is at 2600 FT and HEZ is not an IAF for the approach. With the clearance I may have only been authorized to fly VOR 18 since only it includes HEZ as an IAF. When he gave me the approach clearance and I began toward WEGRA I thought for a moment that the published altitude at WEGRA is 2600 and I am at 2000; but dismissed it since he had given me the approach clearance and knew I was headed to WEGRA. I was thinking primarily about weather and a potential missed approach; thinking about options since weather was worse west of the airport along the missed approach course; and I thought I understood my approach clearance. In retrospect I should have asked about the altitude restriction when I saw that WEGRA should be crossed at 2600 FT. A better option would have been to fly V212 from MCB and shoot RNAV 36 from SETTA which has 1900 FT segments. The confusion with the prior controller had distracted and annoyed me a bit. I was not hung up on the exchange but thought; here in bad weather that's getting worse and these controllers are consuming my attention with a nonsense clearance. The controllers were probably stressed since they had no radar and were holding a departure off MCB since I had the airspace. After the mix up near WEGRA I thought I might have blown my clearance and was about to be read the riot act or worse; but that controller handled it perfectly and probably understood I was in a tense situation with the weather and did not want to make it worse. I do not know how much (if any) sensitivity training controllers receive regarding handling pilots in bad weather; but I know some controllers understand it better than others; probably through experience; and the controller at WEGRA unwound the situation in a few seconds with clear instructions. I am sure the situation would have been total confusion had I still been talking to the prior controller when the mix up occurred. Had it gone on for more that 15 seconds I probably would have declared an emergency and turned east toward the better weather.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.