Narrative:

Captain was the pilot flying; I was in the right seat as the pilot monitoring; and the other first officer was in the jumpseat performing relief pilot duties. We had taxied out one of the parallel taxiways to runway 09R. As we made the right turn on the taxiway; we got an EICAS message 'unscheduled stab trim.' as we were evaluating the message; it went away; leading us to believe the problem had self-corrected. We took the runway and began the takeoff roll. At approximately 75-79 KTS; the same EICAS message appeared again; along with a master caution. I had not given the '80 KTS; throttle hold; thrust normal' callout yet. The captain elected to discontinue the takeoff; and as I transitioned my brain into 'landing mode'; I looked at the airspeed indicator which showed slightly less than 80 KTS; so I announced '80 KTS;' as we do on the landing rollout.the autobrakes did not engage. I then made a call to tower that we had discontinued the takeoff. The captain did not deploy the thrust reversers or the spoilers; and I forgot to make the callout 'speedbrakes not up'. We decelerated and exited the runway and taxied to the deicing spot/taxiway to evaluate. The other first officer made a PA to the passengers explaining the situation. Tower asked me if we needed assistance; and I told them that we did not; and that we were calling local maintenance to evaluate the problem. They also asked the reason for our abort; which I responded that we had a cockpit indication that needed to be looked at. Tower sent the crash fire rescue equipment fire trucks out to our location anyway; which is completely understandable. After we were stopped and the parking brake was set; we started the APU and shut down the engines. They placed chocks under our nose gear and indicated the same. They made interphone contact with us and asked if we needed further assistance; but we told them we were still trying to contact maintenance. He also said there was some smoke coming from the left main landing gear. I referenced the operational data manual; rejected takeoff brake cooling chart; and the brake temp monitoring system was checked between 10 and 15 minutes after we exited the runway. I can't recall the exact numbers for each wheel; but I think the number 2 wheel (l-mlg) was the hottest at a '7'; with four or five other wheels having a white number also. This was in the 'caution zone' for fuse plug melting. The sat-com was on maintenance carry over; but indicated available; so I dialed commercial radio and was promptly disconnected and sat-com became subsequently unavailable.being unable to adequately contact local maintenance through local operations; I placed a call with my personal cell phone to commercial radio to be connected to dispatch and maintenance. After the call was connected; I handed the phone to the captain. It was decided that we would need to return to a gate. We got in touch with local operations regarding a gate; and they sent a mechanic out to us. He got on the interphone and we told him what happened and that we were returning to a gate. We told the crash fire rescue equipment crew that we were going to proceed to a gate; and he said our brakes were ok and that the left medium large transport had cooled and was indicating 300 degrees celsius on his laser thermometer. They removed the chocks from the nosewheel and left. We arrived at the gate 1h 25m after pushback. Back at the gate; we were able to successfully use the sat-com to contact the dispatcher and maintenance. We were also able to use an agent's phone to contact the duty pilot and the chief pilot concerning our duty day. After evaluation by the duty pilot and each of the three of us; we concluded that we could complete the flight segment within 16 hours and were physically/mentally capable of doing so. After approximately one hour on the stand we had been refueled and maintenance had performed the necessary procedures for the unscheduled stab trim message. We taxied out again. On departure at approximately 140 KTS we again receivedan EICAS message 'unscheduled stab trim'; this time with no master caution. The message was displayed for only about 2 to 3 seconds; and given the flight regime; we continued the takeoff uneventfully. Lessons learned: 1. Always deploy the reversers and speed brakes; even on a low speed abort. Doing so may have reduced our brake cooling time. Even a low speed abort on the B767-300ER at heavy weight can potentially cause the fuse plugs to melt. 2. Ask for a fire truck. They may have tools you don't know you need yet; like chocks. We didn't release the parking brake; but probably should have. 3. Have a cell phone with global coverage. I'm glad I have mine. With the sat-com inoperative; it was really difficult to get any information to the company in a timely manner. Sure; we had ACARS; but it's slow and can't make a conference call. My experience is that our company will gladly reimburse a $10-$20 phone call if it's operationally necessary. (And it's cheaper than a sat call). I wonder if it's a good idea to place a global cell phone on the airplane when the sat-com is on a maintenance carry over for 'off-gate' communication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300ER rejected their takeoff due to an EICAS UNSCHEDULED STAB TRIM warning and Master Caution light illuminating just before 80 KTS. Because it happened prior to the speed at which RTO arms a number of subsequent issues developed which resulted in a lengthy delay.

Narrative: Captain was the pilot flying; I was in the right seat as the pilot monitoring; and the other First Officer was in the jumpseat performing relief pilot duties. We had taxied out one of the parallel taxiways to Runway 09R. As we made the right turn on the taxiway; we got an EICAS message 'Unscheduled Stab Trim.' As we were evaluating the message; it went away; leading us to believe the problem had self-corrected. We took the runway and began the takeoff roll. At approximately 75-79 KTS; the same EICAS message appeared again; along with a Master Caution. I had not given the '80 KTS; throttle hold; thrust normal' callout yet. The Captain elected to discontinue the takeoff; and as I transitioned my brain into 'landing mode'; I looked at the airspeed indicator which showed slightly less than 80 KTS; so I announced '80 KTS;' as we do on the landing rollout.The autobrakes did not engage. I then made a call to Tower that we had discontinued the takeoff. The Captain did not deploy the thrust reversers or the spoilers; and I forgot to make the callout 'speedbrakes not up'. We decelerated and exited the runway and taxied to the deicing spot/taxiway to evaluate. The other First Officer made a PA to the passengers explaining the situation. Tower asked me if we needed assistance; and I told them that we did not; and that we were calling Local Maintenance to evaluate the problem. They also asked the reason for our abort; which I responded that we had a cockpit indication that needed to be looked at. Tower sent the CFR fire trucks out to our location anyway; which is completely understandable. After we were stopped and the parking brake was set; we started the APU and shut down the engines. They placed chocks under our nose gear and indicated the same. They made interphone contact with us and asked if we needed further assistance; but we told them we were still trying to contact Maintenance. He also said there was some smoke coming from the left Main Landing Gear. I referenced the Operational Data Manual; rejected takeoff brake cooling chart; and the Brake Temp Monitoring System was checked between 10 and 15 minutes after we exited the runway. I can't recall the exact numbers for each wheel; but I think the Number 2 wheel (L-MLG) was the hottest at a '7'; with four or five other wheels having a white number also. This was in the 'Caution Zone' for fuse plug melting. The sat-com was on Maintenance Carry Over; but indicated available; so I dialed Commercial Radio and was promptly disconnected and sat-com became subsequently unavailable.Being unable to adequately contact Local Maintenance through Local Operations; I placed a call with my personal cell phone to Commercial Radio to be connected to Dispatch and Maintenance. After the call was connected; I handed the phone to the Captain. It was decided that we would need to return to a gate. We got in touch with Local Operations regarding a gate; and they sent a Mechanic out to us. He got on the interphone and we told him what happened and that we were returning to a gate. We told the CFR crew that we were going to proceed to a gate; and he said our brakes were ok and that the left MLG had cooled and was indicating 300 degrees Celsius on his laser thermometer. They removed the chocks from the nosewheel and left. We arrived at the gate 1h 25m after pushback. Back at the gate; we were able to successfully use the sat-com to contact the Dispatcher and Maintenance. We were also able to use an agent's phone to contact the Duty Pilot and the Chief Pilot concerning our duty day. After evaluation by the Duty Pilot and each of the three of us; we concluded that we could complete the flight segment within 16 hours and were physically/mentally capable of doing so. After approximately one hour on the stand we had been refueled and Maintenance had performed the necessary procedures for the Unscheduled Stab Trim message. We taxied out again. On departure at approximately 140 KTS we again receivedan EICAS message 'Unscheduled Stab Trim'; this time with no Master Caution. The message was displayed for only about 2 to 3 seconds; and given the flight regime; we continued the takeoff uneventfully. Lessons Learned: 1. Always deploy the reversers and speed brakes; even on a low speed abort. Doing so may have reduced our brake cooling time. Even a low speed abort on the B767-300ER at heavy weight can potentially cause the fuse plugs to melt. 2. Ask for a fire truck. They may have tools you don't know you need yet; like chocks. We didn't release the parking brake; but probably should have. 3. Have a cell phone with global coverage. I'm glad I have mine. With the sat-com inoperative; it was really difficult to get any information to the company in a timely manner. Sure; we had ACARS; but it's slow and can't make a conference call. My experience is that our company will gladly reimburse a $10-$20 phone call if it's operationally necessary. (And it's cheaper than a sat call). I wonder if it's a good idea to place a global cell phone on the airplane when the sat-com is on a Maintenance Carry Over for 'off-gate' communication.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.