Narrative:

Planned our departure from the intersection; but during taxi out were advised to expect full length [departure]. I pulled up new performance numbers and noted that the flap setting was to become F2 as opposed to F1. I made the numbers adjustment in the mcdu; performance speeds; F setting; flex temperature; and removed the takeoff shift. I briefed the captain on the changes to the speeds. We had not received our final numbers so I sent a message to load planning. Received a notice back that there was a 'significant change' to [the] aircraft weight [and told to] stand by for numbers. We got the final numbers; but there was no significant change in the weights; zero fuel weight; etc. We had taxied across the runway to hold on the pad to await the final numbers and then were ready to go relatively quickly. We were cleared for takeoff. During the roll; at about 100 KTS; I noticed that the flap handle was still in the F1 position. Having just entered the new numbers I knew that the speeds we were now using were actually greater than the F1 speeds; hence I opted to not distract the captain during a critical phase. He rotated and the aircraft flew; according to him later; normally -- he had no idea. When I advised him of the issue (after climb-out) he agreed with my decision to not engage a high speed abort given the circumstances.the flaw came when neither one of us cross checked the other on the actual flap setting. It would have been caught if we had run the entire before takeoff checklist again. It is curious that the takeoff configuration button had been pressed and was correct up until the mcdu numbers were altered. That might be a valuable tool (i.e.: allowing the takeoff configuration to trigger an alert if the actual and planned [settings] do not agree). Given the performance limits in this scenario we were safe; but in a different situation it could have been a more egregious error. I will say that we showed for work well before sun-up; and I was up two hours before that. We had flown two legs worth about 6 hours and sat for 3+ hours and then had a busy departure set of issues...I was tired.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 First Officer reports receiving revised flap and V speed settings prior to takeoff and entering the information into the MCDU. The flap lever was not positioned to flaps 2 from position 1 as required by the new data and this is not detected until well into the takeoff roll. The takeoff is continued.

Narrative: Planned our departure from the intersection; but during taxi out were advised to expect full length [departure]. I pulled up new performance numbers and noted that the flap setting was to become F2 as opposed to F1. I made the numbers adjustment in the MCDU; performance speeds; F setting; flex temperature; and removed the takeoff shift. I briefed the Captain on the changes to the speeds. We had not received our final numbers so I sent a message to Load Planning. Received a notice back that there was a 'significant change' to [the] aircraft weight [and told to] stand by for numbers. We got the final numbers; but there was no significant change in the weights; zero fuel weight; etc. We had taxied across the runway to hold on the pad to await the final numbers and then were ready to go relatively quickly. We were cleared for takeoff. During the roll; at about 100 KTS; I noticed that the flap handle was still in the F1 position. Having just entered the new numbers I knew that the speeds we were now using were actually greater than the F1 speeds; hence I opted to not distract the Captain during a critical phase. He rotated and the aircraft flew; according to him later; normally -- he had no idea. When I advised him of the issue (after climb-out) he agreed with my decision to not engage a high speed abort given the circumstances.The flaw came when neither one of us cross checked the other on the actual flap setting. It would have been caught if we had run the entire before takeoff checklist again. It is curious that the takeoff configuration button had been pressed and was correct up until the MCDU numbers were altered. That might be a valuable tool (i.e.: allowing the takeoff configuration to trigger an alert if the actual and planned [settings] do not agree). Given the performance limits in this scenario we were safe; but in a different situation it could have been a more egregious error. I will say that we showed for work well before sun-up; and I was up two hours before that. We had flown two legs worth about 6 hours and sat for 3+ hours and then had a busy departure set of issues...I was tired.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.