Narrative:

While being vectored for the ILS 04R into bos; I was the pilot flying and experienced a total failure of both the pilot flight display (pfd) and the pilot navigation display (nd). We were flying in IMC conditions with light rime icing conditions. Both displays came back on after a few seconds so we decided to continue with the approach. At this time boston approach advised of a new ATIS for bos; which the PIC acknowledged. I was monitoring the de-ice boots activation and removal of a light rime ice build up on the wings and some how we both missed that the new ATIS advised of a runway change to 33 with an ILS approach to 33. We proceeded to fly through the localizer and executed a missed approach. Boston approach then vectored us around for a 2nd attempt to join the localizer. Again we were unable to join the localizer and executed a missed approach. At this point I realized we had the wrong ILS approach tuned in and corrected our navigation equipment for a third attempt. Boston approach vectored us around again for the ILS 33 approach into bos and we landed the aircraft normally. Looking back at this event I realize now that we should have never attempted that first approach. We didn't have enough time after the momentary pfd and nd failure to confirm that the aircraft was ready for the approach. I was flying; dealing with IMC; icing conditions; and proper power management for engine anti-icing while the PIC was trouble shooting the equipment failure with the check list. We both missed the runway and approach change. Another link in the error chain was the fact that ATC was conducting training as well. I'm very positive that the controller didn't specify the runway number on the first 2 approaches. He just cleared us for the 'approach'. It wasn't till the final attempt that we heard cleared for the ILS 33 approach. This event stresses the importance of good CRM between crew members. Even though the aircraft was always at a safe altitude; I realize now that we could have avoided 2 missed approaches if we would have just taken the time after the initial display failures to confirm our approach check list. This would have enabled us to review the new ATIS and realize the runway change at bos.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A flight crew preparing for a BOS Runway 4R ILS was distracted by a momentary failure of the First Officer's PFD and ND and they missed the runway change to 33. After a second go around in IMC the First Officer selected the correct runway ILS and a successful approach followed.

Narrative: While being vectored for the ILS 04R into BOS; I was the pilot flying and experienced a total failure of both the Pilot Flight Display (PFD) and the Pilot Navigation Display (ND). We were flying in IMC conditions with light rime icing conditions. Both displays came back on after a few seconds so we decided to continue with the approach. At this time Boston Approach advised of a new ATIS for BOS; which the PIC acknowledged. I was monitoring the de-ice boots activation and removal of a light rime ice build up on the wings and some how we both missed that the new ATIS advised of a runway change to 33 with an ILS approach to 33. We proceeded to fly through the localizer and executed a missed approach. Boston Approach then vectored us around for a 2nd attempt to join the localizer. Again we were unable to join the localizer and executed a missed approach. At this point I realized we had the wrong ILS approach tuned in and corrected our navigation equipment for a third attempt. Boston Approach vectored us around again for the ILS 33 approach into BOS and we landed the aircraft normally. Looking back at this event I realize now that we should have never attempted that first approach. We didn't have enough time after the momentary PFD and ND failure to confirm that the aircraft was ready for the approach. I was flying; dealing with IMC; icing conditions; and proper power management for engine anti-icing while the PIC was trouble shooting the equipment failure with the check list. We both missed the runway and approach change. Another link in the error chain was the fact that ATC was conducting training as well. I'm very positive that the Controller didn't specify the runway number on the first 2 approaches. He just cleared us for the 'approach'. It wasn't till the final attempt that we heard cleared for the ILS 33 approach. This event stresses the importance of good CRM between crew members. Even though the aircraft was always at a safe altitude; I realize now that we could have avoided 2 missed approaches if we would have just taken the time after the initial display failures to confirm our approach check list. This would have enabled us to review the new ATIS and realize the runway change at BOS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.