Narrative:

We arrived to find our next flight to ord was on a ground delay due to low ceilings and deteriorating weather in chicago. I called the dispatcher to confirm the delay from the gate. He advised me of wheels up time. I discussed with him the fact that we had a long day already and would time out about 46 minutes after the proposed wheels up. This is where the outrageous pressure came from the gate supervisor; I informed her that we would be close to 'timing out' as a crew. I then returned to the aircraft and received the ACARS message from dispatch showing the wheels up time; I also printed her [gate supervisor] a copy. At about 2.5 hours from wheels up time I called scheduling and confirmed the information with him regarding the delay. I wanted to give him the 'heads up' that the possibility would exist that we may 'time out'. He said the 'powers that be' were talking it over. He suggested that I call back in a few minutes. He also mentioned someone from the station had called him. The supervisor had apparently called him to reconfirm the information I had already given her. I had noticed that there were several mechanics in and out of the jetway. I went in to the aircraft to find three mechanics in the flight deck. I approached one and pleasantly asked if my aircraft was broke. He responded by saying; 'define broke'. I observed the mechanic who signed off the MEL on the cell phone in the cockpit. I returned to the aircraft about fifteen minutes later and noticed that he was still on the phone. I had grown suspicious after I had witnessed at least seven or eight mechanics come and go over a period of thirty to forty minutes. The mechanic in the cockpit had now been on the phone for a very long time. I assumed he was talking to maintenance control. Meanwhile; I thought we could begin boarding at XA55 and push at XB25. This would give us plenty of time to taxi and takeoff. Five minutes before boarding the gate supervisor grew very impatient and began interrupting me while I was explaining the situation to the assistant chief pilot. The mechanics in the cockpit and I told her we would let her know when it was reasonable for her to begin the boarding process. I phoned scheduling and he informed me they were going 'to roll the dice' and hope for a XC07 or earlier departure. The gate supervisor continued to interrupt us even after she was told there was no 'new information' regarding the amount of time the mechanics would require to resolve the situation. This was very annoying and disruptive. After a long period of time the mechanic got off the cell phone and informed me he was putting MEL 28-40-06 condition left and north inner and outer fuel gage inoperative. The problem was that the MEL stated '2 installed and 1 required'. Both channels in the right wing outer and right wing inner were inoperative also causing the fob (fuel on board) to be inoperative. I looked at the MEL. This is when it crossed my mind that the lengthy conversation was how to get around all the malfunctions in the fuel system. Now the gate agent was back while I was working to understand what the mechanics have tried to do. I tried to explain to the mechanic that this MEL requires one of the systems to be working and they were not. With a long day behind us; and a three hour flight ahead of us with an alternate; I needed to know how much fuel was on board. The mechanic who added the MEL suggested I call my chief pilot. I called the chief pilot office at XB05 and asked if I could speak to someone regarding an airbus issue. I was on hold when; of course; comes my favorite gate supervisor to get her five minute update. I tried to explain that I had called dispatch and tried to get another aircraft at XA45 but; was informed there weren't any. She did not accept that information gently and demanded that she 'had to know'. I spoke with the assistant chief pilot and he said he would be right over. I showed him the MEL. We agreed this is a bigger problem than one channel out.the entire fuel system was down. He called the airbus fleet manager. He agreed this was not a valid MEL. I called my dispatcher to advise him of the situation. We called scheduling and they released us.the MEL requires one of the systems to be working. If a mechanic cannot explain the MEL or I am not comfortable with the MEL and the way it reads; being the captain in command of the aircraft; I should not be suggested to call the chief pilot. There was no safe way to get around this serious malfunction. The problem I have noticed that has occurred in 2010 is that too much pressure is put on maintenance to get the aircraft off the gate. It appears this group will do anything to get an MEL added even if it is not correct. In regard to safety; this culture is extremely dangerous. If the captain of the aircraft says 'no'....that means 'no'. The repetitive interruption from gate agents and gate supervisors only adds to the length of a delay.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain described maintenance and weather delays including continuous interruptions by the gate agent requesting updates. The Captain believed the the MEL number assigned by Maintenance is not valid and the Assistant Chief Pilot agreed. The crew was eventually released for duty time limitations.

Narrative: We arrived to find our next flight to ORD was on a ground delay due to low ceilings and deteriorating weather in Chicago. I called the Dispatcher to confirm the delay from the gate. He advised me of wheels up time. I discussed with him the fact that we had a long day already and would time out about 46 minutes after the proposed wheels up. This is where the outrageous pressure came from the Gate Supervisor; I informed her that we would be close to 'timing out' as a crew. I then returned to the aircraft and received the ACARS message from Dispatch showing the wheels up time; I also printed her [Gate Supervisor] a copy. At about 2.5 hours from wheels up time I called scheduling and confirmed the information with him regarding the delay. I wanted to give him the 'heads up' that the possibility would exist that we may 'time out'. He said the 'powers that be' were talking it over. He suggested that I call back in a few minutes. He also mentioned someone from the station had called him. The Supervisor had apparently called him to reconfirm the information I had already given her. I had noticed that there were several mechanics in and out of the jetway. I went in to the aircraft to find three mechanics in the flight deck. I approached one and pleasantly asked if my aircraft was broke. He responded by saying; 'define broke'. I observed the mechanic who signed off the MEL on the cell phone in the cockpit. I returned to the aircraft about fifteen minutes later and noticed that he was still on the phone. I had grown suspicious after I had witnessed at least seven or eight mechanics come and go over a period of thirty to forty minutes. The mechanic in the cockpit had now been on the phone for a very long time. I assumed he was talking to Maintenance Control. Meanwhile; I thought we could begin boarding at XA55 and push at XB25. This would give us plenty of time to taxi and takeoff. Five minutes before boarding the Gate Supervisor grew very impatient and began interrupting me while I was explaining the situation to the Assistant Chief Pilot. The mechanics in the cockpit and I told her we would let her know when it was reasonable for her to begin the boarding process. I phoned scheduling and he informed me they were going 'to roll the dice' and hope for a XC07 or earlier departure. The Gate Supervisor continued to interrupt us even after she was told there was no 'new information' regarding the amount of time the mechanics would require to resolve the situation. This was very annoying and disruptive. After a long period of time the mechanic got off the cell phone and informed me he was putting MEL 28-40-06 condition L and N inner and outer fuel gage inoperative. The problem was that the MEL stated '2 installed and 1 required'. Both channels in the right wing outer and right wing inner were inoperative also causing the FOB (Fuel On Board) to be inoperative. I looked at the MEL. This is when it crossed my mind that the lengthy conversation was how to GET AROUND all the malfunctions in the fuel system. Now the gate agent was back while I was working to understand what the mechanics have tried to do. I tried to explain to the mechanic that this MEL requires one of the systems to be working and they were not. With a long day behind us; and a three hour flight ahead of us with an alternate; I needed to know how much fuel was on board. The mechanic who added the MEL suggested I call my Chief Pilot. I called the chief pilot office at XB05 and asked if I could speak to someone regarding an airbus issue. I was on hold when; of course; comes my favorite Gate Supervisor to get her five minute update. I tried to explain that I had called Dispatch and tried to get another aircraft at XA45 but; was informed there weren't any. She did not accept that information gently and demanded that she 'had to know'. I spoke with the Assistant Chief Pilot and he said he would be right over. I showed him the MEL. We agreed this is a bigger problem than one channel out.The entire fuel system was down. He called the Airbus Fleet Manager. He agreed this was not a valid MEL. I called my Dispatcher to advise him of the situation. We called Scheduling and they released us.The MEL requires one of the systems to be working. If a mechanic cannot explain the MEL or I am not comfortable with the MEL and the way it reads; being the Captain in command of the aircraft; I should not be suggested to call the Chief Pilot. There was no safe way to get around this serious malfunction. The problem I have noticed that has occurred in 2010 is that too much pressure is put on Maintenance to get the aircraft off the gate. It appears this group will do anything to get an MEL added even if it is not correct. In regard to safety; this culture is extremely dangerous. If the Captain of the aircraft says 'no'....that means 'no'. The repetitive interruption from gate agents and Gate Supervisors only adds to the length of a delay.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.