Narrative:

We missed a note in the pre departure clearance clearance that assigned us a new altitude to climb to; instead of what was on the chart; which is what we set and climbed to. So; as we climbed through 3;300 ft; ATC queried us and informed us we were supposed to stop at 2;500 instead. Fortunately; there was no other traffic and separation was not an issue. ATC said 'that's okay; just continue your climb to 5;000.' an early morning report for a ewr turn; normally operated by a difference equipment type; found us instantly in unfamiliar territory. I had been to ewr about six years ago; but as a first officer. During the whole flight from ewr we discussed early on; all the things we needed to familiarize ourselves with the ewr operation. Upon arrival at ewr; as forecast; we were to experience moderate turbulence in the descent as well as a 20 KT direct crosswind with gusts above that. Since we were a little late arriving; we were faced with a quick turn. Despite the pressures to get back on time we tried to take things methodically to prepare for a departure from an unfamiliar airport. We did the legs check; briefed the departure and at some point must have gotten distracted as I missed the note at the end of the pre departure clearance that we were assigned a new altitude to level off at 2;500 ft; which is different from the charted altitude of 5;000 ft. I think; despite our best efforts to mitigate any errors in operating at this unfamiliar airport; we were unable to catch this note and we made this mistake. It was a busy departure with a strong crosswind and turbulence. It frustrates me and makes me angry at myself for allowing this to happen. As I said before; we were as methodical as possible; or so we thought; to prevent any errors from happening. I've learned that to help mitigate such errors one must proceed even slower and more methodical than originally planned. If we had actually had the pre departure clearance page on the CDU while the brief was conducted we would have avoided this embarrassing error. It might also be a good idea to tune out all extra noise. On this flight; while we were trying to brief; we had a jumpseater in the flight deck; rampers handing us fuel receipts; gate agents handing bag cards and final weather; flight attendant asking to close the door; rampers getting permission to disconnect AC power and all the other extraneous noise that a crew normally finds on a late inbound quickturn.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Carrier crew briefed the EWR 8 Runway 22R departure and the modified initial altitude of 2;500 FT but climbed to 5;000 FT because of distractions and rushed operations.

Narrative: We missed a note in the PDC clearance that assigned us a new altitude to climb to; instead of what was on the chart; which is what we set and climbed to. So; as we climbed through 3;300 FT; ATC queried us and informed us we were supposed to stop at 2;500 instead. Fortunately; there was no other traffic and separation was not an issue. ATC said 'that's okay; just continue your climb to 5;000.' An early morning report for a EWR turn; normally operated by a difference equipment type; found us instantly in unfamiliar territory. I had been to EWR about six years ago; but as a First Officer. During the whole flight from EWR we discussed early on; all the things we needed to familiarize ourselves with the EWR operation. Upon arrival at EWR; as forecast; we were to experience moderate turbulence in the descent as well as a 20 KT direct crosswind with gusts above that. Since we were a little late arriving; we were faced with a quick turn. Despite the pressures to get back on time we tried to take things methodically to prepare for a departure from an unfamiliar airport. We did the legs check; briefed the departure and at some point must have gotten distracted as I missed the note at the end of the PDC that we were assigned a new altitude to level off at 2;500 FT; which is different from the charted altitude of 5;000 FT. I think; despite our best efforts to mitigate any errors in operating at this unfamiliar airport; we were unable to catch this note and we made this mistake. It was a busy departure with a strong crosswind and turbulence. It frustrates me and makes me angry at myself for allowing this to happen. As I said before; we were as methodical as possible; or so we thought; to prevent any errors from happening. I've learned that to help mitigate such errors one must proceed even slower and more methodical than originally planned. If we had actually had the PDC page on the CDU while the brief was conducted we would have avoided this embarrassing error. It might also be a good idea to tune out all extra noise. On this flight; while we were trying to brief; we had a jumpseater in the flight deck; rampers handing us fuel receipts; gate agents handing bag cards and final weather; Flight Attendant asking to close the door; rampers getting permission to disconnect AC power and all the other extraneous noise that a crew normally finds on a late inbound quickturn.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.