Narrative:

I witnessed a near mid-air collision (near midair collision) within the first four hours of my shift. All sectors were open. Ojti was taking place on rw. Air carrier X departed aus and was turned northeast; stopped at 5;000. Aircraft Y was inbound from the northeast; descending to 6;000. The aircraft were wired for the same common point in the sky; but separated. The re controller issued traffic to air carrier X; and the air carrier X pilot reported the traffic in sight. The re controller then told air carrier X to maintain visual separation from that traffic (aircraft Y); and issued a climb to 12;000. I did not hear if aircraft Y was informed that visual separation was being applied. The re controller then said; 'oh; I've never had that happen before'; and the re controller then turned aircraft Y left to a heading of 110; and turned air carrier X left to a heading of 010. The re controller then said that air carrier X had lost sight of his traffic; but the aircraft were already less than 1;000 ft and 3 miles. These two aircraft passed within 1 mile of each other at the same altitude on converging courses; a near midair collision in my book. I've reported this before regarding the usage of visual separation at aus. We use it incorrectly; inappropriately and we are going to kill someone. How close is too close? I thought that we were controllers; but apparently we have a pattern and practice of asking the pilots to provide visual separation; and this is what happens. My recommendation? Why don't we just separate the aircraft?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AUS Controller described witnessing a conflict event involving the use of visual separation between two aircraft; another controller working the aircraft providing another perspective.

Narrative: I witnessed a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) within the first four hours of my shift. All sectors were open. OJTI was taking place on RW. Air Carrier X departed AUS and was turned northeast; stopped at 5;000. Aircraft Y was inbound from the northeast; descending to 6;000. The aircraft were wired for the same common point in the sky; but separated. The RE Controller issued traffic to Air Carrier X; and the Air Carrier X pilot reported the traffic in sight. The RE Controller then told Air Carrier X to maintain Visual Separation from that traffic (Aircraft Y); and issued a climb to 12;000. I did not hear if Aircraft Y was informed that visual separation was being applied. The RE Controller then said; 'Oh; I've never had that happen before'; and the RE Controller then turned Aircraft Y left to a heading of 110; and turned Air Carrier X left to a heading of 010. The RE Controller then said that Air Carrier X had lost sight of his traffic; but the aircraft were already less than 1;000 FT and 3 miles. These two aircraft passed within 1 mile of each other at the same altitude on converging courses; a NMAC in my book. I've reported this before regarding the usage of visual separation at AUS. We use it incorrectly; inappropriately and we are going to kill someone. How close is too close? I thought that we were Controllers; but apparently we have a pattern and practice of asking the pilots to provide visual separation; and this is what happens. My recommendation? Why don't we just separate the aircraft?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.