Narrative:

This report is the result of a breakdown in standard operating procedures. The new stabilized approach criteria most recently published in the latest fom revision was circumvented by 'experience'. We were on a late morning leg. The weather in the entire northwest was winter operations but with VFR conditions at our destination. Nearing the airport I pulled up the runway performance for the anticipated runway 21; and the associated local weather report and notams. The captain commented that the runway was plenty long for pulling up performance and I replied that I wanted to see the runway condition report on the performance data. My thinking it was 2 steps in 1. I handed it to the captain and I pulled out the fom to look at the cold weather section. It was the first cold weather operations of the season for me and I recalled that the low mu friction numbers were the ugly numbers. The numbers that I can best remember were a mu value of around 40 for touchdown; 28 for mid and 4 for the rollout. Basically the first 3rd of the runway was pretty good but it got worse as you went further down the runway. 4 at the rollout caught my attention as being 'nil' on the chart effectively cutting the good usable available runway distance down considerably. The captain shortly thereafter requested runway conditions for the same runway from ACARS. Closer we got the current ATIS; which was still indicating braking advisories in effect; briefed and set up the approach for a visual landing on runway 21 backed up by the ILS 21. We were being preceded by an A320 landing on the same runway about 6 miles ahead. Upon landing I believe they reported the braking as being 'good'. We were cleared to land and advised of the previous crew's report. We were carrying a fair amount of energy on to the approach; but the captain was getting the airplane slowed down. As we got closer the captain started to get more aggressive with slowing the plane but it was beginning to appear to me like the stabilized criteria would not be met. The captain called for flaps full down through about 800 ft and reiterated 'cleared to land' for the 1;000 ft call. As we quickly came up on 500 RA I called '500 ft' and observing that we were about 30 KTS above target; I called 'go around'. The captain replied 'what did you say?' and I looked at him and again said 'go around'. The captain said something like 'this will be fine' and 'see; the speed is coming back so just relax.' the speed was coming back into the target range and the power was coming back up by around 300 ft. I looked out and assessed the runway condition; our descent rate and speed and predicted we would touch down in the very same spot where would touch down had we been on speed per the stabilized criteria. I saw landing as the best alternative to low altitude go arounds and/or arguments. I was not happy. We landed without event and the braking action was described by the captain as being good. We taxied to the gate; completed the shutdown and accomplished the after landing checklist. I asked the captain; 'what was that?' the reply was 'what was what....that?'. He described how he had a lot of experience and been doing this job for a long time with no issues and the flight he felt was never in an unsafe condition. Some factors I believe contributing to this issue include the high energy on the approach being compounded by the rapidly rising terrain toward the airport a couple miles to the northeast. At a point when we were maybe 6 miles to the airport; I do not think we had not yet heard the automatic '2;500 ft' callout. When the terrain rapidly rose; so did our radio altimeter at a faster than normal rate putting us behind the airplane. I was surprised by how rapidly the altitude calls came up namely the 1;000 ft call. I missed it because I was fixated on watching the speed to be ready for the next flap call. The captain; I reiterate; got the 1;000 ft call after calling for flaps full at about 800 ft. Knowing he was working diligently on the airspeed my reply was only that the landing memo was green myself neglecting the word 'airspeed'. Additionally contributing to the event was the captain's confidence in the airplane; himself and the outcome. I was aware on the trip that the captain has been on the plane for a long time and that he knew the airplane and flew it well. It was confidence in my own ability to assess the situation (we going to land on speed; in the touchdown zone; no excessive maneuvering; runway condition; etc) once the captain decided he has going to land that allowed me to justify landing. He later said to me that he said the speed was coming back. I do not remember him saying that. Regardless of that; it just did not matter. The SOP is clear. Reject at 500 ft if over by more than 15 KTS with momentary correctable conditions being ok. This was not that condition and it was especially not the conditions to be testing the limits. The captain made the final decision as it should be. I did not agree with it but I allowed it on my own safety assessment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 flight crew offers differing perceptions about a Captain's approach and landing which the First Officer considered unstabilized but which the Captain considered totally under control.

Narrative: This report is the result of a breakdown in standard operating procedures. The new stabilized approach criteria most recently published in the latest FOM revision was circumvented by 'experience'. We were on a late morning leg. The weather in the entire northwest was winter operations but with VFR conditions at our destination. Nearing the airport I pulled up the runway performance for the anticipated Runway 21; and the associated local weather report and NOTAMs. The Captain commented that the runway was plenty long for pulling up performance and I replied that I wanted to see the runway condition report on the performance data. My thinking it was 2 steps in 1. I handed it to the Captain and I pulled out the FOM to look at the cold weather section. It was the first cold weather operations of the season for me and I recalled that the low MU friction numbers were the ugly numbers. The numbers that I can best remember were a MU value of around 40 for touchdown; 28 for mid and 4 for the rollout. Basically the first 3rd of the runway was pretty good but it got worse as you went further down the runway. 4 at the rollout caught my attention as being 'nil' on the chart effectively cutting the good usable available runway distance down considerably. The Captain shortly thereafter requested runway conditions for the same runway from ACARS. Closer we got the current ATIS; which was still indicating braking advisories in effect; briefed and set up the approach for a visual landing on Runway 21 backed up by the ILS 21. We were being preceded by an A320 landing on the same runway about 6 miles ahead. Upon landing I believe they reported the braking as being 'good'. We were cleared to land and advised of the previous crew's report. We were carrying a fair amount of energy on to the approach; but the Captain was getting the airplane slowed down. As we got closer the Captain started to get more aggressive with slowing the plane but it was beginning to appear to me like the stabilized criteria would not be met. The Captain called for flaps full down through about 800 FT and reiterated 'cleared to land' for the 1;000 FT call. As we quickly came up on 500 RA I called '500 FT' and observing that we were about 30 KTS above target; I called 'go around'. The Captain replied 'What did you say?' and I looked at him and again said 'go around'. The Captain said something like 'this will be fine' and 'see; the speed is coming back so just relax.' The speed was coming back into the target range and the power was coming back up by around 300 FT. I looked out and assessed the runway condition; our descent rate and speed and predicted we would touch down in the very same spot where would touch down had we been on speed per the stabilized criteria. I saw landing as the best alternative to low altitude go arounds and/or arguments. I was not happy. We landed without event and the braking action was described by the Captain as being good. We taxied to the gate; completed the shutdown and accomplished the after landing checklist. I asked the Captain; 'What was that?' The reply was 'What was what....that?'. He described how he had a lot of experience and been doing this job for a long time with no issues and the flight he felt was never in an unsafe condition. Some factors I believe contributing to this issue include the high energy on the approach being compounded by the rapidly rising terrain toward the airport a couple miles to the northeast. At a point when we were maybe 6 miles to the airport; I do not think we had not yet heard the automatic '2;500 FT' callout. When the terrain rapidly rose; so did our radio altimeter at a faster than normal rate putting us behind the airplane. I was surprised by how rapidly the altitude calls came up namely the 1;000 FT call. I missed it because I was fixated on watching the speed to be ready for the next flap call. The Captain; I reiterate; got the 1;000 FT call after calling for flaps full at about 800 FT. Knowing he was working diligently on the airspeed my reply was only that the landing memo was green myself neglecting the word 'airspeed'. Additionally contributing to the event was the Captain's confidence in the airplane; himself and the outcome. I was aware on the trip that the Captain has been on the plane for a long time and that he knew the airplane and flew it well. It was confidence in my own ability to assess the situation (we going to land on speed; in the touchdown zone; no excessive maneuvering; runway condition; etc) once the Captain decided he has going to land that allowed me to justify landing. He later said to me that he said the speed was coming back. I do not remember him saying that. Regardless of that; it just did not matter. The SOP is clear. Reject at 500 FT if over by more than 15 KTS with momentary correctable conditions being OK. This was not that condition and it was especially not the conditions to be testing the limits. The Captain made the final decision as it should be. I did not agree with it but I allowed it on my own safety assessment.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.