Narrative:

A E120 was setting up for VOR/DME 14 approach into lmt descending to 120. About 30 miles south of the field; pilot asked for ILS runway 32 instead. R-side gave initial vector for ILS final approach course. Shortly after r-side gave pilot descent to 8;500; the mia in that area. Three miles from the localizer; aircraft was still high to intercept; so r-side gave pilot a right turn heading 160 to give a little more time for descent. Aircraft was established on heading 160 for maybe a minute and was now down to 8;500. R-side planned to continue a right turn back to the localizer; gave the pilot a right turn heading 220 about 3 miles east of a 10;000 ft mia. Right after the r-side gave the heading; I said; 'watch out for that mia' and pointed to it on the scope. R-side gave the pilot instructions to continue right turn to a heading 050 when the aircraft was roughly 1 mile from the 10;000 ft mia. The aircraft went through the boundary of the 10;000 ft mia and roughly 2 miles into the 10;000 ft mia area. Interestingly; the east/MSAW alert never went off. As the aircraft was about 3 miles from the 10;000 mia boundary and turning into it at 8;500; we both were wondering why we weren't getting an alert. My recommendation would be to research why the MSAW alert didn't go off. Although our incident was self discovered; that is; we knew what the mia was; the fact that MSAW didn't go off is worrisome. That can be a valuable tool for ATC; and if it doesn't work as it's supposed to on eram; that should be investigated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZSE Controller described a MVA loss of separation event when the E/MSAW equipment never activated an alert.

Narrative: A E120 was setting up for VOR/DME 14 approach into LMT descending to 120. About 30 miles south of the field; pilot asked for ILS Runway 32 instead. R-Side gave initial vector for ILS final approach course. Shortly after R-Side gave pilot descent to 8;500; the MIA in that area. Three miles from the localizer; aircraft was still high to intercept; so R-Side gave pilot a right turn heading 160 to give a little more time for descent. Aircraft was established on heading 160 for maybe a minute and was now down to 8;500. R-Side planned to continue a right turn back to the localizer; gave the pilot a right turn heading 220 about 3 miles east of a 10;000 FT MIA. Right after the R-Side gave the heading; I said; 'watch out for that MIA' and pointed to it on the scope. R-Side gave the pilot instructions to continue right turn to a heading 050 when the aircraft was roughly 1 mile from the 10;000 FT MIA. The aircraft went through the boundary of the 10;000 FT MIA and roughly 2 miles into the 10;000 FT MIA area. Interestingly; the E/MSAW alert never went off. As the aircraft was about 3 miles from the 10;000 MIA boundary and turning into it at 8;500; we both were wondering why we weren't getting an alert. My recommendation would be to research why the MSAW alert didn't go off. Although our incident was self discovered; that is; we knew what the MIA was; the fact that MSAW didn't go off is worrisome. That can be a valuable tool for ATC; and if it doesn't work as it's supposed to on ERAM; that should be investigated.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.