Narrative:

Aug 1988 reported to aircraft to start flight clt-ric-lga. Aircraft had an engine write up from previous crews concerning slow engine starts. Maintenance had already been notified. Normal preflight duties were being performed by crew when FAA inspector came on board; showed his credentials and said he would be conducting an in-flight inspection. The inspector appeared very tired and dishevelled. He stated that he had been in the simulator most of the night. He indicated that he was not current on the airplane and seemed distracted about engine out procedures on this aircraft. The aircraft was boarded for departure before maintenance arrived. When the mechanic arrived he wanted to do an engine start. The inspector questioned this procedure and we both assured him that it was a normal procedure and would create no problems. The engine start was attempted but there was not enough air for a spool up so the start was terminated. Mechanic MEL'd the APU and we continued the flight using ground air for starts. No other comment was made by the FAA inspector at this time. On descent into ric aircraft was cleared to 9000'. Autoplt was engaged and computer system in use. Autoplt set for 250 KTS on speed and 9000 on altitude. At 10000' autoplt did not slow aircraft correctly. I disengaged the autoplt and recovered manually. Descent was arrested prior to 9700' and aircraft was slowed to 250 KTS at this time. Flight continued to lga. In lga the inspector acted like he was going to leave and then suddenly requested to speak with me alone in the jetway. He proceeded to berate me for the way I handled the mechanical problem in clt. He criticized the company for using poor safety procedures in handling mechanical problems. And he also stated that I did not slow the airplane down in ric until reaching 9000'. I tried to talk to the man but he was very argumentative and flustered. I felt that the most professional way to handle the situation was to terminate the conversation as soon as possible. I felt that he had not performed his duties correctly anyway since he did not discuss any of these problems in ric but waited until we got to his destination of lga. The gentleman had obviously had very little sleep the night before and was not in the proper frame of mind to conduct a professional and unbiased check ride. Supplemental information from acn 91776. It appeared that the inspector was unrested, upset, uncomfortable and unprofessional. It seemed that he was trying to find something/anything to be critical of. At lga inspection debriefed captain away from first officer, so there were no witnesses of the debriefing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACI CRITICISED FLT CREW FOR THE WAY A START PROC WAS COMPLETED AND FOR FAILING TO SLOW TO 250 KTS BEFORE DESCENT BELOW 10000'. TWO REPORTS ARE CRITICAL OF THE ACI MANNER.

Narrative: AUG 1988 RPTED TO ACFT TO START FLT CLT-RIC-LGA. ACFT HAD AN ENG WRITE UP FROM PREVIOUS CREWS CONCERNING SLOW ENG STARTS. MAINT HAD ALREADY BEEN NOTIFIED. NORMAL PREFLT DUTIES WERE BEING PERFORMED BY CREW WHEN FAA INSPECTOR CAME ON BOARD; SHOWED HIS CREDENTIALS AND SAID HE WOULD BE CONDUCTING AN INFLT INSPECTION. THE INSPECTOR APPEARED VERY TIRED AND DISHEVELLED. HE STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN THE SIMULATOR MOST OF THE NIGHT. HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS NOT CURRENT ON THE AIRPLANE AND SEEMED DISTRACTED ABOUT ENG OUT PROCS ON THIS ACFT. THE ACFT WAS BOARDED FOR DEP BEFORE MAINT ARRIVED. WHEN THE MECHANIC ARRIVED HE WANTED TO DO AN ENG START. THE INSPECTOR QUESTIONED THIS PROC AND WE BOTH ASSURED HIM THAT IT WAS A NORMAL PROC AND WOULD CREATE NO PROBS. THE ENG START WAS ATTEMPTED BUT THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH AIR FOR A SPOOL UP SO THE START WAS TERMINATED. MECHANIC MEL'D THE APU AND WE CONTINUED THE FLT USING GND AIR FOR STARTS. NO OTHER COMMENT WAS MADE BY THE FAA INSPECTOR AT THIS TIME. ON DSCNT INTO RIC ACFT WAS CLRED TO 9000'. AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND COMPUTER SYS IN USE. AUTOPLT SET FOR 250 KTS ON SPD AND 9000 ON ALT. AT 10000' AUTOPLT DID NOT SLOW ACFT CORRECTLY. I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND RECOVERED MANUALLY. DSCNT WAS ARRESTED PRIOR TO 9700' AND ACFT WAS SLOWED TO 250 KTS AT THIS TIME. FLT CONTINUED TO LGA. IN LGA THE INSPECTOR ACTED LIKE HE WAS GOING TO LEAVE AND THEN SUDDENLY REQUESTED TO SPEAK WITH ME ALONE IN THE JETWAY. HE PROCEEDED TO BERATE ME FOR THE WAY I HANDLED THE MECHANICAL PROB IN CLT. HE CRITICIZED THE COMPANY FOR USING POOR SAFETY PROCS IN HANDLING MECHANICAL PROBS. AND HE ALSO STATED THAT I DID NOT SLOW THE AIRPLANE DOWN IN RIC UNTIL REACHING 9000'. I TRIED TO TALK TO THE MAN BUT HE WAS VERY ARGUMENTATIVE AND FLUSTERED. I FELT THAT THE MOST PROFESSIONAL WAY TO HANDLE THE SITUATION WAS TO TERMINATE THE CONVERSATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I FELT THAT HE HAD NOT PERFORMED HIS DUTIES CORRECTLY ANYWAY SINCE HE DID NOT DISCUSS ANY OF THESE PROBS IN RIC BUT WAITED UNTIL WE GOT TO HIS DEST OF LGA. THE GENTLEMAN HAD OBVIOUSLY HAD VERY LITTLE SLEEP THE NIGHT BEFORE AND WAS NOT IN THE PROPER FRAME OF MIND TO CONDUCT A PROFESSIONAL AND UNBIASED CHK RIDE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 91776. IT APPEARED THAT THE INSPECTOR WAS UNRESTED, UPSET, UNCOMFORTABLE AND UNPROFESSIONAL. IT SEEMED THAT HE WAS TRYING TO FIND SOMETHING/ANYTHING TO BE CRITICAL OF. AT LGA INSPECTION DEBRIEFED CAPT AWAY FROM F/O, SO THERE WERE NO WITNESSES OF THE DEBRIEFING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.