Narrative:

Air carrier B757-200 was enroute when # 2 engine oil filter message appeared on EICAS. Flight crew used QRH (quick reference handbook) procedures and performed ifsd (in-flight shut down) and diverted to ZZZ. I was sent to ZZZ with another amt (aircraft maintenance technician) to troubleshoot the cause of the message and determine corrective action. It was a no-notice trip; and utmost haste was used in getting us on a departing flight. ZZZ is a non-maintenance station for our carrier. Contract support mechanic had been injured and was off site. Long story short; we went in without really even knowing what the logbook write-up was. In the communication confusion between numerous entities; the cause of the ifsd was reported as oil pressure loss; oil quantity loss; oil pressure indication loss; good oil pressure when engine was wind milling; oil filter and pressure switch failure. The cause of the ifsd was determined to be a faulty oil filter bypass pressure switch. Oil filter and chip detector inspection yielded no chips or metal of any kind. No oil quantity was lost. We replaced the switch and ran the engine at idle for a leak check and at high power to get a minimum of 75 psi at the scavenge inlet. No anomalies of any kind presented. Two FAA inspectors were on the aircraft in ZZZ after we parked it at the gate for a return revenue flight. ZZZ contract maintenance representatives called us in operations to tell us the FAA wanted to talk to us; but they never did come into operations. We couldn't go meet them at the plane due to no security badge access. The aircraft revenue back flight operated with no events. The next day I got up to go to work and had a message from company maintenance control to call as soon as possible. I called in and they said the same B757-200 had another ifsd on the next leg and was down at another out station. They wanted to ensure that the oil filter was replaced and was in quarantine; and did so while I was asleep; through normal channels. I admitted that my corrective action on the logbook item was not as smooth as it could have been due to the fact that we were documenting maintenance as we went; and when the oil filter was cleared under an amm (aircraft maintenance manual) reference; the verbiage did not clearly indicate replacement of the filter.at work I was informed that another crew found an intermittent short from the oil filter bypass switch to the eec. Replacement of the cannon plug was listed as corrective action. While in ZZZ; the engine analyst did call to request that we inspect the wiring and plug; which we verified with him that we indeed did do. The next day at work; my supervisor told me that I needed to fill out the back of the ifsd report. I was unaware that there was information that we fill out on this report; so when I filled it out I noticed that it called for a windmill inspection after an ifsd. Looking in the amm for the windmill inspection; I found that all of the criteria for the windmill inspection were met during the troubleshooting of the event; but a separate log item was not made. In my opinion; communication was very stilted during this event. We have had a reference sheet as for events such as this; but they have become 'somebody else's' responsibility and are no longer used. The experience level at maintenance control in ZZZ was disappointing to me. As a former lead; I felt fully qualified to handle the situation; but our mandate is that maintenance control calls all the shots. At some point the guy on scene [at aircraft location] has to be given some credit; but maintenance control personnel are trained to 'be in charge' of every aircraft; even if they don't have a clue as to what they are talking about. All reference paperwork was faxed to ZZZ. This is the year 2010; and I find it hard to believe that fax transmission is the best means of getting reference material; but my 25 billion dollar airline chooses to let maintenance be treated as an expense instead of an asset. The fact [also stands] that the maintenance controller faxed [us] the wrong paperwork and we had no access to the fax; etc. Etc. Since we had no prep time for the trip; I did not get to pull up any good information such as engine and component history. I had no company report for ZZZ; no airport chart of the airport; and no contact numbers for the contract guys. Blind; naked; and dumb is how we arrived at ZZZ. The aircraft operated as intended with the condition it was in. Safety was never a question in my mind; but cost of operational impact; customer relations; and just bad public relations overall were very obvious in my mind. This is not the way we normally operate. In the end I feel that the documentation of discrepancies and work performed was inadequate. The communication was like playing post office. Experience at maintenance control is suspect. I regret any mistakes I have made; and in the future will not be pressured into doing what someone else thinks is best when my highly evolved intuition tells me different.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Line Mechanic reports about contributing factors that led to a company B757-200 incurring two IFSD's (In-flightShut Down) events caused by a faulty Oil Filter Bypass Pressure switch electrical wiring.

Narrative: Air carrier B757-200 was enroute when # 2 engine Oil Filter message appeared on EICAS. Flight crew used QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) procedures and performed IFSD (In-flight Shut Down) and diverted to ZZZ. I was sent to ZZZ with another AMT (Aircraft Maintenance Technician) to troubleshoot the cause of the message and determine corrective action. It was a no-notice trip; and utmost haste was used in getting us on a departing flight. ZZZ is a non-Maintenance station for our carrier. Contract support Mechanic had been injured and was off site. Long story short; we went in without really even knowing what the Logbook Write-up was. In the communication confusion between numerous entities; the cause of the IFSD was reported as oil pressure loss; oil quantity loss; oil pressure indication loss; good oil pressure when engine was wind milling; oil filter and pressure switch failure. The cause of the IFSD was determined to be a faulty Oil Filter Bypass pressure switch. Oil filter and chip detector Inspection yielded no chips or metal of any kind. No oil quantity was lost. We replaced the switch and ran the engine at idle for a Leak Check and at High Power to get a minimum of 75 psi at the scavenge inlet. No anomalies of any kind presented. Two FAA inspectors were on the aircraft in ZZZ after we parked it at the gate for a return revenue flight. ZZZ Contract Maintenance Representatives called us in Operations to tell us the FAA wanted to talk to us; but they never did come into Operations. We couldn't go meet them at the plane due to no security badge access. The aircraft revenue back flight operated with no events. The next day I got up to go to work and had a message from company Maintenance Control to call as soon as possible. I called in and they said the same B757-200 had another IFSD on the next leg and was down at another out station. They wanted to ensure that the oil filter was replaced and was in quarantine; and did so while I was asleep; through normal channels. I admitted that my corrective action on the Logbook item was not as smooth as it could have been due to the fact that we were documenting maintenance as we went; and when the oil filter was cleared under an AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) reference; the verbiage did not clearly indicate replacement of the filter.At work I was informed that another crew found an intermittent short from the oil filter bypass switch to the EEC. Replacement of the cannon plug was listed as corrective action. While in ZZZ; the Engine Analyst did call to request that we inspect the wiring and plug; which we verified with him that we indeed did do. The next day at work; my Supervisor told me that I needed to fill out the back of the IFSD report. I was unaware that there was information that we fill out on this report; so when I filled it out I noticed that it called for a Windmill Inspection after an IFSD. Looking in the AMM for the Windmill Inspection; I found that all of the criteria for the Windmill Inspection were met during the troubleshooting of the event; but a separate log item was not made. In my opinion; communication was very stilted during this event. We have had a reference sheet as for events such as this; but they have become 'somebody else's' responsibility and are no longer used. The experience level at Maintenance Control in ZZZ was disappointing to me. As a former Lead; I felt fully qualified to handle the situation; but our mandate is that Maintenance Control calls all the shots. At some point the guy on scene [at aircraft location] has to be given some credit; but Maintenance Control personnel are trained to 'be in charge' of every aircraft; even if they don't have a clue as to what they are talking about. All reference paperwork was faxed to ZZZ. This is the year 2010; and I find it hard to believe that fax transmission is the best means of getting reference material; but my 25 billion dollar airline chooses to let Maintenance be treated as an expense instead of an asset. The fact [also stands] that the Maintenance Controller faxed [us] the wrong paperwork and we had no access to the fax; etc. etc. Since we had no prep time for the trip; I did not get to pull up any good information such as engine and component history. I had no company report for ZZZ; no airport chart of the airport; and no contact numbers for the Contract guys. Blind; naked; and dumb is how we arrived at ZZZ. The aircraft operated as intended with the condition it was in. Safety was never a question in my mind; but cost of operational impact; customer relations; and just bad public relations overall were very obvious in my mind. This is not the way we normally operate. In the end I feel that the documentation of discrepancies and work performed was inadequate. The communication was like playing post office. Experience at Maintenance Control is suspect. I regret any mistakes I have made; and in the future will not be pressured into doing what someone else thinks is best when my highly evolved intuition tells me different.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.