Narrative:

After cabin door closed; the before start checklist was run. I (captain) elected to not turn on ignition; due to the fact I was attempting to not exceed limitations on ignition. As we pushed; ground cleared me to start #2 engine. When I lifted fuel lever; engine did not light off. I failed to turn off the fuel lever due to distractions from ground crew talking to me to set the brakes. I was then cleared to start #1 engine. At that time; I switched on ignition and engaged the left starter switch. A moment later; a startled ground crew notified me that flames were coming out the back of the right engine. I released the start trigger for number one engine; and began motoring number two engine in an attempt to clear the flames. Tower call us and advised us we had flames; and I heard them sending the fire trucks. I did not initially notice an egt rise in number two engine. I continued motoring and asked ramp if the flames were gone; they said they thought so; but there was smoke. I observed egt rapidly rising; then peg off the scale. I activated the T handle and fired one squib into #2 engine. The egt began to drop; and the fire trucks were on scene. I called for the engine fire checklist. This was accomplished. It was at this time that I realized that I had left the #2 fuel lever on. Once the list was complete; I instructed ramp crew to take us back to the gate. I decided not to do an evacuation; since the problem seemed to be over; and fire trucks were on scene. I then reached the gate; the jetway was brought up; and I made a PA that everyone should calmly exit through the front door. The situation seemed orderly; so I went outside to get a visual on the engine. There was some residual smoke; but the fire was clearly out; so I returned to the cockpit. After all passenger were deplaned; we accomplished the secure cockpit checklist. This statement is truthful and accurate to the best of my memory. There was quite a lot of input coming from all directions; so I apologize if something was omitted; or inadvertently inaccurate. I failed to follow flow patterns that would have prevented this incident. T-handle was pulled and fire extinguisher was fired to the engine. Checklist secured the fuel lever. Never let oneself become distracted by outside events. I intend to never start the engine again until push is complete; and brakes are parked.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MD80 Captain caused an engine fire because he opened the engine fuel valve first and later turned on the ignition igniting the accumulated fuel. The fire handle was pulled and a squib fired after the engine EGT rose to the limit.

Narrative: After cabin door closed; the before start checklist was run. I (Captain) elected to not turn on ignition; due to the fact I was attempting to not exceed limitations on ignition. As we pushed; ground cleared me to start #2 engine. When I lifted fuel lever; engine did not light off. I failed to turn off the fuel lever due to distractions from ground crew talking to me to set the brakes. I was then cleared to start #1 engine. At that time; I switched on ignition and engaged the left starter switch. A moment later; a startled ground crew notified me that flames were coming out the back of the right engine. I released the start trigger for number one engine; and began motoring number two engine in an attempt to clear the flames. Tower call us and advised us we had flames; and I heard them sending the fire trucks. I did not initially notice an EGT rise in number two engine. I continued motoring and asked Ramp if the flames were gone; they said they thought so; but there was smoke. I observed EGT rapidly rising; then peg off the scale. I activated the T handle and fired one squib into #2 engine. The EGT began to drop; and the fire trucks were on scene. I called for the engine fire checklist. This was accomplished. It was at this time that I realized that I had left the #2 fuel lever on. Once the list was complete; I instructed ramp crew to take us back to the gate. I decided not to do an evacuation; since the problem seemed to be over; and fire trucks were on scene. I then reached the gate; the jetway was brought up; and I made a PA that everyone should calmly exit through the front door. The situation seemed orderly; so I went outside to get a visual on the engine. There was some residual smoke; but the fire was clearly out; so I returned to the cockpit. After all passenger were deplaned; we accomplished the secure cockpit checklist. This statement is truthful and accurate to the best of my memory. There was quite a lot of input coming from all directions; so I apologize if something was omitted; or inadvertently inaccurate. I failed to follow flow patterns that would have prevented this incident. T-handle was pulled and fire extinguisher was fired to the engine. Checklist secured the fuel lever. Never let oneself become distracted by outside events. I intend to never start the engine again until push is complete; and brakes are parked.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.