Narrative:

This report concerns a TCAS RA on long final for 19R at sna! We were descending out of 6;000 ft on visual approach to 19R. Our approach clearance was to 'follow the boeing 737 ahead; cleared visual approach 19R; contact tower.' there was no mention of VFR traffic at all; and as is usual for sna; we were on a high left base and within 3 miles of the 737 if we did not square our turn. I asked for the gear and checklist and shared my plan to square the turn to final to ensure 3 to 4 miles on the 737. My attention was on the energy dissipation problem; and I put the airbus in its max-dump configuration of gear out; flaps 3; full boards; 155 KTS. My map was at the 10 mile setting with TCAS switch set to below (there was no traffic displayed). Our rate of descent was about 2;200 FPM at 3;000 ft. It was at this time that a pop-up TCAS 'traffic; traffic' with white diamond symbol appeared basically right on our aircraft symbol. It showed '-4' (400 ft below). My first response was to turn slightly left and decrease my rate of descent. I said something to the affect of; 'is this a 'ghost' or is there really traffic.' the first officer called tower and asked if there was any other traffic on final near us. That call was blocked by an aircraft attempting to tell tower that he had us in sight. TCAS then went RA with; 'monitor vertical speed' then 'climb; climb' which showed vsi red to about 500 FPM climb. We complied and then some because the sun was on the pfd and I could not see the vsi very well. I also further side-stepped the centerline to the left to give the first officer a chance to see the traffic. Tower directed the aircraft to brake out with a right turn heading to contact sct. At that point the first officer saw the traffic at about 1/4 - 1/2 mile to our right and behind break-out to the right. We continued our approach and landing; but it was a lot of work to be stable at 500 ft. I am convinced of four things as a result of this incident (I'd like an answer on all four): 1) while TCAS really did well here; and effectively 'made the save'; the way TCAS works in the A-320 at this airline (not displaying all traffic) added risk. Had TCAS shown us that aircraft on final; we would have asked about it before accepting the visual. If we'd have known or suspected (from TCAS information) that he was inbound to 19R sna; I would have stayed with sct for the right box pattern for the ILS approach. In this occurrence; TCAS displayed nothing until we were in a conflict situation which removed all the safety margin of time to de-conflict the problem before it became an RA. So; TCAS made the save; but it also hid the problem. 2) sct cleared us for a visual approach with the knowledge that the VFR traffic was on straight-in approach to the same runway; yet never pointed this traffic out to us. A phone conversation with sct; after the occurrence; indicated that the aircraft had called us in sight; and would 'maintain visual separation from' us. From there I think assumptions took over. The controller that cleared us assumed we would be faster on the approach than the other aircraft and assumed that we would angle into final further placing the at aircraft behind us. Both aircraft were handed off to tower at about 6 miles and about 3;000 ft. Had TCAS been inoperative on this leg; I think this may well have been a major cnn story. The sct controllers were honest; willing to learn from this; and professional on the phone. My thanks to them. 3) the CRT displays in the airbus are too dim. I have never been a big whiner about this issue; but this one bit me hard. I could not see the monitor with the information of our RA with the screen set 'full bright'. The sun completely washed it out. This aircraft's screens were no different than other airbuses; so it was not a squawk against this particular monitor. All these monitors are simply too dim on some days and in some conditions. When they are; these primary flight displays are simply inadequate to the task of being seen by the crews who put their lives; the passenger's lives; and the company reputation on the information they don't show. Fix this; no matter the damn cost; please. 4) the TCAS traffic never had us in sight; or he did not understand that his mode-C transponder would cause an RA for us at the ridiculously close distance he elected to keep his VFR aircraft from us. This pilot seems to bear zero responsibility for what he did or did not due to cause this RA. The mix of these kinds of traffic to an airport like sna will end badly some day. VFR aircraft need to be given and follow more positive control in these terminal areas. IFR aircraft transitioning to visual approach need to be given all the traffic information which could impact their approach. There is no way we should have been allowed to get this close.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 Captain reported a near miss with an aircraft at about 3;000 FT on approach to SNA Runway 19R. The crew executed a TCAS RA Climb in response to the target which SCT knew was also on approach but assumed the jet would out run it. The PDF was so faded in the bright light that it was difficult to see.

Narrative: This report concerns a TCAS RA on long final for 19R at SNA! We were descending out of 6;000 FT on visual approach to 19R. Our approach clearance was to 'follow the Boeing 737 ahead; cleared visual approach 19R; contact Tower.' There was no mention of VFR traffic at all; and as is usual for SNA; we were on a high left base and within 3 miles of the 737 if we did not square our turn. I asked for the gear and checklist and shared my plan to square the turn to final to ensure 3 to 4 miles on the 737. My attention was on the energy dissipation problem; and I put the Airbus in its max-dump configuration of gear out; flaps 3; full boards; 155 KTS. My map was at the 10 mile setting with TCAS switch set to below (there was no traffic displayed). Our rate of descent was about 2;200 FPM at 3;000 FT. It was at this time that a pop-up TCAS 'TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC' with white diamond symbol appeared basically right on our aircraft symbol. It showed '-4' (400 FT below). My first response was to turn slightly left and decrease my rate of descent. I said something to the affect of; 'is this a 'ghost' or is there really traffic.' The First Officer called Tower and asked if there was any other traffic on final near us. That call was blocked by an aircraft attempting to tell Tower that he had us in sight. TCAS then went RA with; 'monitor vertical speed' then 'climb; climb' which showed VSI red to about 500 FPM climb. We complied and then some because the sun was on the PFD and I could not see the VSI very well. I also further side-stepped the centerline to the left to give the First Officer a chance to see the traffic. Tower directed the aircraft to brake out with a right turn heading to contact SCT. At that point the First Officer saw the traffic at about 1/4 - 1/2 mile to our right and behind break-out to the right. We continued our approach and landing; but it was a lot of work to be stable at 500 FT. I am convinced of four things as a result of this incident (I'd like an answer on all four): 1) While TCAS really did well here; and effectively 'made the save'; the way TCAS works in the A-320 at this airline (not displaying ALL traffic) added risk. Had TCAS shown us that aircraft on final; we would have asked about it before accepting the visual. If we'd have known or suspected (from TCAS information) that he was inbound to 19R SNA; I would have stayed with SCT for the right box pattern for the ILS approach. In this occurrence; TCAS displayed nothing until we were in a conflict situation which removed all the safety margin of time to de-conflict the problem before it became an RA. So; TCAS made the save; but it also hid the problem. 2) SCT cleared us for a visual approach with the knowledge that the VFR traffic was on straight-in approach to the same runway; yet never pointed this traffic out to us. A phone conversation with SCT; after the occurrence; indicated that the aircraft had called us in sight; and would 'maintain visual separation from' us. From there I think assumptions took over. The Controller that cleared us assumed we would be faster on the approach than the other aircraft and assumed that we would angle into final further placing the at aircraft behind us. Both aircraft were handed off to Tower at about 6 miles and about 3;000 FT. Had TCAS been inoperative on this leg; I think this may well have been a major CNN story. The SCT Controllers were honest; willing to learn from this; and professional on the phone. My thanks to them. 3) The CRT displays in the Airbus are too dim. I have never been a big whiner about this issue; but this one bit me hard. I could not see the monitor with the information of our RA with the screen set 'full bright'. The sun completely washed it out. This aircraft's screens were no different than other Airbuses; so it was not a squawk against this particular monitor. All these monitors are simply too dim on some days and in some conditions. When they are; these primary flight displays are simply inadequate to the task of being seen by the crews who put their lives; the passenger's lives; and the Company reputation on the information they DON'T show. Fix this; no matter the damn cost; please. 4) The TCAS traffic never had us in sight; or he did not understand that his Mode-C transponder would cause an RA for us at the ridiculously close distance he elected to keep his VFR aircraft from us. This pilot seems to bear zero responsibility for what he did or did not due to cause this RA. The mix of these kinds of traffic to an airport like SNA will end badly some day. VFR aircraft need to be given and FOLLOW more positive control in these terminal areas. IFR aircraft transitioning to visual approach need to be given ALL the traffic information which could impact their approach. There is no way we should have been allowed to get this close.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.