Narrative:

Atlanta center advised me that air carrier X was minimum fuel upon hand off. Based upon traffic and other operational conditions at the time; I anticipated no 'undue' delay in air carrier X's arrival. Even with weather prominent in the atlanta terminal area; and the southeast united states for that matter; I expected air carrier X to fly at 250 KTS to midfield downwind; then reduce to 210; turn base and reduce to 180 and be cleared for approach and land; just like the previous 300 arrivals during the evening shift so far. What I did not expect was that when abeam the airport; air carrier X declared that he could fly no farther than a fifteen mile final or else would have to divert. Atlanta approach; during triple ILS operations; routinely; turns final no closer than twenty miles and more typically 22-25 NM. It would have been unsafe to pull three or four aircraft off a triple parallel operation for an MD88 who could have flown an additional twenty two miles and landed normally; with everyone else. I was moderately busy at the time and the insane amount of coordination which had to be done; placed the ten arrivals behind him and the five departures under him all at risk for an operational error. Approach positions; flm; tmc; dr north; dr south; P; ho P would be affected. The flightplan had to be amended; coordination had to be done to turn air carrier X out of the downwind and opposite direction to the arrivals and departures; clear him to ags and accomplish point outs to two departures and a hand off to the center. I understand the IFR rules about fuel requirements; however; instead of flying twenty two miles farther (total) than a fifteen mile final caused an aircraft to fly an additional 140 NM and land at a location other than where they wanted to be. The amount of workload placed upon the system by this flight crew action increased the risk and potential for incidents in a highly congested and complex environment. The rules and regulations should permit the PIC to make an educated and informed decision based upon actual conditions and probability to continue and make a safe landing at the original airport of destination when they are already in the terminal area of the destination.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Controller described a confused and unanticipated fuel shortage declaration that led to confusion and a significant increase in workload. The reporter suggested the rules governing fuel issues need revision.

Narrative: Atlanta Center advised me that Air Carrier X was minimum fuel upon hand off. Based upon traffic and other operational conditions at the time; I anticipated no 'undue' delay in Air Carrier X's arrival. Even with weather prominent in the Atlanta Terminal Area; and the Southeast United States for that matter; I expected Air Carrier X to fly at 250 KTS to midfield downwind; then reduce to 210; turn base and reduce to 180 and be cleared for approach and land; just like the previous 300 arrivals during the evening shift so far. What I did not expect was that when abeam the airport; Air Carrier X declared that he could fly no farther than a fifteen mile final or else would have to divert. Atlanta Approach; during triple ILS operations; routinely; turns final no closer than twenty miles and more typically 22-25 NM. It would have been unsafe to pull three or four aircraft off a triple parallel operation for an MD88 who could have flown an additional twenty two miles and landed normally; with everyone else. I was moderately busy at the time and the insane amount of coordination which had to be done; placed the ten arrivals behind him and the five departures under him all at risk for an operational error. Approach positions; FLM; TMC; DR N; DR S; P; HO P would be affected. The flightplan had to be amended; coordination had to be done to turn Air Carrier X out of the downwind and opposite direction to the arrivals and departures; clear him to AGS and accomplish point outs to two departures and a hand off to the Center. I understand the IFR rules about fuel requirements; however; instead of flying twenty two miles farther (total) than a fifteen mile final caused an aircraft to fly an additional 140 NM and land at a location other than where they wanted to be. The amount of workload placed upon the system by this flight crew action increased the risk and potential for incidents in a highly congested and complex environment. The rules and regulations should permit the PIC to make an educated and informed decision based upon actual conditions and probability to continue and make a safe landing at the original airport of destination when they are already in the terminal area of the destination.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.