Narrative:

While this event did not happen to us directly; I have submitted this event from what I saw and heard as a potential for the continued safe operation of aircraft in the area in which the event occurred. To fully understand what transpired; I ask that you reference the 10-9B page of phl and follow along with me. First I must explain that on the 10-9B page; in between the east and F concourses; there are two taxi lines as designated by the spots 11 and 12 in the 'alleyway.' the south alleyway taxi line and spot 11 is now controlled by ramp frequency 130.57; and the north alleyway taxi line and spot 12 is controlled by ramp frequency 129.75. The aircraft I was in was taxiing down the north part of that alleyway (the spot 12 side) to our gate. An air carrier Y aircraft was at spot 11 in the alleyway awaiting taxi instructions from ground control. An air carrier Z aircraft was at spot 11 on taxiway J (controlled by the ramp) awaiting further taxi instructions from ramp control to proceed up on taxiway J to its gate on the north side of the F concourse. What happened was that the air carrier Z aircraft and the air carrier Y aircraft almost collided; if not for the crews on each airplane. The event occurred because the air carrier Y aircraft at spot 11 in the alleyway started to taxi to taxiway H at the same time that the air carrier Z aircraft received permission to taxi to the gate. This led to a near collision at the intersection of both spots; and taxiways J and H. Luckily; the air carrier Z aircraft saw the air carrier Y jet was not giving way; so instead gave way to air carrier Y and avoided the collision. This event occurred because of the simple fact of lack of communication due to those two spots being controlled by different ramp frequencies. I don't know who made the decision to change the way things were done with those spots; but it has led to an increase of the possibility and risk of collision at that spot. I have personally witnessed numerous close calls; this one being the worst so far; as there are many variations of potential collision hazards at this spot; all dealing with lack of communication at those spots. These events occurred because you cannot have an aircraft on spot 11 on taxiway J on ramp control 129.75 asking for permission to continue taxi down J; and another aircraft at spot 11 in the alleyway talking to a different ramp frequency telling him to go over to ground and get further taxi instructions; without the one ramp frequency knowing what the other is doing. Its the same spot...controlled by two different frequencies! Doesn't that just sound wrong? I have even personally talked to one of the ramp controllers on 130.57 and they state that they cannot even see the gates to the north side of the east concourse. How can you effectively control what you cannot see! Once the event happened the air carrier Z crew asked our ramp controller what the air carrier Y aircraft was doing and that he was not giving way; and our ramp controller said that he didn't know what air carrier Y was doing and that the other ramp controllers don't tell him what they are doing. So the air carrier Z aircraft gave way; then proceeded to the gate without further incident. Again a complete lack of knowledge and control for a certain operating area. Suggestions for avoiding recurrence of this event is a simple issue. Regardless of any political issues involved; those spots need to be controlled by the same controller. It is easily depicted on the 10-9B page what should happen. Gates E1-E17 and everything north of those gates on the ramp should be controlled as depicted by ramp control 129.75. Gates E2-E16 and south should be controlled by ramp 130.57. Why doesn't the phl airport simply follow that depiction? If that is not accomplished these events will continue to happen and will eventually lead to an aircraft ground collision if the pilots are not alert enough.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier First Officer commented that PHL taxi Spot 11 on Taxiway J is controlled by a different Ramp Control frequency than Spot 11 in the alleyway between Concourses E and F. This disconnect has lead to some critical conflicts with narrowly avoided collisions.

Narrative: While this event did not happen to us directly; I have submitted this event from what I saw and heard as a potential for the continued safe operation of aircraft in the area in which the event occurred. To fully understand what transpired; I ask that you reference the 10-9B page of PHL and follow along with me. First I must explain that on the 10-9B page; in between the E and F concourses; there are two taxi lines as designated by the spots 11 and 12 in the 'alleyway.' The south alleyway taxi line and spot 11 is now controlled by ramp frequency 130.57; and the north alleyway taxi line and spot 12 is controlled by ramp frequency 129.75. The aircraft I was in was taxiing down the north part of that alleyway (the spot 12 side) to our gate. An Air Carrier Y aircraft was at spot 11 in the alleyway awaiting taxi instructions from ground control. An Air Carrier Z aircraft was at spot 11 on taxiway J (controlled by the ramp) awaiting further taxi instructions from ramp control to proceed up on taxiway J to its gate on the north side of the F concourse. What happened was that the Air Carrier Z aircraft and the Air Carrier Y aircraft almost collided; if not for the crews on each airplane. The event occurred because the Air Carrier Y aircraft at spot 11 in the alleyway started to taxi to taxiway H at the same time that the Air Carrier Z aircraft received permission to taxi to the gate. This led to a near collision at the intersection of both spots; and Taxiways J and H. Luckily; the Air Carrier Z aircraft saw the Air Carrier Y jet was not giving way; so instead gave way to Air Carrier Y and avoided the collision. This event occurred because of the simple fact of lack of communication due to those two spots being controlled by different ramp frequencies. I don't know who made the decision to change the way things were done with those spots; but it has led to an increase of the possibility and risk of collision at that spot. I have personally witnessed numerous close calls; this one being the worst so far; as there are many variations of potential collision hazards at this spot; all dealing with lack of communication at those spots. These events occurred because you cannot have an aircraft on spot 11 on Taxiway J on ramp control 129.75 asking for permission to continue taxi down J; and another aircraft at spot 11 in the alleyway talking to a different ramp frequency telling him to go over to ground and get further taxi instructions; without the one ramp frequency knowing what the other is doing. Its the same spot...controlled by two different frequencies! Doesn't that just sound wrong? I have even personally talked to one of the Ramp Controllers on 130.57 and they state that they cannot even see the gates to the north side of the E concourse. How can you effectively control what you cannot see! Once the event happened the Air Carrier Z crew asked our Ramp Controller what the Air Carrier Y aircraft was doing and that he was not giving way; and our Ramp Controller said that he didn't know what Air Carrier Y was doing and that the other ramp controllers don't tell him what they are doing. So the Air Carrier Z aircraft gave way; then proceeded to the gate without further incident. Again a complete lack of knowledge and control for a certain operating area. Suggestions for avoiding recurrence of this event is a simple issue. Regardless of any political issues involved; those spots need to be controlled by the same controller. It is easily depicted on the 10-9B page what should happen. Gates E1-E17 and everything north of those gates on the ramp should be controlled as depicted by ramp control 129.75. Gates E2-E16 and south should be controlled by ramp 130.57. Why doesn't the PHL airport simply follow that depiction? If that is not accomplished these events will continue to happen and will eventually lead to an aircraft ground collision if the pilots are not alert enough.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.