Narrative:

At gate in bzn, I contacted bzn radio or airport advisories. Given runway 12 was preferential runway for departure and told an small aircraft doing touch and go's on runway 30. After engine start, advised FSS we were taxiing to runway 12. We were not advised of any new traffic in the pattern. Received IFR clearance from slc center and advised them of intended runway of departure. After visually clearing the traffic pattern and observing the small aircraft turning crosswind for runway 30. I made an advisory call on bzn FSS 123.65 of our intent to 'take runway 12 for departure.' midway into our takeoff we heard an small transport announce a go around since he was on final for the opp runway (30) we were above 100 KTS at this point and when he turned on his landing lights, we observed him to be on a 3-5 mi final. He started a right turn to the north. This was the first we were aware of his position or presence. He never acknowledged his position when I made the departure call on FSS frequency. The small transport did not clear the runway course--instead he paralleled runway 30 between 100-200' to the right or north. When we became airborne, the small transport passed our altitude 100-200' off our left wind and never attempted to climb to clear the runway area. Since he announced a go around in a see and be seen atmosphere, it was his responsibility to adequately clear the conflict. We were very close to the ground and the gear had not been retracted. I feel the incident occurred because: 1) the small transport failed to advise us of his position and intention to land on the opp runway (non preferential runway). 2) he failed to adequately complete a go around which he announced, therefore not clearing the departure course. 3) lack of using landing lights in traffic pattern made it impossible for him to be seen due to size of aircraft. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: the wind was 200/03 an there was no good reason why the small aircraft was shooting touch and go's on other than the preferential runway. All pilots familiar with bzn know that the normal departure runway, wind permitting, is 12. The small transport involved is extremely hard to see nose on. It presents a very small target. The medium large transport did not evade because it was not absolutely necessary and they were too low to maneuver safely. The reporter is a high time pilot and very familiar with procedures for flying in and out of uncontrolled airports.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG HAD JUST TAKEN OFF AND HAD NMAC WITH SMT APCHING IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION.

Narrative: AT GATE IN BZN, I CONTACTED BZN RADIO OR ARPT ADVISORIES. GIVEN RWY 12 WAS PREFERENTIAL RWY FOR DEP AND TOLD AN SMA DOING TOUCH AND GO'S ON RWY 30. AFTER ENG START, ADVISED FSS WE WERE TAXIING TO RWY 12. WE WERE NOT ADVISED OF ANY NEW TFC IN THE PATTERN. RECEIVED IFR CLRNC FROM SLC CENTER AND ADVISED THEM OF INTENDED RWY OF DEP. AFTER VISUALLY CLRING THE TFC PATTERN AND OBSERVING THE SMA TURNING XWIND FOR RWY 30. I MADE AN ADVISORY CALL ON BZN FSS 123.65 OF OUR INTENT TO 'TAKE RWY 12 FOR DEP.' MIDWAY INTO OUR TKOF WE HEARD AN SMT ANNOUNCE A GO AROUND SINCE HE WAS ON FINAL FOR THE OPP RWY (30) WE WERE ABOVE 100 KTS AT THIS POINT AND WHEN HE TURNED ON HIS LNDG LIGHTS, WE OBSERVED HIM TO BE ON A 3-5 MI FINAL. HE STARTED A RIGHT TURN TO THE N. THIS WAS THE FIRST WE WERE AWARE OF HIS POS OR PRESENCE. HE NEVER ACKNOWLEDGED HIS POS WHEN I MADE THE DEP CALL ON FSS FREQ. THE SMT DID NOT CLR THE RWY COURSE--INSTEAD HE PARALLELED RWY 30 BTWN 100-200' TO THE RIGHT OR N. WHEN WE BECAME AIRBORNE, THE SMT PASSED OUR ALT 100-200' OFF OUR LEFT WIND AND NEVER ATTEMPTED TO CLB TO CLR THE RWY AREA. SINCE HE ANNOUNCED A GO AROUND IN A SEE AND BE SEEN ATMOSPHERE, IT WAS HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO ADEQUATELY CLR THE CONFLICT. WE WERE VERY CLOSE TO THE GND AND THE GEAR HAD NOT BEEN RETRACTED. I FEEL THE INCIDENT OCCURRED BECAUSE: 1) THE SMT FAILED TO ADVISE US OF HIS POS AND INTENTION TO LAND ON THE OPP RWY (NON PREFERENTIAL RWY). 2) HE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY COMPLETE A GO AROUND WHICH HE ANNOUNCED, THEREFORE NOT CLRING THE DEP COURSE. 3) LACK OF USING LNDG LIGHTS IN TFC PATTERN MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE SEEN DUE TO SIZE OF ACFT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: THE WIND WAS 200/03 AN THERE WAS NO GOOD REASON WHY THE SMA WAS SHOOTING TOUCH AND GO'S ON OTHER THAN THE PREFERENTIAL RWY. ALL PLTS FAMILIAR WITH BZN KNOW THAT THE NORMAL DEP RWY, WIND PERMITTING, IS 12. THE SMT INVOLVED IS EXTREMELY HARD TO SEE NOSE ON. IT PRESENTS A VERY SMALL TARGET. THE MLG DID NOT EVADE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY AND THEY WERE TOO LOW TO MANEUVER SAFELY. THE RPTR IS A HIGH TIME PLT AND VERY FAMILIAR WITH PROCS FOR FLYING IN AND OUT OF UNCTLED ARPTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.