Narrative:

My trainee and I returned from break and the supervisor advised us the (caman) dta; which normally works the westbound departures out of mco; was closing due to weather. I thought it would be a good time to get my trainee exposed to the practice of building routes for aircraft deviating around weather and tying them back into their flight plans. We got to work and the initial workload was manageable for training purposes. The st. Johns sector; which is a narrow departure sector by design; had only the eastern half of the airspace usable due to moderate/heavy/extreme precipitation spanning the entire western portion. The st. Augustine sector which shares the eastern boundary with the st. Johns sector works the mco inbounds from over ormand beach VOR. That sector was working through mostly difficult complexity with all of the orlando complex arrivals and the southbound and northbound over flights within the local sectors being diverted through this airspace. Once the st. Augustine sector started to get really messy with a fairly junior fpl managing the sector; I found myself in the familiar position of trying to keep my trainee focused on the task at hand; reaching out and making key moves for the adjacent sector and trying to advise my fairly new to the area supervisor of the need for help at the st. Augustine sector. A competent; but brand new d-side only; was assigned to the st. Augustine sector and I was able to focus more on our sector which had slowly become busier and more complex. At this point my trainee was falling behind but I knew he needed to see some busy traffic to work on his speed problem which we have been struggling through for a few weeks now. I gave him some help here and there just to keep him in the game but my instincts were telling me I would be taking over the frequencies soon and I felt confident that I could get the sector organized with a few key moves. Once I finally did take the frequencies over I left the trainee in front of the scope to do the typing and I started to get to work. There were a few aircraft with routes of flight that would have originally taken them due west if it weren't for the precipitation and the sector above was doing there best to keep up with the pilots wishes around these storms. In my experience with weather impacting sectors I've learned to always use vertical separation until the aircraft are through the weather and are able to navigate in an anticipated way. Unfortunately; I missed the fact that my trainee gave a clearance to aircraft Y which discontinued vertical separation from aircraft X. The R75 sector; which owns the airspace above my sector; called on the override for control on the aircraft X 'for a hard turn to the west' and I granted them control without recognizing that aircraft Y was in definite conflict with that request. I made a few more clearances in an attempt to get the sector back to where my trainee could get back to work and then noticed the situation between to the two aircraft in conflict. I noticed the aircraft X's poor rate of climb so I climbed aircraft Y to FL230 and tried to get the R75 control to level aircraft X or take him back down to FL220 because I knew aircraft Y would climb fast. In the instant of making the decision for separation I felt a turn to the east was not safe because of the amount of traffic in the adjacent sector and the fact that aircraft Y was already near the shared boundary. My instructions to R75 did not make it to aircraft X in time and by then aircraft Y had reported the aircraft X insight. I then asked my trainee to move away from the r-side console and managed the sector until the supervisor was able to get me out. Once I was out of the control room and talking with certain parties that were involved I was told that a supervisor from the area that would have been normally working the 'caman' departures; came to my area and said he wasn't aware the 'caman' data was closed and he felt his sector could have been working these aircraft if the area would have been asked. The situation I have described to you today; unfortunately is not close to the chaotic; unsupported; unprotected and unforeseen events that have taken place between the st. Johns / st. Augustine sectors in the past. On a regular basis between the months of may through september; I have learned to expect; at least four or five times a month to witness or be directly involved in a 'how did we get through that without having a serious incident' session at these sectors. Through my 'can do' attitude and willingness to always want to help I have become a resident expert on what needs to happen to give myself or those I may be helping the best chance to get through these occurrences without a supervisor having to fill out paper work at the end of the night. I now know that 'just barely getting through without any harm' is not what we should be going for but still this scenario is allowed to repeat itself time and again. I hope this program will finally shed some light on a very serious weakness in our structure and support at ZJX. Recommendations: 1. Use the tools and resources provided to stay ahead of the potential weather and traffic flow through the airspace. 2. Make sure ZJX tmu has the support to protect their sectors as much as the northeast regions can protect theirs. 3. Basically reevaluate our priorities: it shouldn't be; 'lets see if we can get just a few more to squeeze by that thunderstorm'; it should be; 'would I want my loved ones on that 757 trying to press its way in or out of an airport that's surrounded by thunderstorms'; not to mention the said 757 is being worked through a sector that is saturated with deviating aircraft and there is a good chance the fpl sitting in front of the scope still owns the shoes he graduated high school about three years ago.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A detailed description of a training session where the Developmental was unable to keep control of the traffic. Concerns regarding repeated weather influenced traffic periods that need improved Traffic Management initiatives and overall supervision are expressed.

Narrative: My trainee and I returned from break and the Supervisor advised us the (Caman) DTA; which normally works the westbound departures out of MCO; was closing due to weather. I thought it would be a good time to get my trainee exposed to the practice of building routes for aircraft deviating around weather and tying them back into their flight plans. We got to work and the initial workload was manageable for training purposes. The St. Johns Sector; which is a narrow departure sector by design; had only the eastern half of the airspace usable due to moderate/heavy/extreme precipitation spanning the entire western portion. The St. Augustine Sector which shares the eastern boundary with the St. Johns Sector works the MCO inbounds from over Ormand Beach VOR. That sector was working through mostly difficult complexity with all of the Orlando complex arrivals and the southbound and northbound over flights within the local sectors being diverted through this airspace. Once the St. Augustine Sector started to get really messy with a fairly junior FPL managing the sector; I found myself in the familiar position of trying to keep my trainee focused on the task at hand; reaching out and making key moves for the adjacent sector and trying to advise my fairly new to the area Supervisor of the need for help at the St. Augustine Sector. A competent; but brand new D-Side only; was assigned to the St. Augustine Sector and I was able to focus more on our sector which had slowly become busier and more complex. At this point my trainee was falling behind but I knew he needed to see some busy traffic to work on his speed problem which we have been struggling through for a few weeks now. I gave him some help here and there just to keep him in the game but my instincts were telling me I would be taking over the frequencies soon and I felt confident that I could get the sector organized with a few key moves. Once I finally did take the frequencies over I left the trainee in front of the scope to do the typing and I started to get to work. There were a few aircraft with routes of flight that would have originally taken them due west if it weren't for the precipitation and the sector above was doing there best to keep up with the pilots wishes around these storms. In my experience with weather impacting sectors I've learned to always use vertical separation until the aircraft are through the weather and are able to navigate in an anticipated way. Unfortunately; I missed the fact that my trainee gave a clearance to Aircraft Y which discontinued vertical separation from Aircraft X. The R75 Sector; which owns the airspace above my sector; called on the override for control on the Aircraft X 'for a hard turn to the west' and I granted them control without recognizing that Aircraft Y was in definite conflict with that request. I made a few more clearances in an attempt to get the sector back to where my trainee could get back to work and then noticed the situation between to the two aircraft in conflict. I noticed the Aircraft X's poor rate of climb so I climbed Aircraft Y to FL230 and tried to get the R75 control to level Aircraft X or take him back down to FL220 because I knew Aircraft Y would climb fast. In the instant of making the decision for separation I felt a turn to the east was not safe because of the amount of traffic in the adjacent sector and the fact that Aircraft Y was already near the shared boundary. My instructions to R75 did not make it to Aircraft X in time and by then Aircraft Y had reported the Aircraft X insight. I then asked my trainee to move away from the R-Side console and managed the sector until the Supervisor was able to get me out. Once I was out of the control room and talking with certain parties that were involved I was told that a Supervisor from the area that would have been normally working the 'Caman' departures; came to my area and said he wasn't aware the 'Caman' data was closed and he felt his sector could have been working these aircraft if the area would have been asked. The situation I have described to you today; unfortunately is not close to the chaotic; unsupported; unprotected and unforeseen events that have taken place between the St. Johns / St. Augustine Sectors in the past. On a regular basis between the months of May through September; I have learned to expect; at least four or five times a month to witness or be directly involved in a 'how did we get through that without having a serious incident' session at these sectors. Through my 'can do' attitude and willingness to always want to help I have become a resident expert on what needs to happen to give myself or those I may be helping the best chance to get through these occurrences without a Supervisor having to fill out paper work at the end of the night. I now know that 'just barely getting through without any harm' is not what we should be going for but still this scenario is allowed to repeat itself time and again. I hope this program will finally shed some light on a very serious weakness in our structure and support at ZJX. Recommendations: 1. Use the tools and resources provided to stay ahead of the potential weather and traffic flow through the airspace. 2. Make sure ZJX TMU has the support to protect their sectors as much as the northeast regions can protect theirs. 3. Basically reevaluate our priorities: It shouldn't be; 'lets see if we can get just a few more to squeeze by that thunderstorm'; It should be; 'would I want my loved ones on that 757 trying to press its way in or out of an airport that's surrounded by thunderstorms'; not to mention the said 757 is being worked through a sector that is saturated with deviating aircraft and there is a good chance the FPL sitting in front of the scope still owns the shoes he graduated high school about three years ago.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.