|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||atc facility : 5bo|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 3000
|Controlling Facilities||tracon : bdl|
|Operator||general aviation : instructional|
|Make Model Name||Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear|
|Flight Phase||climbout : intermediate altitude|
climbout : takeoff
|Function||instruction : instructor|
|Qualification||pilot : cfi|
pilot : commercial
pilot : instrument
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 120|
flight time total : 850
flight time type : 35
|Function||flight crew : single pilot|
|Qualification||pilot : private|
|Anomaly||non adherence : clearance|
non adherence : far
|Independent Detector||other controllera|
|Resolutory Action||controller : issued new clearance|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||Pilot Deviation|
On IFR training flight, instrument allowed the student to contact clearance delivery on the telephone to obtain an IFR clearance. Student received a void time window of xx+5Z and was told what the time was at that moment according to the clock used by approach. At the T ime, the student failed to check that time against his watch. Prior to takeoff, student asked instrument what time it was, to which the instrument replied XX45, according to his watch. Upon contacting bradley approach climbing through 2000' MLS, the controller advised that it was 5 mins past the takeoff void time, stating that it was X50Z. A check at that time revealed that the instrument's watch was 4 mins slow. The incident could have been avoided by the instrument synchronizing times with the student the moment clearance delivery gave him (the student) the time. The instructor's role is supervisory and thus I allowed the student too much responsibility in the clearance process west/O monitoring his actions sufficiently enough to catch mistakes before they made their way into the arwy system. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: once airborne, controller asked if pilot knew it was past void time. When watch discrepancy was discussed controller cleared aircraft on its way. No further comment.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: VOID TIME EXPIRED PRIOR TO DEP.
Narrative: ON IFR TRNING FLT, INSTR ALLOWED THE STUDENT TO CONTACT CLRNC DELIVERY ON THE TELEPHONE TO OBTAIN AN IFR CLRNC. STUDENT RECEIVED A VOID TIME WINDOW OF XX+5Z AND WAS TOLD WHAT THE TIME WAS AT THAT MOMENT ACCORDING TO THE CLOCK USED BY APCH. AT THE T IME, THE STUDENT FAILED TO CHK THAT TIME AGAINST HIS WATCH. PRIOR TO TKOF, STUDENT ASKED INSTR WHAT TIME IT WAS, TO WHICH THE INSTR REPLIED XX45, ACCORDING TO HIS WATCH. UPON CONTACTING BRADLEY APCH CLBING THROUGH 2000' MLS, THE CTLR ADVISED THAT IT WAS 5 MINS PAST THE TKOF VOID TIME, STATING THAT IT WAS X50Z. A CHK AT THAT TIME REVEALED THAT THE INSTR'S WATCH WAS 4 MINS SLOW. THE INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY THE INSTR SYNCHRONIZING TIMES WITH THE STUDENT THE MOMENT CLRNC DELIVERY GAVE HIM (THE STUDENT) THE TIME. THE INSTRUCTOR'S ROLE IS SUPERVISORY AND THUS I ALLOWED THE STUDENT TOO MUCH RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CLRNC PROCESS W/O MONITORING HIS ACTIONS SUFFICIENTLY ENOUGH TO CATCH MISTAKES BEFORE THEY MADE THEIR WAY INTO THE ARWY SYS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: ONCE AIRBORNE, CTLR ASKED IF PLT KNEW IT WAS PAST VOID TIME. WHEN WATCH DISCREPANCY WAS DISCUSSED CTLR CLRED ACFT ON ITS WAY. NO FURTHER COMMENT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.