Narrative:

During the taxi to the ramp after landing; the captain noticed the aircraft pulled to the left. Btms [brake temperature monitoring system] temperatures for the left main brakes continued to increase and indicated 7 outboard and 8 inboard by the time we reached the gate. The captain notified dispatch/maintenance of brake malfunction. Maintenance personnel allowed brakes to cool then began inspection/repairs. During the completion of maintenance a difference of opinion developed between personnel. A maintenance person reported brakes continued to drag/bind. Later; a different maintenance person reported brakes were acceptable with a simple cleaning. He further reported that if necessary; maintenance was available at our destination. Maintenance personnel seemed to be preoccupied with major repairs to the flight controls on another aircraft. The captain and I were not fully convinced our brakes were repaired and probably should have been replaced and a separate taxi check conducted. Maintenance signed off the repair and we were left with no choice but to operate the flight. En-route to the runway btms temperatures for the left main brakes continued to increase and reached 7/8. We coordinated with ground and taxied over to a holding area to contact the company. During conversation with maintenance; the maintenance controller said those temperatures were within limits. The captain suspected that the controller was implying that we should continue and take-off. We disregarded that suggestion and coordinated fire/crash truck support to follow us back to the gate. As we approached the gate; btms temperatures climbed to 10/11 and the brake overheat warning message illuminated. At the gate; fire/crash personnel notified us that the fuse plugs melted. We quickly de-boarded the aircraft and the fire department cooled the brakes with water and fans. The captain contacted the company to report our status. Later that night he talked to scheduling. Scheduling seemed to be completely disconnected with the reality of our situation. No company representatives had contacted us to this point concerning alternate plans. Additionally; maintenance personnel had not re-inspected the brake and tire assemble since we brought it back to the gate. Scheduling was now insistent that we would ferry this aircraft. The captain explained that we needed new tires and brakes and maintenance had not even looked over the damage caused by the hot brakes and melted plugs. It would take a long time to transport the parts and repair the aircraft throughout the night. At this point the captain and I agreed we were exhausted from the stress of this emergency situation with hot brakes. I was particularly concerned over the company's lack of situational awareness.I felt the company was driving the situation to a possible failure for the following reasons: first; maintenance personnel should not have signed-off the brake for airworthiness with simply wiping down the brake area. Second; once we discovered the repairs failed; the maintenance controller falsely assumed we could take off with our brakes above a reading of 6 on the btms. Third; scheduling was completely lost and wanted us to ferry the aircraft even though we had a flat tire and bad brakes. Fourth; it was late in the evening and we were both exhausted and stressed. Finally; there was heavy thunderstorm activity both at the departure airport and en-route. In the interest of safety; I declared myself fatigued.we have seen this time and time again. Maintenance was under pressure to repair our aircraft as fast as possible. In a contest between safety and urgency; we should error on side of safety. Maintenance needs time to do their work properly. Nothing is worse than pencil whipping a repair; then loading passengers on the aircraft and experiencing the same malfunction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ50 First Officer reports dragging left brakes during taxi to the gate. Maintenance is called; and after taking no apparent action the flight is released. Brake temperatures rise during taxi out and the crew returns to the gate where the fuse plugs melt.

Narrative: During the taxi to the ramp after landing; the Captain noticed the aircraft pulled to the left. BTMS [Brake Temperature Monitoring System] temperatures for the left main brakes continued to increase and indicated 7 outboard and 8 inboard by the time we reached the gate. The Captain notified Dispatch/Maintenance of brake malfunction. Maintenance personnel allowed brakes to cool then began inspection/repairs. During the completion of maintenance a difference of opinion developed between personnel. A maintenance person reported brakes continued to drag/bind. Later; a different maintenance person reported brakes were acceptable with a simple cleaning. He further reported that if necessary; maintenance was available at our destination. Maintenance personnel seemed to be preoccupied with major repairs to the flight controls on another aircraft. The Captain and I were not fully convinced our brakes were repaired and probably should have been replaced and a separate taxi check conducted. Maintenance signed off the repair and we were left with no choice but to operate the flight. En-route to the runway BTMS temperatures for the left main brakes continued to increase and reached 7/8. We coordinated with Ground and taxied over to a holding area to contact the Company. During conversation with Maintenance; the Maintenance Controller said those temperatures were within limits. The Captain suspected that the Controller was implying that we should continue and take-off. We disregarded that suggestion and coordinated fire/crash truck support to follow us back to the gate. As we approached the gate; BTMS temperatures climbed to 10/11 and the brake overheat warning message illuminated. At the gate; fire/crash personnel notified us that the fuse plugs melted. We quickly de-boarded the aircraft and the Fire Department cooled the brakes with water and fans. The Captain contacted the Company to report our status. Later that night he talked to scheduling. Scheduling seemed to be completely disconnected with the reality of our situation. No Company Representatives had contacted us to this point concerning alternate plans. Additionally; maintenance personnel had not re-inspected the brake and tire assemble since we brought it back to the gate. Scheduling was now insistent that we would ferry this aircraft. The Captain explained that we needed new tires and brakes and Maintenance had not even looked over the damage caused by the hot brakes and melted plugs. It would take a long time to transport the parts and repair the aircraft throughout the night. At this point the Captain and I agreed we were exhausted from the stress of this emergency situation with hot brakes. I was particularly concerned over the Company's lack of situational awareness.I felt the company was driving the situation to a possible failure for the following reasons: First; Maintenance personnel should not have signed-off the brake for airworthiness with simply wiping down the brake area. Second; once we discovered the repairs failed; the Maintenance Controller falsely assumed we could take off with our brakes above a reading of 6 on the BTMS. Third; Scheduling was completely lost and wanted us to ferry the aircraft even though we had a flat tire and bad brakes. Fourth; it was late in the evening and we were both exhausted and stressed. Finally; there was heavy thunderstorm activity both at the departure airport and en-route. In the interest of safety; I declared myself fatigued.We have seen this time and time again. Maintenance was under pressure to repair our aircraft as fast as possible. In a contest between safety and urgency; we should error on side of safety. Maintenance needs time to do their work properly. Nothing is worse than pencil whipping a repair; then loading passengers on the aircraft and experiencing the same malfunction.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.