Narrative:

The captain of the subject flight contacted eglin approach control on the ground in destin and was issued an initial altitude and heading; route clearance; and transponder code approximately 1 hour before actual departure. He was instructed to 'call for release' prior to departure. The passengers arrived and we taxied the airplane to runway 14. Two other single engine piston aircraft were in the pattern as we were monitoring the CTAF frequency. As we neared the approach end of runway 14; I asked the 2 aircraft to update us on there position in the pattern. One was a full down wind and the closest aircraft was midfield downwind. On advisory frequency the closest aircraft stated that he had us in site and it would not be a problem if we wanted to 'get out before his approach.' the pilot flying took the runway and I advised the CTAF traffic we were departing runway 14. I switched frequency to contact eglin approach and advised we had multiple aircraft in the pattern and we were departing runway 14. After several seconds without a response from eglin; I then switched to CTAF to make another traffic call. We took off and climbed runway heading per the initial instructions. At 1;200 ft MSL I made radio contact with eglin approach control and the controller stated 'who released you for takeoff?' I responded that we had departed VFR and would like to pick up our IFR to destination. He promptly gave us vectors and climb; maintain 10;000 ft without any further discussion. After landing I contacted eglin by telephone and asked to speak with the controller who was on duty at the time of our departure. I wanted to understand what we had done wrong; I suspected we were in the wrong and wanted to understand exactly. After a 2 minute hold I was addressed by what I perceived to be his supervisor or someone in management. We had a candid discussion as I wanted to understand what we can improve upon. What myself and the pilot flying failed to realize was this: destin; while an un-towered field; is in positive control by eglin approach control and is a class D airport even though there might uncontrolled traffic in the pattern squawking VFR. Secondly; the 'call for release' was lost in translation to me. The salient point is that we were so focused on the close in traffic and trying to safely work our departure into the flow of that traffic that we failed to take our time in considering all of the airspace and the ATC request to 'call for release'. We both believed we were simply departing legally under VFR from an uncontrolled class east airport in order to pick up or activate our IFR clearance once airborne as is the case with so many other uncontrolled fields around the country where this is perfectly safe and legal practice. Had we adequately studied the airspace beforehand we would not have made the same assumption. I can speak for myself and the other co-captain in this situation that our intent was not to transgress class D airspace purposely. In fact; had there not been other traffic in the pattern; this would not have happened.in the future; I will slow down; had I not been in such a hurry this probably wouldn't have happened. We could have waited until the airplanes were done doing touch and go's. In retrospect I could have been more proactive in clarifying our departure instructions with the pilot flying. I will better study the VFR sectionals before attempting to pick up an airborne IFR clearance. This would have eliminated any confusion on my part. Several hours later I asked the controller on the telephone whether we could expect an enforcement action as a result of my mistake and he said 'no'; however; we could have been in his words in 'a lot of trouble' taking off the other direction. I am self reporting this because I was in the wrong and as a professional pilot I need to be able to make an honest self assessment and inventory what occurred and enact a strategy so as to never again make the same mistake.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Corporate pilot departing DTS; an uncontrolled airport; received a clearance via phone one hour prior to takeoff and was told to 'hold for release.' At departure time this part of the clearance was overlooked and the crew admonished by Eglin Departure Control.

Narrative: The Captain of the subject flight contacted Eglin Approach Control on the ground in Destin and was issued an initial altitude and heading; route clearance; and transponder code approximately 1 hour before actual departure. He was instructed to 'Call for Release' prior to departure. The passengers arrived and we taxied the airplane to Runway 14. Two other single engine piston aircraft were in the pattern as we were monitoring the CTAF frequency. As we neared the approach end of Runway 14; I asked the 2 aircraft to update us on there position in the pattern. One was a full down wind and the closest aircraft was midfield downwind. On advisory frequency the closest aircraft stated that he had us in site and it would not be a problem if we wanted to 'Get out before his approach.' The pilot flying took the runway and I advised the CTAF traffic we were departing Runway 14. I switched frequency to contact Eglin Approach and advised we had multiple aircraft in the pattern and we were departing Runway 14. After several seconds without a response from Eglin; I then switched to CTAF to make another traffic call. We took off and climbed runway heading per the initial instructions. At 1;200 FT MSL I made radio contact with Eglin Approach Control and the controller stated 'Who released you for takeoff?' I responded that we had departed VFR and would like to pick up our IFR to destination. He promptly gave us vectors and climb; maintain 10;000 FT without any further discussion. After landing I contacted Eglin by telephone and asked to speak with the Controller who was on duty at the time of our departure. I wanted to understand what we had done wrong; I suspected we were in the wrong and wanted to understand exactly. After a 2 minute hold I was addressed by what I perceived to be his supervisor or someone in management. We had a candid discussion as I wanted to understand what we can improve upon. What myself and the pilot flying failed to realize was this: Destin; while an un-towered field; is in positive control by Eglin Approach Control and is a Class D airport even though there might uncontrolled traffic in the pattern squawking VFR. Secondly; the 'Call for Release' was lost in translation to me. The salient point is that we were so focused on the close in traffic and trying to safely work our departure into the flow of that traffic that we failed to take our time in considering all of the airspace and the ATC request to 'Call for release'. We both believed we were simply departing legally under VFR from an uncontrolled CLASS E airport in order to pick up or activate our IFR clearance once airborne as is the case with so many other uncontrolled fields around the country where this is perfectly safe and legal practice. Had we adequately studied the airspace beforehand we would not have made the same assumption. I can speak for myself and the other Co-Captain in this situation that our intent was not to transgress Class D airspace purposely. In fact; had there not been other traffic in the pattern; this would not have happened.In the future; I will slow down; had I not been in such a hurry this probably wouldn't have happened. We could have waited until the airplanes were done doing touch and go's. In retrospect I could have been more proactive in clarifying our departure instructions with the pilot flying. I will better study the VFR sectionals before attempting to pick up an airborne IFR clearance. This would have eliminated any confusion on my part. Several hours later I asked the Controller on the telephone whether we could expect an enforcement action as a result of my mistake and he said 'No'; however; we could have been in his words in 'a lot of trouble' taking off the other direction. I am self reporting this because I was in the wrong and as a professional pilot I need to be able to make an honest self assessment and inventory what occurred and enact a strategy so as to never again make the same mistake.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.