Narrative:

It was late at night. I was second in command on a two captain crew of 4. We were very heavy weight and the temperature was hot. No assumed temperature thrust reduction was used and we requested the longer runway for departure to avail ourselves of the extra ground run available. Takeoff was normal except for the fact that our lift off speed was well above V2 and we had a low altitude 'hold down' of 1;700 ft (not even 1;000 ft above the airport elevation). The aircraft climbed rapidly as the nose was pulled to a higher than normal attitude to bleed off the extra airspeed and then the autopilot was engaged rapidly after takeoff at approximately 200 ft AGL. The aircraft automation captured the altitude set in the altitude window immediately and started the automatic level off maneuver. Since the throttles were at a high power setting (no assumed temperature setting) and since the flaps were still set at 15 from takeoff; the aircraft auto throttles retarded the engine power to idle to either attain V2 + 15 or to protect against flap over speed. At the same time that the throttles were retarding to idle; air traffic control (ATC) directed a large left hand turn followed shortly thereafter with a separate radio call directing us to climb to 2;800 ft (only a 1;100 ft change in altitude). The first officer was preoccupied with the radio calls and missed the next crucial event. Just prior to beginning the turn the captain disconnected the auto throttles because he didn't know why they had reduced the thrust levers to idle. He thought they were malfunctioning although they were operating normally. He then commenced the turn with the heading select knob as directed by ATC and forgot about the throttles being at idle. The airspeed continued to bleed off. When the next altitude change was given; and while the aircraft was in a turn the altitude was dialed in by the first officer and executed even though the autopilot was engaged and this 'mode control panel' change should have been executed by the captain (the pilot flying). At this point I am not sure if 'flight level change' was selected or if it was still in VNAV; but the aircraft began a climb while still in the turn. I was preoccupied with watching the airspeed which was rapidly decreasing. I was sitting in the left jump seat (located just behind and between the captain and first officer) and started announcing loudly 'airspeed!'; 'airspeed!' as the speed decreased below 200 KTS. When there was no appropriate response and as the airspeed decreased below V2 I yelled as loud as I could 'lower the nose!' 'maximum power!'; 'maximum power!' I undid my seat belt and was leaning forward to push the throttles to maximum thrust when the commander beat me to it and pushed the throttles to maximum power as he disconnected the autopilot and lowered the nose of the aircraft. The first officer had placed her hand behind the throttles as they were moved forward but did not touch them. Toga was not pushed. We eventually reached V2 minus 15 KTS and the stick shaker had activated along with stall buffet onset by the time the engines had spooled. We were in an undeveloped; (but rapidly developing) heavyweight takeoff stall. Had it been one more nanosecond; we would have been way too far behind the power curve to recover. There was no altitude to exchange for airspeed. The aircrafts' 110;000 pound thrust engines spooled to full power and thankfully we accelerated (slowly at first) to a safe airspeed. I think the flaps were over sped during the recovery (since there was no auto throttle protection). The flaps were retracted by the captain during the recovery (not by the first officer). The first officer called for 'auto throttles' and they were reengaged. The throttles went from maximum thrust to climb power as expected. Another altitude change was given and we continued the climb to altitude in VNAV with no further notable events.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777-200 relief pilot reported a low altitude heavy weight near stall shortly after takeoff when the Captain lost situational awareness.

Narrative: It was late at night. I was second in command on a two Captain crew of 4. We were very heavy weight and the temperature was hot. No assumed temperature thrust reduction was used and we requested the longer runway for departure to avail ourselves of the extra ground run available. Takeoff was normal except for the fact that our lift off speed was well above V2 and we had a low altitude 'hold down' of 1;700 FT (not even 1;000 FT above the airport elevation). The aircraft climbed rapidly as the nose was pulled to a higher than normal attitude to bleed off the extra airspeed and then the autopilot was engaged rapidly after takeoff at approximately 200 FT AGL. The aircraft automation captured the altitude set in the altitude window immediately and started the automatic level off maneuver. Since the throttles were at a high power setting (no assumed temperature setting) and since the flaps were still set at 15 from takeoff; the aircraft auto throttles retarded the engine power to idle to either attain V2 + 15 or to protect against flap over speed. At the same time that the throttles were retarding to idle; Air Traffic Control (ATC) directed a large left hand turn followed shortly thereafter with a separate radio call directing us to climb to 2;800 FT (only a 1;100 FT change in altitude). The First Officer was preoccupied with the radio calls and missed the next crucial event. Just prior to beginning the turn the Captain disconnected the auto throttles because he didn't know why they had reduced the thrust levers to idle. He thought they were malfunctioning although they were operating normally. He then commenced the turn with the heading select knob as directed by ATC and forgot about the throttles being at idle. The airspeed continued to bleed off. When the next altitude change was given; and while the aircraft was in a turn the altitude was dialed in by the First Officer and executed even though the autopilot was engaged and this 'Mode Control Panel' change should have been executed by the Captain (the pilot flying). At this point I am not sure if 'Flight Level Change' was selected or if it was still in VNAV; but the aircraft began a climb while still in the turn. I was preoccupied with watching the airspeed which was rapidly decreasing. I was sitting in the left jump seat (located just behind and between the Captain and First Officer) and started announcing loudly 'Airspeed!'; 'Airspeed!' as the speed decreased below 200 KTS. When there was no appropriate response and as the airspeed decreased below V2 I yelled as loud as I could 'Lower the Nose!' 'Maximum Power!'; 'Maximum Power!' I undid my seat belt and was leaning forward to push the throttles to maximum thrust when the Commander beat me to it and pushed the throttles to maximum power as he disconnected the autopilot and lowered the nose of the aircraft. The First Officer had placed her hand behind the throttles as they were moved forward but did not touch them. TOGA was NOT pushed. We eventually reached V2 minus 15 KTS and the stick shaker had activated along with stall buffet onset by the time the engines had spooled. We were in an undeveloped; (but rapidly developing) heavyweight takeoff stall. Had it been one more nanosecond; we would have been way too far behind the power curve to recover. There was no altitude to exchange for airspeed. The aircrafts' 110;000 LB thrust engines spooled to full power and thankfully we accelerated (slowly at first) to a safe airspeed. I think the flaps were over sped during the recovery (since there was no auto throttle protection). The flaps were retracted by the Captain during the recovery (NOT by the First Officer). The First Officer called for 'auto throttles' and they were reengaged. The throttles went from maximum thrust to climb power as expected. Another altitude change was given and we continued the climb to altitude in VNAV with no further notable events.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.