Narrative:

On the morning of june mon, 1988 I was serving as first officer aboard medium large transport flight from sfo to lax. Approaching fim VOR we were only cleared to FL240 so I requested a clearance from center for the profile descent. Center then cleared us to FL230. We continued to request a clearance for the profile as we were within 15 miles northwest of the fim VOR and were concerned about crossing the VOR at the maximum allowable altitude of FL210 which is required by the runway 24 profile descent. We were held at FL230 until about 10 miles southeast of the fim VOR on the profile route when at that time we were cleared for the runway 24 profile descent. I promptly notified center that we were unable to comply with the speed restriction at sadde nor the altitude restriction at bayst due to the fact that we were held up so long. Center's response was to 'do the best we can.' it is our understanding that trying to 'do the best we can' does not relieve us of our responsibilities to adhere to the clearance. Therefore I immediately requested a clearance relieving us from our speed and altitude crossing restrictions. Again, the center advised us to 'do the best you can.' once again I requested a new clearance as we were unable to comply. Center never reissued a new clearance and handed us over to lax approach shortly afterward. Center's very heavy workload seemed to be the main factor. Another controller, possibly a supervisor, took over prior to the handoff to lax approach. A common factor that we as flight crews are aware of is the apparent lack of understanding by controllers of transport aircraft limitations. Particularly with respect to being held high, slowing down, and trying to descend with a good rate, all at the same time. In order to have a high rate of descent, aircraft have to be flown at higher speeds since our drag devices (speed brakes) are not very effective. When a transport aircraft is held high while close in, a controller should be ready to relieve the crew of the normal speed and altitude restrictions for that particular descent profile, even if it means coordinating with the next handoff agency (lax approach). Without such relief in the form of a new clearance, we as flight crews are caught between a rock and a hard spot!!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG HELD HIGH AND THEN CLEARED FOR PROFILE DESCENT LATE, WAS TOLD TO `DO THE BEST YOU CAN' REFERENCE THE CROSSING RESTRICTIONS.

Narrative: ON THE MORNING OF JUNE MON, 1988 I WAS SERVING AS F/O ABOARD MLG FLT FROM SFO TO LAX. APCHING FIM VOR WE WERE ONLY CLRED TO FL240 SO I REQUESTED A CLRNC FROM CENTER FOR THE PROFILE DSCNT. CENTER THEN CLRED US TO FL230. WE CONTINUED TO REQUEST A CLRNC FOR THE PROFILE AS WE WERE WITHIN 15 MILES NW OF THE FIM VOR AND WERE CONCERNED ABOUT XING THE VOR AT THE MAX ALLOWABLE ALT OF FL210 WHICH IS REQUIRED BY THE RWY 24 PROFILE DSCNT. WE WERE HELD AT FL230 UNTIL ABOUT 10 MILES SE OF THE FIM VOR ON THE PROFILE ROUTE WHEN AT THAT TIME WE WERE CLRED FOR THE RWY 24 PROFILE DSCNT. I PROMPTLY NOTIFIED CENTER THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE SPD RESTRICTION AT SADDE NOR THE ALT RESTRICTION AT BAYST DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE WERE HELD UP SO LONG. CENTER'S RESPONSE WAS TO 'DO THE BEST WE CAN.' IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT TRYING TO 'DO THE BEST WE CAN' DOES NOT RELIEVE US OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES TO ADHERE TO THE CLRNC. THEREFORE I IMMEDIATELY REQUESTED A CLRNC RELIEVING US FROM OUR SPD AND ALT XING RESTRICTIONS. AGAIN, THE CENTER ADVISED US TO 'DO THE BEST YOU CAN.' ONCE AGAIN I REQUESTED A NEW CLRNC AS WE WERE UNABLE TO COMPLY. CENTER NEVER REISSUED A NEW CLRNC AND HANDED US OVER TO LAX APCH SHORTLY AFTERWARD. CENTER'S VERY HEAVY WORKLOAD SEEMED TO BE THE MAIN FACTOR. ANOTHER CTLR, POSSIBLY A SUPERVISOR, TOOK OVER PRIOR TO THE HANDOFF TO LAX APCH. A COMMON FACTOR THAT WE AS FLT CREWS ARE AWARE OF IS THE APPARENT LACK OF UNDERSTANDING BY CTLRS OF TRANSPORT ACFT LIMITATIONS. PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO BEING HELD HIGH, SLOWING DOWN, AND TRYING TO DSND WITH A GOOD RATE, ALL AT THE SAME TIME. IN ORDER TO HAVE A HIGH RATE OF DSCNT, ACFT HAVE TO BE FLOWN AT HIGHER SPDS SINCE OUR DRAG DEVICES (SPD BRAKES) ARE NOT VERY EFFECTIVE. WHEN A TRANSPORT ACFT IS HELD HIGH WHILE CLOSE IN, A CTLR SHOULD BE READY TO RELIEVE THE CREW OF THE NORMAL SPD AND ALT RESTRICTIONS FOR THAT PARTICULAR DSCNT PROFILE, EVEN IF IT MEANS COORDINATING WITH THE NEXT HANDOFF AGENCY (LAX APCH). WITHOUT SUCH RELIEF IN THE FORM OF A NEW CLRNC, WE AS FLT CREWS ARE CAUGHT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD SPOT!!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.