Narrative:

I was being relieved from the south arrival/woodstown combined positions. Meanwhile; ojti (on the job training instruction) had just commenced on south departure; which was combined with dupont & south high. South arrival/woodstown only had about 3 aircraft and 2 point outs (one of which I approved during the briefing) when I gave the position to the relieving controller. While doing the post-brief overlap; I walked to the south departure position to confirm that one of the point-outs would be handed off to south arrival after descent (unusual situation involving a satellite arrival; which comes in high to the south high position; diverting to phl; which means he needed to descend through south arrival airspace and be worked by ood - not sure why they didn't just hand off traffic right away since south arrival & ood were combined; unless they were more concerned about their other point-out which was likely to be more of a factor for the descending diversion than any south arrival traffic). While looking over the developmental's shoulder; I noticed a lot of traffic within the dqo sector; including a lot of crossing traffic; and in particular aircraft X; which I saw proceeding northbound at the edge of the airspace; still at 6000' even though dqo doesn't own 6000'. I see there's no way they'll make the descent in time; at the same moment; I hear south arrival issue descent clearance to air carrier Y from 7000' to 6000'. I go back to the south arrival controller and alert him to the traffic. He says he's already past aircraft X and takes no evasive action; but he hadn't passed the traffic. The pilot of air carrier Y asks him if he is aware of the traffic below and states they had a TCAS call. I believe this was a TA rather than an RA; but I am uncertain. Air carrier Y was approximately 700-800' above the traffic when they did pass. Recommendation; both south arrival & south departure had airspace deviations in this incident and neither aircraft was pointed out to the other sector. South arrival descended before reaching the line where south arrival owns 6000' and south departure had traffic at 6000' beyond the point at which they own that altitude. I wish this were not the case; but this sort of sloppiness and lack of coordination is not unusual (in part due to poor airspace design; which has created a need for a lot of point-outs). In addition; phl was on a 9 configuration; and in a 27 configuration; dqo owns 6000' further to the north. The developmental may have been less aware of the need to descend aircraft X because of this issue. Solutions: 1) in a 9 configuration; south departure; when combined with south high (always) & dqo; is looking at a lot of airspace; with very conflicting goals. This was a day where there was a lot of IFR GA traffic; which means the dqo was quite busy. It used to be more common that ood & dqo would be taken from south arrival & south departure & worked as a combined 'south sats' position. I believe this should've been done; especially due to the high volume and complexity in the dqo sector. The 'woodpont' (dqo & ood) should be opened more often in a 9 configuration; when traffic warrants. This may not have been done in this situation because of staffing (many developmental's on the B side are not checked out on both dqo & ood since they are not trained together; and dqo is not an a side position; so the number of people available to staff the combined position is low). 2) one could make the argument that dqo is a problem for south departure in a 27 operation as well; and should be combined with a low-level sector near the mxe VOR; because north departure has the same issue with approaches/departures from mqs; oqn; & N57 airports. Our departures are commonly working arrivals & departures from satellite airports. It seems they could work phl departure traffic more efficiently if they were not distracted by this traffic. 3) I don't know how to discourage the sloppiness and lack of point outs. Perhaps [we should] take a similar situation in a video replay format and make it mandatory training? However; I've seen how well that sort of thing is received; so I'm not sure that'd be effective. 4) our airspace; as you can see from just the dqo 9 map; has a lot of cutouts and different altitudes for each section. While it is impossible to eliminate all the cutouts; it should be a goal with future (theoretically soon?) redesign projects to simplify the airspace and make the 9 & 27 maps as similar as possible.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PHL TRACON controller described a loss of separation event involving a developmental that failed to respond to the reporter's cautionary advisory and descended traffic to an occupied altitude; the reporter listed a number of causal factors that included lack of point outs and airspace configuration complexities.

Narrative: I was being relieved from the South Arrival/Woodstown combined positions. Meanwhile; OJTI (on the job training instruction) had just commenced on South Departure; which was combined with Dupont & South High. South Arrival/Woodstown only had about 3 aircraft and 2 point outs (one of which I approved during the briefing) when I gave the position to the Relieving Controller. While doing the post-brief overlap; I walked to the South Departure position to confirm that one of the point-outs would be handed off to South Arrival after descent (unusual situation involving a satellite arrival; which comes in high to the South High position; diverting to PHL; which means he needed to descend through South Arrival airspace and be worked by OOD - not sure why they didn't just hand off traffic right away since South Arrival & OOD were combined; unless they were more concerned about their other point-out which was likely to be more of a factor for the descending diversion than any South Arrival traffic). While looking over the Developmental's shoulder; I noticed a lot of traffic within the DQO Sector; including a lot of crossing traffic; and in particular Aircraft X; which I saw proceeding northbound at the edge of the airspace; still at 6000' even though DQO doesn't own 6000'. I see there's no way they'll make the descent in time; at the same moment; I hear South Arrival issue descent clearance to Air Carrier Y from 7000' to 6000'. I go back to the South Arrival Controller and alert him to the traffic. He says he's already past Aircraft X and takes no evasive action; but he hadn't passed the traffic. The pilot of Air Carrier Y asks him if he is aware of the traffic below and states they had a TCAS call. I believe this was a TA rather than an RA; but I am uncertain. Air Carrier Y was approximately 700-800' above the traffic when they did pass. Recommendation; both South Arrival & South Departure had airspace deviations in this incident and neither aircraft was pointed out to the other sector. South Arrival descended before reaching the line where South Arrival owns 6000' and South Departure had traffic at 6000' beyond the point at which they own that altitude. I wish this were not the case; but this sort of sloppiness and lack of coordination is not unusual (in part due to poor airspace design; which has created a need for a lot of point-outs). In addition; PHL was on a 9 configuration; and in a 27 configuration; DQO owns 6000' further to the north. The Developmental may have been less aware of the need to descend Aircraft X because of this issue. Solutions: 1) In a 9 configuration; South Departure; when combined with South High (always) & DQO; is looking at a lot of airspace; with very conflicting goals. This was a day where there was a lot of IFR GA traffic; which means the DQO was quite busy. It used to be more common that OOD & DQO would be taken from South Arrival & South Departure & worked as a combined 'south sats' position. I believe this should've been done; especially due to the high volume and complexity in the DQO Sector. The 'Woodpont' (DQO & OOD) should be opened more often in a 9 configuration; when traffic warrants. This may not have been done in this situation because of staffing (many Developmental's on the B side are not checked out on both DQO & OOD since they are not trained together; and DQO is not an A side position; so the number of people available to staff the combined position is low). 2) One could make the argument that DQO is a problem for South Departure in a 27 operation as well; and should be combined with a low-level sector near the MXE VOR; because North Departure has the same issue with approaches/departures from MQS; OQN; & N57 airports. Our departures are commonly working arrivals & departures from satellite airports. It seems they could work PHL departure traffic more efficiently if they were not distracted by this traffic. 3) I don't know how to discourage the sloppiness and lack of point outs. Perhaps [we should] take a similar situation in a video replay format and make it mandatory training? However; I've seen how well that sort of thing is received; so I'm not sure that'd be effective. 4) Our airspace; as you can see from just the DQO 9 map; has a lot of cutouts and different altitudes for each section. While it is impossible to eliminate all the cutouts; it should be a goal with future (theoretically soon?) redesign projects to simplify the airspace and make the 9 & 27 maps as similar as possible.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.