Narrative:

This is a brief history of what compelled me to do what felt I had to do on order to keep from making a major error regarding our safety standards. There are several aircraft being mentioned in this report that I do not have tail numbers for. It all started with 10 fittings found cracked on an aircraft in our hangar approximately six months ago. The fittings (10 each) are located on the fuel tank (fasteners going through the fuel tank) in the wing center section at fuselage station XXX; stretching from left body line (lbl) to right body line (rbl).this was the first time they had been found to be cracked and because it was the first time; it was pointed out by our immediate supervisor to pay particular attention to this area. As it turned out; it was a crack prone area that turned out several aircrafts with cracked fittings. All inspectors in my department made it a habit to look at these fittings whenever they were exposed; myself included. With all this being said I will now continue with the events that took place.I was assigned to do buybacks (inspection approval) on a B737-700 aircraft. I was called to do a buyback in the cabin area for a window installation in the center cabin area. After that inspection I turned around and flashed my light at the fittings that were exposed in that area; one fitting seemed to show a crack at the end where they have shown to crack before. At that point I removed just enough sealant off the end of the fitting and I exposed a crack. I proceeded to confirm the crack with high frequency eddy current (hfec) inspection. After confirmation and the history involved with this area; I decided to write the non-routine cards for removal of the sealant for the rest of the fittings (nine more). I went to the card booth for [that hangar] and informed the maintenance supervisor of my findings and intentions for the remaining non-routines (write-ups). He said O.K. And to check with my supervisor for the routine card regarding the reference number. I went to and told him about my findings and he too said O.K. And gave me the reference number for the routine cards. I went back upstairs to retrieve the exact locations of the fittings for the non-routines I was about to generate [write] for the sealant removal. I walked back downstairs to go to lunch when I ran into another mechanic who was on the phone with someone and I heard tell him that he would pass the word on to me. He hung up the phone and proceeded to tell me not to generate the other nine non-routines for sealant removal but that I could write the one that was cracked. I ignored him and continued walking to lunch. Three to five minutes later I received a phone call informing me not [to] generate the non-routines. I informed him of my intention of writing the non-routines. We hung up and within one minute a very irate quality control (qc) manager called me up and told me not to generate the cards and if I did he was going to be forced to create a [disciplinary] investigation or some other form of punishment.after lunch the quality control manager (qc) came down to [the hangar] and we continued to argue over generating the non-routines. He told me I had no business creating the cards because there was nothing in writing putting me in the area of the fittings. I argued that I had every right as an inspector and the history of the crack prone area. He finally conceded a little and said he would talk to base manager and heavy maintenance manager. [Later] mr.'X' called to meet with me and mr.'Y' who had been involved in the other conversations. We went into his office and he proceeded to tell us about this agreement that he had regarding these fittings and the conclusion was that they were not a safety item and that because of that we were not driven to inspect or replace the fittings at this particular time. I continued to argue with him regarding the safety of the fittings. He argued that the inspection did not fall within the scheduledmaintenance scope and I argued that the schedule had to be flawed if it did not allow us (inspectors) to inspect areas that were known to be crack prone. After much arguing; he asked me if I would compromise and that he would allow me to generate five non-routines. I told him that I was not comfortable with that and he increased it to six. Once again; I told him that I didn't like it but I was tired of arguing with him. By this time it was 0X: hours and I was scheduled to work evening shift. My assignment for evening shift; ironically; was inspecting the center section on aircraft (the same airplane). Looking at the routine paperwork; I was able to see that the inspection area highlighted included the fittings we had argued about all day. I generated [wrote] six non-routines and proceeded with my inspection. A mechanic had been assigned to remove and replace the fittings I had written up a crack on. I asked him if he had the other six non-routines for sealant removal and he said he didn't but he would go get them after the fitting removal. I told him I would appreciate it because I was inspecting that area. He told me he would do it after lunch. [Later] I went into the airplane and the mechanic was done removing the fittings. However; for some reason; he had been assigned to another job. I asked him about the other non-routines that he said he would go get and he said he had been informed those other six non-routines would not be evaluated by the leads. I then asked about those cards and he said he had been instructed by not to evaluate [process] those cards but to save them for day shift the next day. At this point; I realized I didn't know what was going on and it was then that I decided I would write all the non-routines up and that they could decide what they wanted to do with the write-ups. I talked to my evening shift supervisor and explained the days' events to him. He called and verified my story. Talked to night shift heavy maintenance supervisor and he instructed the leads to evaluate the cards. I wrote up the remaining three fittings. The next day the sealant was removed and a total of five fittings were found to be cracked. Aircraft was in the [hangar] and the inspectors assigned to the center section generated non-routines for the removal of sealant and nothing had been said to them. Four fittings were found cracked. They handed me a letter informing me of a disciplinary investigation regarding those same fittings.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Inspector reports finding five out of ten Wing Center Section Front Spar Fittings cracked on a B737-700 aircraft. The fittings are located on the center fuel tank with fasteners going through the tank. Inspector also describes environment where he was pressured to 'not' make Inspection Write-ups on the tank fittings.

Narrative: This is a brief history of what compelled me to do what felt I had to do on order to keep from making a major error regarding our safety standards. There are several aircraft being mentioned in this report that I do not have tail numbers for. It all started with 10 fittings found cracked on an aircraft in our hangar approximately six months ago. The fittings (10 each) are located on the fuel tank (fasteners going through the fuel tank) in the wing center section at Fuselage Station XXX; stretching from Left Body Line (LBL) to Right Body Line (RBL).This was the first time they had been found to be cracked and because it was the first time; it was pointed out by our immediate Supervisor to pay particular attention to this area. As it turned out; it was a crack prone area that turned out several aircrafts with cracked fittings. All Inspectors in my department made it a habit to look at these fittings whenever they were exposed; myself included. With all this being said I will now continue with the events that took place.I was assigned to do buybacks (Inspection approval) on a B737-700 aircraft. I was called to do a buyback in the cabin area for a window installation in the center cabin area. After that inspection I turned around and flashed my light at the fittings that were exposed in that area; one fitting seemed to show a crack at the end where they have shown to crack before. At that point I removed just enough sealant off the end of the fitting and I exposed a crack. I proceeded to confirm the crack with High Frequency Eddy Current (HFEC) Inspection. After confirmation and the history involved with this area; I decided to write the non-routine cards for removal of the sealant for the rest of the fittings (nine more). I went to the card booth for [that hangar] and informed the Maintenance Supervisor of my findings and intentions for the remaining non-routines (write-ups). He said O.K. and to check with my Supervisor for the routine card regarding the reference number. I went to and told him about my findings and he too said O.K. and gave me the reference number for the routine cards. I went back upstairs to retrieve the exact locations of the fittings for the non-routines I was about to generate [write] for the sealant removal. I walked back downstairs to go to lunch when I ran into another Mechanic who was on the phone with someone and I heard tell him that he would pass the word on to me. He hung up the phone and proceeded to tell me not to generate the other nine non-routines for sealant removal but that I could write the one that was cracked. I ignored him and continued walking to lunch. Three to five minutes later I received a phone call informing me not [to] generate the non-routines. I informed him of my intention of writing the non-routines. We hung up and within one minute a very irate Quality Control (QC) Manager called me up and told me not to generate the cards and If I did he was going to be forced to create a [disciplinary] investigation or some other form of punishment.After lunch the Quality Control Manager (QC) came down to [the hangar] and we continued to argue over generating the non-routines. He told me I had no business creating the cards because there was nothing in writing putting me in the area of the fittings. I argued that I had every right as an Inspector and the history of the crack prone area. He finally conceded a little and said he would talk to Base Manager and Heavy Maintenance Manager. [Later] Mr.'X' called to meet with me and Mr.'Y' who had been involved in the other conversations. We went into his office and he proceeded to tell us about this agreement that he had regarding these fittings and the conclusion was that they were not a safety item and that because of that we were not driven to inspect or replace the fittings at this particular time. I continued to argue with him regarding the safety of the fittings. He argued that the inspection did not fall within the scheduledmaintenance scope and I argued that the schedule had to be flawed if it did not allow us (Inspectors) to inspect areas that were known to be crack prone. After much arguing; he asked me if I would compromise and that he would allow me to generate five Non-routines. I told him that I was not comfortable with that and he increased it to six. Once again; I told him that I didn't like it but I was tired of arguing with him. By this time it was 0X: hours and I was scheduled to work evening shift. My assignment for evening shift; ironically; was inspecting the center section on aircraft (the same airplane). Looking at the routine paperwork; I was able to see that the inspection area highlighted included the fittings we had argued about all day. I generated [wrote] six non-routines and proceeded with my inspection. A Mechanic had been assigned to remove and replace the fittings I had written up a crack on. I asked him if he had the other six non-routines for sealant removal and he said he didn't but he would go get them after the fitting removal. I told him I would appreciate it because I was inspecting that area. He told me he would do it after lunch. [Later] I went into the airplane and the Mechanic was done removing the fittings. However; for some reason; he had been assigned to another job. I asked him about the other non-routines that he said he would go get and he said he had been informed those other six non-routines would not be evaluated by the Leads. I then asked about those cards and he said he had been instructed by not to evaluate [process] those cards but to save them for day shift the next day. At this point; I realized I didn't know what was going on and it was then that I decided I would write all the non-routines up and that they could decide what they wanted to do with the write-ups. I talked to my evening shift Supervisor and explained the days' events to him. He called and verified my story. Talked to night shift Heavy Maintenance Supervisor and he instructed the Leads to evaluate the cards. I wrote up the remaining three fittings. The next day the sealant was removed and a total of five fittings were found to be cracked. Aircraft was in the [hangar] and the Inspectors assigned to the center section generated non-routines for the removal of sealant and nothing had been said to them. Four fittings were found cracked. They handed me a letter informing me of a disciplinary investigation regarding those same fittings.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.