Narrative:

[I] flew a three day sequence with a PIC (pilot in command) that exhibited dangerous CRM and dangerous flying traits. Prior to initial departure I was only part finished loading the navigation data in the GPS equipment. He yelled that he wanted to depart immediately even though we were not on a schedule. Said he was in a hurry. Replied that I was not and kept typing. Prior to departure I asked about weather as there was none on board. PIC replied that he checked it. That meant watching it on tv. I had checked it by computer. Prior to departure the PIC was last person in the cockpit. I was on the way out to do a preflight. He replied that he had done it. He had not. On taxi keeps yelling that he wants the departure chart out not the taxi chart; even though we have a very long taxi at an unfamiliar airport. [He] accepts the fact that we need the chart to find our way. On departure PIC was flying. I noticed the climb speed was very slow and decreasing. Brought it to his attention and he became very defensive. Said he was flying the mach needle. That was too low also. The flight engineer confirmed that we were too slow. The PIC then increased his climb speed but not to recommended speed. On turning on to the airway remarked to the PIC that we were about 10 miles north and he needed to return to the airway. He yelled that he did not fly airways; he flew his own routes. We were not cleared direct. PIC had filed to FL400 to save fuel. This was with an old airplane that had been sitting a long time. I suggested we stop at FL320 and check the systems before continuing the climb. He yelled; 'what systems would we check?' I suggested the yaw damper; pressurization; fuel balance; aircraft weight and our own familiarity with the aircraft. As it was the plane was too heavy to climb above 340. At a time prior to proper weight the PIC initiated a slow climb to FL360; where we hung on the nose until fuel burned off. Then he wished to immediately repeat to climb to 380. This time the flight engineer stopped him. At the earliest moment PIC initiated a slow climb to 380; once again barely maintaining altitude; repeated again to FL400. Let speed accelerate to M.85-M.86 even though max was M.84. Never flew the centerline of any airway. Let plane drift up to 10 miles off course. Started descent too late into first airport; kept pushing nose down to get down but we just kept going faster. [Got] high speed warning going through 370; high speed bell remained on for most of the descent. PIC kept pulling back the throttles; flight engineer kept pushing them up to regain pressurization control. Around FL300-330 PIC pulls on full speed brakes. Dive continues with bell ringing. Around 10;000 puts out gear to get down. Goes to flaps 50 at about 5;000 then has trouble controlling the descent; makes the approach below the glide slope. Day two: relatively normal except for airway usage. [He has a] high speed into destination airport with 330K IAS down to 8;000. Realizes his error and yanks back on wheel and initiates climb back up to 9;000 as a means of slowing aircraft. Again conducts the approach well below glide slope. Floats a significant distance down the runway; and then keeps the reversers full on down to slow speed in spite of compressor stalls and callouts by crew; repeats this on future landings. On departure 3rd day we level at 10;000 and remain there for about 5 minutes. [He] lets airspeed accelerate until high speed bell sounds. It remains sounding until climb. [He is] jerking the controls while the high speed bell sounds. Approaches airway intercept still at high speed. I call it to his attention. Needle comes alive and with high speed bell still sounding he yanks the aircraft into a bank well in excess of 45 degrees; probably closer to 60 degrees. I grab the wheel to stabilize the aircraft and take control. He yells to get my hands off the wheel. I tell him to slow.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B707 First Officer reported that the Captain exhibited dangerous CRM practices while ignoring crew cautions about his dangerous flying actions with high speed and low speed flight as well as airway deviations.

Narrative: [I] flew a three day sequence with a PIC (Pilot in Command) that exhibited dangerous CRM and dangerous flying traits. Prior to initial departure I was only part finished loading the navigation data in the GPS equipment. He yelled that he wanted to depart immediately even though we were not on a schedule. Said he was in a hurry. Replied that I was not and kept typing. Prior to departure I asked about weather as there was none on board. PIC replied that he checked it. That meant watching it on TV. I had checked it by computer. Prior to departure the PIC was last person in the cockpit. I was on the way out to do a preflight. He replied that he had done it. He had not. On taxi keeps yelling that he wants the departure chart out not the taxi chart; even though we have a very long taxi at an unfamiliar airport. [He] accepts the fact that we need the chart to find our way. On departure PIC was flying. I noticed the climb speed was very slow and decreasing. Brought it to his attention and he became very defensive. Said he was flying the mach needle. That was too low also. The Flight Engineer confirmed that we were too slow. The PIC then increased his climb speed but not to recommended speed. On turning on to the airway remarked to the PIC that we were about 10 miles north and he needed to return to the airway. He yelled that he did not fly airways; he flew his own routes. We were not cleared direct. PIC had filed to FL400 to save fuel. This was with an old airplane that had been sitting a long time. I suggested we stop at FL320 and check the systems before continuing the climb. He yelled; 'What systems would we check?' I suggested the yaw damper; pressurization; fuel balance; aircraft weight and our own familiarity with the aircraft. As it was the plane was too heavy to climb above 340. At a time prior to proper weight the PIC initiated a slow climb to FL360; where we hung on the nose until fuel burned off. Then he wished to immediately repeat to climb to 380. This time the Flight Engineer stopped him. At the earliest moment PIC initiated a slow climb to 380; once again barely maintaining altitude; repeated again to FL400. Let speed accelerate to M.85-M.86 even though max was M.84. Never flew the centerline of any airway. Let plane drift up to 10 miles off course. Started descent too late into first airport; kept pushing nose down to get down but we just kept going faster. [Got] high speed warning going through 370; high speed bell remained on for most of the descent. PIC kept pulling back the throttles; Flight Engineer kept pushing them up to regain pressurization control. Around FL300-330 PIC pulls on full speed brakes. Dive continues with bell ringing. Around 10;000 puts out gear to get down. Goes to Flaps 50 at about 5;000 then has trouble controlling the descent; makes the approach below the glide slope. Day two: Relatively normal except for airway usage. [He has a] high speed into destination airport with 330K IAS down to 8;000. Realizes his error and yanks back on wheel and initiates climb back up to 9;000 as a means of slowing aircraft. Again conducts the approach well below glide slope. Floats a significant distance down the runway; and then keeps the reversers full on down to slow speed in spite of compressor stalls and callouts by crew; repeats this on future landings. On departure 3rd day we level at 10;000 and remain there for about 5 minutes. [He] lets airspeed accelerate until high speed bell sounds. It remains sounding until climb. [He is] jerking the controls while the high speed bell sounds. Approaches airway intercept still at high speed. I call it to his attention. Needle comes alive and with high speed bell still sounding he yanks the aircraft into a bank well in excess of 45 degrees; probably closer to 60 degrees. I grab the wheel to stabilize the aircraft and take control. He yells to get my hands off the wheel. I tell him to slow.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.