Narrative:

We were being vectored downwind, north of the airport, for a visual to sfo runway 28L/right. About 3 mi east of the san mateo bridge the controller said, 'confirm you have the airport in sight, you're cleared for a visual to runway 28R.' (we were not cleared to follow another aircraft nor to maintain visual sep from another aircraft nor were we advised that another aircraft was maintaining visual sep from us.) when we got turned around on an inbound heading which would take us over the high span, we saw large transport Z angling in toward us, apparently on a visual to the left. The controller was very busy--we had no opportunity to query him about large transport Z. About 1/2 mi from the bridge the controller cleared us to contact the tower. When we switched to the tower, the controller said, 'slow to final approach speed, you're 2 1/2 behind a light twin, continue.' we then were able to pick out the light twin from among the houses and bldgs along the bayshore. Essentially, we were forced into see and avoid by an unplanned situation resulting from a poor procedure. As a result there existed a collision hazard. The immediate problem is the visual approach procedure at sfo. The procedure is too much for the pilots and it is too much for the controllers. The pilots are busy with the highest cockpit workload of the flight. The demand for the pilots to additionally provide the sep and/or to fly unplanned formation west/O training, west/O prearrangement, west/O a leader and west/O communications is unwise at best, deadly at worst. The controller is handling 4, 5 or 6 airplanes in a 1/2 IFR-1/2 VFR situation. It is impossible for him to keep track of which airplane has been cleared for a quiet bridge or just a straight visual, perhaps to maintain visual sep and perhaps not, perhaps to follow another aircraft and perhaps not, which aircraft has been cleared for a tipp toe to follow another aircraft, which aircraft has been cleared to maintain visual sep but not cleared for an approach, which aircraft has been advised that another aircraft is maintaining visual sep from him and is cleared for an approach with no restrictions, which aircraft he is providing radar sep for, etc, etc. The root problem is an FAA administration which apparently has allowed their concern for airport acceptance rate to cloud the importance of safety.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE CONDUCTING A VISUAL APCH, REPORTER'S ACFT CAME INTO CONFLICT WITH AN ACR-SMT AHEAD AND ACR-LGT ALONGSIDE.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED DOWNWIND, N OF THE ARPT, FOR A VISUAL TO SFO RWY 28L/R. ABOUT 3 MI E OF THE SAN MATEO BRIDGE THE CTLR SAID, 'CONFIRM YOU HAVE THE ARPT IN SIGHT, YOU'RE CLRED FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 28R.' (WE WERE NOT CLRED TO FOLLOW ANOTHER ACFT NOR TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP FROM ANOTHER ACFT NOR WERE WE ADVISED THAT ANOTHER ACFT WAS MAINTAINING VISUAL SEP FROM US.) WHEN WE GOT TURNED AROUND ON AN INBND HDG WHICH WOULD TAKE US OVER THE HIGH SPAN, WE SAW LGT Z ANGLING IN TOWARD US, APPARENTLY ON A VISUAL TO THE LEFT. THE CTLR WAS VERY BUSY--WE HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO QUERY HIM ABOUT LGT Z. ABOUT 1/2 MI FROM THE BRIDGE THE CTLR CLRED US TO CONTACT THE TWR. WHEN WE SWITCHED TO THE TWR, THE CTLR SAID, 'SLOW TO FINAL APCH SPD, YOU'RE 2 1/2 BEHIND A LIGHT TWIN, CONTINUE.' WE THEN WERE ABLE TO PICK OUT THE LIGHT TWIN FROM AMONG THE HOUSES AND BLDGS ALONG THE BAYSHORE. ESSENTIALLY, WE WERE FORCED INTO SEE AND AVOID BY AN UNPLANNED SITUATION RESULTING FROM A POOR PROC. AS A RESULT THERE EXISTED A COLLISION HAZARD. THE IMMEDIATE PROB IS THE VISUAL APCH PROC AT SFO. THE PROC IS TOO MUCH FOR THE PLTS AND IT IS TOO MUCH FOR THE CTLRS. THE PLTS ARE BUSY WITH THE HIGHEST COCKPIT WORKLOAD OF THE FLT. THE DEMAND FOR THE PLTS TO ADDITIONALLY PROVIDE THE SEP AND/OR TO FLY UNPLANNED FORMATION W/O TRNING, W/O PREARRANGEMENT, W/O A LEADER AND W/O COMS IS UNWISE AT BEST, DEADLY AT WORST. THE CTLR IS HANDLING 4, 5 OR 6 AIRPLANES IN A 1/2 IFR-1/2 VFR SITUATION. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO KEEP TRACK OF WHICH AIRPLANE HAS BEEN CLRED FOR A QUIET BRIDGE OR JUST A STRAIGHT VISUAL, PERHAPS TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP AND PERHAPS NOT, PERHAPS TO FOLLOW ANOTHER ACFT AND PERHAPS NOT, WHICH ACFT HAS BEEN CLRED FOR A TIPP TOE TO FOLLOW ANOTHER ACFT, WHICH ACFT HAS BEEN CLRED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP BUT NOT CLRED FOR AN APCH, WHICH ACFT HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT ANOTHER ACFT IS MAINTAINING VISUAL SEP FROM HIM AND IS CLRED FOR AN APCH WITH NO RESTRICTIONS, WHICH ACFT HE IS PROVIDING RADAR SEP FOR, ETC, ETC. THE ROOT PROB IS AN FAA ADMINISTRATION WHICH APPARENTLY HAS ALLOWED THEIR CONCERN FOR ARPT ACCEPTANCE RATE TO CLOUD THE IMPORTANCE OF SAFETY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.