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37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
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| Attributes | |
| ACN | 884741 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201004 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
| State Reference | US |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
| Flight Phase | Cruise |
| Route In Use | None |
| Flight Plan | None |
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | Engine |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Instructor Pilot Flying |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Commercial |
| Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100 Flight Crew Total 1500 Flight Crew Type 150 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue |
Narrative:
The student and I were completing an engine break-in procedure. The student was informed to preflight the aircraft. When I arrived at the aircraft; the student had completed the preflight; and I had the student give me brief on the aircraft; fuel; oil; lights; etc. The student said that we were full on fuel and that there were no problems. I did not check the fuel myself. The student is a 200+ hour pilot that I had flown with for 80+ hours and trusted his preflight. I also failed to check the fuel gauges when we entered the aircraft. I programmed full fuel into the fuel flow/pressure monitoring unit. I had only been monitoring our fuel flow system and failed to check the fuel gauges. I saw a drop in fuel pressure. The left engine failed; I did a full trouble shoot; and found after looking at our fuel gauges that we were on reserves. I feathered the left engine and advised approach that we had experienced an engine failure and would like priority to land. I received priority and had a safe single engine landing. After further investigation; we found that we had no fuel on the left side; and that were on reserves on the right. We determined that there was no fuel leak. We had taken off with only 1/2 full on fuel. This has taught me to not trust another pilot's preflight; and that I should always double check the fuel. Mistakes can be made; and if I check the fuel myself; the likelihood of a repeat event will be very low. I also learned not to solely rely on the fuel flow/pressure unit for fuel information. Because I programmed it with full fuel; it was reading incorrect for the whole flight. I will be checking the fuel myself; and remember to include the fuel gauges in my engine instrument scans; and not completely rely on the fuel flow/pressure unit.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A PA44 Pilot reported losing an engine as a result of fuel starvation. The reporter; also the instructor; failed to check fuel quantity before departure.
Narrative: The student and I were completing an engine break-in procedure. The student was informed to preflight the aircraft. When I arrived at the aircraft; the student had completed the preflight; and I had the student give me brief on the aircraft; fuel; oil; lights; etc. The student said that we were full on fuel and that there were no problems. I did not check the fuel myself. The student is a 200+ hour pilot that I had flown with for 80+ hours and trusted his preflight. I also failed to check the fuel gauges when we entered the aircraft. I programmed full fuel into the fuel flow/pressure monitoring unit. I had only been monitoring our fuel flow system and failed to check the fuel gauges. I saw a drop in fuel pressure. The left engine failed; I did a full trouble shoot; and found after looking at our fuel gauges that we were on reserves. I feathered the left engine and advised Approach that we had experienced an engine failure and would like priority to land. I received priority and had a safe single engine landing. After further investigation; we found that we had no fuel on the left side; and that were on reserves on the right. We determined that there was no fuel leak. We had taken off with only 1/2 full on fuel. This has taught me to not trust another pilot's preflight; and that I should always double check the fuel. Mistakes can be made; and if I check the fuel myself; the likelihood of a repeat event will be very low. I also learned not to solely rely on the fuel flow/pressure unit for fuel information. Because I programmed it with full fuel; it was reading incorrect for the whole flight. I will be checking the fuel myself; and remember to include the fuel gauges in my engine instrument scans; and not completely rely on the fuel flow/pressure unit.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.