Narrative:

During descent just after entering us airspace after ursus intersection; ATC began vectoring and slowing us for spacing into the miami area. Eventually we ended up just north of fll at 6000 ft and 190 KIAS with slats out. At this point we determined landing fuel to be about 4300 pounds. After a 25 mi downwind in this configuration we determined that we would burn into our reserve fuel. We notified ATC that we were at minimum fuel. After another 5-7 mi ATC started turning us back toward the airport. During the last 7 mi of the approach we started to get ecams for low level fuel in the right wing. As we started to comply with ECAM action; warning would disappear. This happened 3-4 times. We decided to open the crossfeed valve and continue toward airport with the intent of landing runway 09L or if there was a problem with 09L landing 13. Landed fll 3000 pounds fuel; planned fuel for landing had been 5000 pounds. Improper fuel planning by dispatch; [they had] no consistency in fuel planning between city pairs. I had two other flights that day and was dispatched with not only extra fuel to bring planned landing fuel up to the company minimum; but also contingency fuel ranging from 1200 pounds to 1500 pounds. Both times even with this 'added weight' on the airplane we were able to arrive below total fuel burn for the trip effectively carrying the fuel weight for free. This dismisses the argument that it costs fuel to carry fuel. With proper knowledge and pilot technique this is an invalid point. Dispatch not taking into account flow issues for time of day or time of year. Pilots have no idea of flows into a given airport and this information is always available to dispatch and the company. ATC stringing out flights to undetermined lengths without informing crews to the extent of the delay; it would actually be better to hold airplanes for flow into an airport and give standard approach vectoring to a runway. Holding will at least give us a fixed point at which to make accurate calculations for the safe continuing the flight or diverting. The company is intimidating the dispatchers and pilots to put on as little fuel as possible. This is evidenced by the fact that when I tell dispatch I want to increase my fuel load for what I perceive as a valid reason; I am told by dispatch the company is maintaining a log of those pilots taking more fuel than planned and also they will be notifying the chief pilot. My response to this is; 'would you like me to call him right now?' how can this not be perceived as intimidation. Operation of the flight in what the pilots or dispatchers perceive as safe operation should never be questioned when within reason. As evidenced by the above paragraph; the extra fuel is really of no added cost to the company; it will just go toward the uplift on the next leg. Pilots; who feel they will somehow be disciplined for their safe actions could result in an impaired judgment of any situation; not just fuel; resulting in an irrational action causing further complications or incidents. This ignorant attempt at bullying must not continue and the pilots need to reacquaint themselves with the fact that they are the final say on the safe operation of our airline. Safety is; as pilots; our number one concern; why is it not the company's number one concern.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Carrier Captain arriving into the MIA area was vectored and delayed so that minimum fuel was declared and fuel alert messages were displayed on approach. The reporter described his carrier's threats to pilots about uploading extra contingency fuel.

Narrative: During descent just after entering US airspace after URSUS intersection; ATC began vectoring and slowing us for spacing into the Miami area. Eventually we ended up just north of FLL at 6000 FT and 190 KIAS with slats out. At this point we determined landing fuel to be about 4300 LBS. After a 25 MI downwind in this configuration we determined that we would burn into our reserve fuel. We notified ATC that we were at minimum fuel. After another 5-7 MI ATC started turning us back toward the airport. During the last 7 MI of the approach we started to get ECAMs for low level fuel in the right wing. As we started to comply with ECAM action; warning would disappear. This happened 3-4 times. We decided to open the crossfeed valve and continue toward airport with the intent of landing Runway 09L or if there was a problem with 09L landing 13. Landed FLL 3000 LBS fuel; planned fuel for landing had been 5000 LBS. Improper fuel planning by Dispatch; [they had] no consistency in fuel planning between city pairs. I had two other flights that day and was dispatched with not only extra fuel to bring planned landing fuel up to the company minimum; but also contingency fuel ranging from 1200 LBS to 1500 LBS. Both times even with this 'added weight' on the airplane we were able to arrive below total fuel burn for the trip effectively carrying the fuel weight for free. This dismisses the argument that it costs fuel to carry fuel. With proper knowledge and pilot technique this is an invalid point. Dispatch not taking into account flow issues for time of day or time of year. Pilots have no idea of flows into a given airport and this information is always available to Dispatch and the Company. ATC stringing out flights to undetermined lengths without informing crews to the extent of the delay; it would actually be better to hold airplanes for flow into an airport and give standard approach vectoring to a runway. Holding will at least give us a fixed point at which to make accurate calculations for the safe continuing the flight or diverting. The company is intimidating the dispatchers and pilots to put on as little fuel as possible. This is evidenced by the fact that when I tell Dispatch I want to increase my fuel load for what I perceive as a valid reason; I am told by Dispatch the company is maintaining a log of those pilots taking more fuel than planned and also they will be notifying the chief pilot. My response to this is; 'would you like me to call him right now?' How can this not be perceived as intimidation. Operation of the flight in what the pilots or dispatchers perceive as SAFE operation should never be questioned when within reason. As evidenced by the above paragraph; the extra fuel is really of no added cost to the company; it will just go toward the uplift on the next leg. Pilots; who feel they will somehow be disciplined for their safe actions could result in an impaired judgment of any situation; not just fuel; resulting in an irrational action causing further complications or incidents. This ignorant attempt at bullying must not continue and the pilots need to reacquaint themselves with the fact that they are the FINAL say on the safe operation of our airline. Safety is; as pilots; our number one concern; why is it not the Company's number one concern.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.