Narrative:

We started engines successfully and proceeded to the runway. We received the first set of final weights during engine start at XA15z. Then again at XA20z. We commenced takeoff at XB06z. Climbing out of 10;000 ft we saw an ACARS message from dispatch at XB11z asking us to return to the gate due to bad loading. I sent an ACARS message to dispatch asking what the issue was. Dispatch replied at XB22z that load planning would send us a message shortly with an explanation. I then called dispatch via sat phone to discuss the matter. I required that he get the on duty flight manager; the chief of dispatch and the chief of load planning on the conference call. I was only able to talk to dispatch and the duty flight manager relayed messages from load planning. First I was told that 12 containers in the forward cargo hold were not locked down. Then it was revised to only six containers. Then they said that they were locked down but with the old blocks not the new ones. I was asked if we noticed anything unusual during takeoff. If there was not anything unusual such as pitch attitude or noise on takeoff then the barrier was holding the cargo in place. I said I was two stories above the cargo pit and we could not hear it and would inquire down below in first class where there were numerous deadheading pilots. Then we were told that it was all a mistake and that everything was fine. I inquired down below about noise and no one noticed anything unusual. I then asked that a flight manager meet me at the forward cargo door at our destination. That it not be opened until I arrived so I could see for myself what was going on. At this point I trusted no one. The locks were all in place; there was no barrier installed. I have very little faith in the load planners and loaders of this airline when I get such bad information. I have no idea what precipitated this fiasco. We have been doing this much too long to have these kinds of mistakes. There are many systems breakdowns present here; not just personnel. This is a management issue that needs to be fixed before a real safety issue happens. I am not a test pilot with 391 souls on board.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-400 flight crew was frustrated by conflicting reports from ground personnel regarding the security of cargo containers on board.

Narrative: We started engines successfully and proceeded to the runway. We received the first set of final weights during engine start at XA15z. Then again at XA20z. We commenced takeoff at XB06z. Climbing out of 10;000 FT we saw an ACARS message from dispatch at XB11z asking us to return to the gate due to bad loading. I sent an ACARS message to Dispatch asking what the issue was. Dispatch replied at XB22z that load planning would send us a message shortly with an explanation. I then called Dispatch via sat phone to discuss the matter. I required that he get the on duty Flight Manager; the Chief of Dispatch and the Chief of Load Planning on the conference call. I was only able to talk to Dispatch and the Duty Flight Manager relayed messages from load planning. First I was told that 12 containers in the forward cargo hold were not locked down. Then it was revised to only six containers. Then they said that they were locked down but with the old blocks not the new ones. I was asked if we noticed anything unusual during takeoff. If there was not anything unusual such as pitch attitude or noise on takeoff then the barrier was holding the cargo in place. I said I was two stories above the cargo pit and we could not hear it and would inquire down below in First Class where there were numerous deadheading pilots. Then we were told that it was all a mistake and that everything was fine. I inquired down below about noise and no one noticed anything unusual. I then asked that a Flight Manager meet me at the forward cargo door at our destination. That it not be opened until I arrived so I could see for myself what was going on. At this point I trusted no one. The locks were all in place; there was no barrier installed. I have very little faith in the load planners and loaders of this airline when I get such bad information. I have no idea what precipitated this fiasco. We have been doing this much too long to have these kinds of mistakes. There are many systems breakdowns present here; not just personnel. This is a management issue that needs to be fixed before a real safety issue happens. I am not a test pilot with 391 souls on board.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.