Narrative:

This was our first flight together. We began by discussing frost removal procedures. After pushback and before I had chance to finish reading checklist; the captain started rolling to deice spot. I tried to slow down the pace due to workload and incomplete checklist. He proceeded to roll to deice spot without clearance. I immediately notified ground control that we were already taxiing to the spot. Before the aircraft rolled to a stop; the captain reached down and called 'iceman' on frequency and turned packs; APU/engine bleeds off; while calling for the deice checklist. I was quite confused.before the truck arrived; I noticed an autofail light had illuminated. We checked the QRH and it required further evaluation. I asked him if he wanted to complete the QRH issue before getting deiced. He said we would continue to get deiced and handle it later. The pace seemed to be all that mattered at this point. The captain decided to handle the now intermittent light on the way to the departure runway. We taxied out after completing all necessary checklists. After thirty minutes of consulting with dispatch; at the end of 4R we taxied back to the gate. Fixed the issue and took off for ind.enroute at FL210 I pulled up the ATIS via ACARS. The ATIS reported zero miles visibility; there were no RVR values listed. We both seemed a little surprised how dramatically the weather dropped and how dispatch never clued us in. I told the captain I was off to gather more info from the ATIS if possible. The captain was now in charge of radios and flying the aircraft. I needed a little extra time to figure out if we could get in with the lack of RVR reports. I contacted dispatch and got the info I needed. Tower visibility was zero; the RVR was greater than 6;000 ft.I had just returned from listening to the radios when the captain asked ATC if we could get direct to the airport. Center responded; 'uh; sir. You were supposed to cross jakks at 13;000.' I looked up and saw he had put it in the altitude alerter; but not in the FMC. We were now about 1 mile north of jakks and 8;000 ft high. This added to my frustration to say the least. ATC gave us a couple of vectors to get down and we landed uneventfully.slow down the pace! This is not single pilot ops. I do not understand why so many captains think it's do or die when flying the jet. Instead of trying to release the brakes before the door closes; rush through checklists; fly the aircraft; talk to maintenance; deice crews; the flight attendants; and taxi at 30.9 mph; I think the captain needs to look at the big picture. The first officer is a resource many captains ignore. I feel like nothing more than a radio man for some of the guys.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 First Officer discusses CRM failures of the Captain with whom he is flying for the first time. The Captain however only addresses distractions and aircraft equipment automation differences; which caused an altitude deviation.

Narrative: This was our first flight together. We began by discussing frost removal procedures. After pushback and before I had chance to finish reading checklist; the Captain started rolling to Deice Spot. I tried to slow down the pace due to workload and incomplete checklist. He proceeded to roll to Deice Spot without clearance. I immediately notified Ground Control that we were already taxiing to the Spot. Before the aircraft rolled to a stop; the Captain reached down and called 'Iceman' on frequency and turned packs; APU/engine bleeds off; while calling for the Deice checklist. I was quite confused.Before the truck arrived; I noticed an Autofail light had illuminated. We checked the QRH and it required further evaluation. I asked him if he wanted to complete the QRH issue before getting deiced. He said we would continue to get deiced and handle it later. The pace seemed to be all that mattered at this point. The Captain decided to handle the now intermittent light on the way to the departure runway. We taxied out after completing all necessary checklists. After thirty minutes of consulting with Dispatch; at the end of 4R we taxied back to the gate. Fixed the issue and took off for IND.Enroute at FL210 I pulled up the ATIS via ACARS. The ATIS reported zero miles visibility; there were no RVR values listed. We both seemed a little surprised how dramatically the weather dropped and how Dispatch never clued us in. I told the Captain I was off to gather more info from the ATIS if possible. The Captain was now in charge of radios and flying the aircraft. I needed a little extra time to figure out if we could get in with the lack of RVR reports. I contacted Dispatch and got the info I needed. Tower visibility was zero; the RVR was greater than 6;000 FT.I had just returned from listening to the radios when the Captain asked ATC if we could get direct to the airport. Center responded; 'Uh; Sir. You were supposed to cross JAKKS at 13;000.' I looked up and saw he had put it in the altitude alerter; but not in the FMC. We were now about 1 mile north of JAKKS and 8;000 FT high. This added to my frustration to say the least. ATC gave us a couple of vectors to get down and we landed uneventfully.Slow down the pace! This is not single Pilot Ops. I do not understand why so many Captains think it's do or die when flying the jet. Instead of trying to release the brakes before the door closes; rush through checklists; fly the aircraft; talk to Maintenance; deice crews; the flight attendants; and taxi at 30.9 mph; I think the Captain needs to look at the big picture. The First Officer is a resource many Captains ignore. I feel like nothing more than a radio man for some of the guys.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.