Narrative:

I started my taxi from the ramp at trm announcing my intention to use runway 35 for departure. At the time; the winds were reported from the north at approximately 3 KTS. While taxiing to runway 35; I overheard an air ambulance helicopter announce its intention to depart from the ramp area to the east; and noted its departure on the TCAS display. Upon arrival at the arrival end of 35; I spent approximately 5-7 minutes troubleshooting an avionics problem while continuing to monitor the CTAF and TCAS display. During this time; I overheard the air ambulance talking to other traffic; advising them that they would remain clear; however; I did not hear the traffic that had initiated the advisory from the air ambulance. After resolving the issue with the avionics; I departed the run-up area on the west side of runway 35 and announced (over the CTAF) my intention to take runway 35; and that we would be departing to the east. Prior to taking the runway I overheard no other traffic on the CTAF; and the only traffic displayed on the TCAS was the air ambulance helicopter that was flying northeast of the airport. As I took the runway; I illuminated the exterior lights (landing; recognition; and anti-collision) on the aircraft to enhance our visibility to other aircraft. As I was about to begin our takeoff roll; I noticed a piston single engine aircraft; with no lights; initiating its takeoff roll from runway 17. This aircraft did not abort; and I did not have time to clear the runway before it departed 17 and overflew our aircraft by approximately 300 ft. After determining that the runway environment was clear; I then departed runway 35 and continued my planned flight. At no time during this sequence did I hear the other aircraft transmit its intentions over the published CTAF; nor did it appear as a target on the TCAS. There were several factors that contributed to this incident: 1) the other pilot's decision to make a downwind takeoff 2) the lack of transponder use (no target on my TCAS) by the other pilot for undetermined reasons 3) failure of the other aircraft to acknowledge any of my transmissions during the incident for undetermined reasons 4) the other pilot's decision to continue his/her takeoff roll; despite having a well lit aircraft on the opposite end of the runway; and ample room to safely abort (8;500 ft runway). Recurrence of this type of incident can be easily prevented by pilots exercising more care at uncontrolled airports. More specifically; pilots should use runways that favor the existing winds; communicate their intentions clearly over the CTAF; verify that they are using proper frequencies and that their radios are transmitting as expected; use of the transponder as a means of providing their position to TCAS equipped aircraft; and finally; verify that the departure end of the runway is clear prior to starting the takeoff roll.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE550 pilot reports taking Runway 35 at TRM after announcing on the CTAF; with all lights on. A single engine aircraft was seen departing from the opposite end; with no CTAF announcement and no transponder; and continues to depart 300 FT over the CE550.

Narrative: I started my taxi from the ramp at TRM announcing my intention to use Runway 35 for departure. At the time; the winds were reported from the north at approximately 3 KTS. While taxiing to Runway 35; I overheard an air ambulance helicopter announce its intention to depart from the ramp area to the east; and noted its departure on the TCAS display. Upon arrival at the arrival end of 35; I spent approximately 5-7 minutes troubleshooting an avionics problem while continuing to monitor the CTAF and TCAS display. During this time; I overheard the air ambulance talking to other traffic; advising them that they would remain clear; however; I did not hear the traffic that had initiated the advisory from the air ambulance. After resolving the issue with the avionics; I departed the run-up area on the west side of Runway 35 and announced (over the CTAF) my intention to take Runway 35; and that we would be departing to the east. Prior to taking the runway I overheard no other traffic on the CTAF; and the only traffic displayed on the TCAS was the air ambulance helicopter that was flying NE of the airport. As I took the runway; I illuminated the exterior lights (landing; recognition; and anti-collision) on the aircraft to enhance our visibility to other aircraft. As I was about to begin our takeoff roll; I noticed a piston single engine aircraft; with no lights; initiating its takeoff roll from Runway 17. This aircraft did not abort; and I did not have time to clear the runway before it departed 17 and overflew our aircraft by approximately 300 FT. After determining that the runway environment was clear; I then departed Runway 35 and continued my planned flight. At no time during this sequence did I hear the other aircraft transmit its intentions over the published CTAF; nor did it appear as a target on the TCAS. There were several factors that contributed to this incident: 1) The other pilot's decision to make a downwind takeoff 2) The lack of transponder use (no target on my TCAS) by the other pilot for undetermined reasons 3) Failure of the other aircraft to acknowledge any of my transmissions during the incident for undetermined reasons 4) The other pilot's decision to continue his/her takeoff roll; despite having a well lit aircraft on the opposite end of the runway; and ample room to safely abort (8;500 FT runway). Recurrence of this type of incident can be easily prevented by pilots exercising more care at uncontrolled airports. More specifically; pilots should use runways that favor the existing winds; communicate their intentions clearly over the CTAF; verify that they are using proper frequencies and that their radios are transmitting as expected; use of the transponder as a means of providing their position to TCAS equipped aircraft; and finally; verify that the departure end of the runway is clear prior to starting the takeoff roll.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.