Narrative:

An A319 aircraft arrived and had a turn around check scheduled. Myself and three other mechanics; mr.'X'; mr.'Y' and mr.'Z' went to the gate to perform this check. Mr.'X' did the walk-around; mr.'Z' did the tire pressure/struts; mr.'Y' completed paperwork signoff; and I serviced the engines. I serviced number one engine as required and went to service number two engine oil and found the oil cap not secured; with no visible oil in sight glass.I serviced the number two engine using the quick disconnect port with the oil cap removed - serviced the engine with 7.5 quarts and thought this wasn't correct and hooked up a drain bottle to the tank. I drained 2.0 quarts from the oil tank overflow port and took the cap off the drain bottle to make sure it stopped draining; it stopped and I removed the drain bottle; secured the oil cap and verified the oil level from the cockpit (19.5). The sight glass was unreadable and not a reliable indication source.we were not aware of the practice of not using the quick disconnect port to service these engines. This aircraft flew from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and on landing rollout the flight crew received red 'engine 2 oil lo pr'; cleared runway and complied with quick reference handbook (QRH). The number 2 engine showed 12 psi oil pressure. Maintenance in ZZZ1 signed off the item saying 'removed approximately eight quarts of oil from #2 engine. Ran engine at idle power; quantity now reads 18.5 quarts. Oil pressure during engine run was at 22 psi. Reference amm chapter 12-13-79. Maintenance control advised 'ok' for service.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Line Mechanic reports using the Quick Disconnect port and servicing equipment for servicing the engine oils on their A319 aircraft that were previously serviced by Contract Maintenance. On landing rollout at the following station the flight crew received an ECAM red 'ENG 2 OIL LO Pr' message. Engine Number Two found overserviced by eight quarts of oil.

Narrative: An A319 aircraft arrived and had a Turn Around check scheduled. Myself and three other Mechanics; Mr.'X'; Mr.'Y' and Mr.'Z' went to the gate to perform this check. Mr.'X' did the Walk-Around; Mr.'Z' did the tire pressure/struts; Mr.'Y' completed paperwork signoff; and I serviced the engines. I serviced Number One engine as required and went to service Number Two engine oil and found the oil cap not secured; with no visible oil in Sight Glass.I serviced the Number Two engine using the Quick Disconnect port with the oil cap removed - serviced the engine with 7.5 quarts and thought this wasn't correct and hooked up a drain bottle to the tank. I drained 2.0 quarts from the oil tank overflow port and took the cap off the drain bottle to make sure it stopped draining; it stopped and I removed the drain bottle; secured the oil cap and verified the oil level from the cockpit (19.5). The sight glass was unreadable and not a reliable indication source.We were not aware of the practice of not using the Quick Disconnect port to service these engines. This aircraft flew from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and on landing rollout the Flight Crew received red 'ENG 2 OIL LO PR'; cleared Runway and complied with Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). The Number 2 engine showed 12 PSI oil pressure. Maintenance in ZZZ1 signed off the item saying 'removed approximately eight quarts of oil from #2 engine. Ran engine at idle power; quantity now reads 18.5 quarts. Oil pressure during engine run was at 22 PSI. Reference AMM Chapter 12-13-79. Maintenance Control advised 'OK' for Service.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.