Narrative:

Air carrier X had just departed runway 33L. The aircraft was passing november taxiway at approximately 250 feet. Air carrier Y was taxiing outbound on bravo taxiway approaching november taxiway. The asde-X alerted; 'warning; runway 33L occupied.' the departure was climbing and the taxiing aircraft was taxiing parallel to the runway 33L. There is no logical reason why the system alerted. There are far too many false alerts for far too many reasons with the asde-X system. Recommendation; this system has far too many flaws to be operational. Not only does it induce a high level of stress when it alerts unnecessarily; every time it alerts; it reduces it's effectiveness. This system was not adequate for certification when it was first certified for operational use and it is no better almost a year later. There are false alerts. There are false targets. There are no targets where aircraft exist. How many warning signs do we need? Decertify this system and keep it that way until it is safe and effective; neither of which it is today or has ever been to date.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BOS Controller described an ASDE-X alert between an airborne Runway 33L departure and a taxiing aircraft on a parallel taxiway; voicing concern regarding ASDE-X operational flaws and false alarms.

Narrative: Air Carrier X had just departed Runway 33L. The aircraft was passing November taxiway at approximately 250 feet. Air Carrier Y was taxiing outbound on Bravo taxiway approaching November taxiway. The ASDE-X alerted; 'warning; Runway 33L occupied.' The departure was climbing and the taxiing aircraft was taxiing PARALLEL to the Runway 33L. There is no logical reason why the system alerted. There are far too many false alerts for far too many reasons with the ASDE-X system. Recommendation; this system has far too many flaws to be operational. Not only does it induce a high level of stress when it alerts unnecessarily; every time it alerts; it reduces it's effectiveness. This system was not adequate for certification when it was first certified for operational use and it is no better almost a year later. There are false alerts. There are false targets. There are no targets where aircraft exist. How many warning signs do we need? Decertify this system and keep it that way until it is safe and effective; neither of which it is today or has ever been to date.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.