Narrative:

I was pilot flying for a scheduled XA00(left) departure; captain's leg. Aircraft was late arriving at the gate due to maintenance and we pushed at XB45(left) and headed to pad east for deice. It was the ship's first flight. Weather was low overcast; around a half mile visibility with snow. Weather at destination was a little better; but it was snowing there as well. We deiced with type I and type iv and proceeded to taxi to the runway. Taxi; before takeoff checklists and first flight checks were completed after leaving deice and everything tested normally. We were number three upon reaching the runway at approx XC45(left). It was still snowing; but we were well within our holdover time when we were number one for takeoff and the wings looked clean from the cockpit. The runway had been groomed and was fairly clean. We were cleared for takeoff at which point the wing anti-ice was selected on due to the type iv fluid application; line-up checklist was completed. I slowly advanced the thrust and made sure we had two good arcs on the N2 gauges and called for thrust to be set. Thrust was set and we continued. Prior to the 100 KT call; at approximately 90 KTS; we received a right wing anti-ice caution message and I elected to abort the takeoff. We told tower we were aborting and exited at taxiway J without incident; cleared the runway and asked tower if we could stay on taxiway D for a minute to call maintenance. That was approved so first officer called the flight attendant and briefed the passenger while I called maintanence and explained what happened. They asked that we return to the gate which we did without further problems. Upon arriving at the gate I made a PA to the passenger explaining the situation and we deplaned. During the abort; I was so focused on maintaining centerline control and watching for any sign of sliding that I cannot say what our maximum airspeed reached was. I based my abort decision on several factors: (1) the long; fairly clear runway ahead of me; (2) we were light; just over 47;000 pounds as I recall and (3) as hard as the snow was falling; I felt flying with a possible asymmetrical wing icing scenario with low ceilings and poor visibility; even if it was only long enough to return; held an unacceptable risk; let alone a possible divert. Looking back; I should have had the first officer test the wing anti-ice system on the way to the deice pad; as we were using two engines with the cowl heat on. We did that with our next aircraft when we pushed back the second time and headed to the deice pad.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ50 Captain reports rejecting the takeoff at 90 KTS for a right wing anti-ice caution. Crew returned to the gate and changed aircraft.

Narrative: I was pilot flying for a scheduled XA00(L) departure; Captain's leg. Aircraft was late arriving at the gate due to maintenance and we pushed at XB45(L) and headed to Pad E for deice. It was the ship's first flight. Weather was low overcast; around a half mile visibility with snow. Weather at destination was a little better; but it was snowing there as well. We deiced with Type I and Type IV and proceeded to taxi to the runway. taxi; before takeoff checklists and first flight checks were completed after leaving deice and everything tested normally. We were number three upon reaching the runway at approx XC45(L). It was still snowing; but we were well within our holdover time when we were number one for takeoff and the wings looked clean from the cockpit. The runway had been groomed and was fairly clean. We were cleared for takeoff at which point the wing anti-ice was selected on due to the Type IV fluid application; line-up checklist was completed. I slowly advanced the thrust and made sure we had two good arcs on the N2 gauges and called for thrust to be set. Thrust was set and we continued. Prior to the 100 KT call; at approximately 90 KTS; we received a right wing anti-ice caution message and I elected to abort the takeoff. We told Tower we were aborting and exited at Taxiway J without incident; cleared the runway and asked Tower if we could stay on Taxiway D for a minute to call Maintenance. That was approved so First Officer called the Flight Attendant and briefed the passenger while I called Maintanence and explained what happened. They asked that we return to the gate which we did without further problems. Upon arriving at the gate I made a PA to the passenger explaining the situation and we deplaned. During the abort; I was so focused on maintaining centerline control and watching for any sign of sliding that I cannot say what our maximum airspeed reached was. I based my abort decision on several factors: (1) the long; fairly clear runway ahead of me; (2) we were light; just over 47;000 LBS as I recall and (3) as hard as the snow was falling; I felt flying with a possible asymmetrical wing icing scenario with low ceilings and poor visibility; even if it was only long enough to return; held an unacceptable risk; let alone a possible divert. Looking back; I should have had the First Officer test the wing anti-ice system on the way to the deice pad; as we were using two engines with the cowl heat on. We did that with our next aircraft when we pushed back the second time and headed to the deice pad.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.