Narrative:

Once we checked in; we were given notice that we were going to ferry a 100 up to ZZZ; and then do an evaluation flight and ferry a 300 back. We took one mechanic with us in order to sign-off the logbook. There was no flight attendant. Once arriving into ZZZ; into which could be categorized as a blizzard; (the interstates were closed) we met with the crew of the 300 we were taking and got briefed on their situation. They stated they departed earlier that morning before the bad weather came and had the #2 engine and prop surging on takeoff. They declared an emergency and returned to the field under VMC conditions with the firetrucks rolled. I told maintenance control and dispatch I was not comfortable doing a test flight under the current conditions. During the whole day; conditions did not change much from 1/2 mile visibility 200 overcast; wind gusting up to 35 KTS with 20+ KTS of x-wind component; moderate blowing snow; and freezing fog with LLWS. I would be comfortable doing this test flight if I was able to make a VFR pattern back to the airport in case of an emergency; which coincidentally happened the next day. After both dispatch and maintenance tried to convince me to do the evaluation flight; we were then assigned by maintenance control to complete run-ups to troubleshoot a possible ecu problem. They asked for full power run-ups. We taxied the aircraft to the runway to complete the run-ups since the taxiways and ramp areas were worse than the runway. Once on the runway we did two static run-ups with limited success. Both could only be accomplished with about 50-55% tq since the aircraft started to slide underneath us due to the icy conditions. Following our static run-ups; we did a high-speed taxi check. We were able to get to a more reasonable takeoff tq for only a second or two before having to reject. We did that twice with the same results. After returning to the gate and telling maintenance about our run-ups they were not satisfied with the results; so they told us to do another run-up on the ramp area this time and asked us again when can we do the evaluation; flight. Since the ramp area was reporting poor breaking action; they directed us to tell the ZZZ operations people to spray type 1 fluid onto a portion of the ramp. They sprayed a small area and we tried again. While holding the brakes all the way and upon reaching 65-70% tq or so; we started sliding again. I rejected the run-up and the airplane found itself on top of the chocks placed by the main landing gear. I shut down both engines. The operations personnel could not remove the chocks since they were underneath the landing gear. I called maintenance and the maintenance supervisor told us to start the engines and back the aircraft off of the chocks. I told him that is prohibited in our manuals and he stated that it is approved under maintenance direction; and told me that this is the only way to correct the situation. I suggested that we get a push from the tug to get us down. We both agreed to that; we told ZZZ operations our problem and they got a heavy duty tractor of some sort and pushed us off of the chocks. We called dispatch and maintenance control and told them of the outcome. After receiving a remark from dispatch asking us if 'we planned to take this aircraft out of ZZZ this winter' and telling us they 'were going to tell the chief pilot of this'; I got annoyed. I asked to speak with the chief pilot and we set up a conference call with; I believe the coordinator. The coordinator agreed with me that he was not comfortable with a test flight under these conditions and asked if I could do a test flight if conditions improved. I said yes to this; and that was the agreement. The mechanic with us signed off the open write-up as an informational write-up. We went to the hotel for the overnight. End of day 1 day 2 conditions improved the next morning enough that I felt comfortable conducting the ferry flight. Still convinced that the problem was notaddressed correctly; my first officer and myself briefed a beta lock-out failure emergency checklist and had a plan set for this. After takeoff at about 50-100 feet AGL we had engine tq surging and prop surging. We completed the beta lock-out failure; declared an emergency; requested crash fire rescue equipment; completed a VFR traffic pattern and landed probably less than 5 minutes later. We went back to the gate and called dispatch and maintenance and they MEL'd the beta lock-out system which resulted in an uneventful ferry flight. My biggest concern here is the issue of pilot pushing. This event brought me to the brink of questioning my own judgment and had me thinking I should take this aircraft into the blizzard conditions to accomplish what they want. That almost happened. I'm concerned that someone else might have done this; fallen victim to their pushing; especially new captains that may have only been here two or three years. Questions raised are why? Why did I have such a bad experience with dispatch and maintenance control? They are supposed to be my 'teammates' not my opponents. It seems they'll put safety aside in order to move aircraft and keep the system moving. What is causing this mentality within an airline?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Dash 8-300 flight crew is instructed to ferry an aircraft that had returned to the airport for a surging propeller. Near blizzard conditions exist and the crew is reluctant to depart without a static runup to check the repairs. This cannot be accomplished due to icy ramps and taxiways; which greatly upsets Maintenance Control. The crew departs the next day and immediately returns with a surging propeller. Maintenance defers the Beta Lockout and the crew has an uneventful ferry flight.

Narrative: Once we checked in; we were given notice that we were going to ferry a 100 up to ZZZ; and then do an evaluation flight and ferry a 300 back. We took one Mechanic with us in order to sign-off the logbook. There was no Flight Attendant. Once arriving into ZZZ; into which could be categorized as a blizzard; (the interstates were closed) we met with the crew of the 300 we were taking and got briefed on their situation. They stated they departed earlier that morning before the bad weather came and had the #2 engine and prop surging on takeoff. They declared an emergency and returned to the field under VMC conditions with the firetrucks rolled. I told Maintenance Control and Dispatch I was not comfortable doing a test flight under the current conditions. During the whole day; conditions did not change much from 1/2 mile visibility 200 overcast; wind gusting up to 35 KTS with 20+ KTS of X-wind component; moderate blowing snow; and freezing fog with LLWS. I would be comfortable doing this test flight if I was able to make a VFR pattern back to the airport in case of an emergency; which coincidentally happened the next day. After both Dispatch and Maintenance tried to convince me to do the evaluation flight; we were then assigned by Maintenance Control to complete run-ups to troubleshoot a possible ECU problem. They asked for full power run-ups. We taxied the aircraft to the runway to complete the run-ups since the taxiways and ramp areas were worse than the runway. Once on the runway we did two static run-ups with limited success. Both could only be accomplished with about 50-55% TQ since the aircraft started to slide underneath us due to the icy conditions. Following our static run-ups; we did a high-speed taxi check. We were able to get to a more reasonable takeoff TQ for only a second or two before having to reject. We did that twice with the same results. After returning to the gate and telling maintenance about our run-ups they were not satisfied with the results; so they told us to do another run-up on the ramp area this time and asked us again when can we do the evaluation; flight. Since the ramp area was reporting poor breaking action; they directed us to tell the ZZZ operations people to spray type 1 fluid onto a portion of the ramp. They sprayed a small area and we tried again. While holding the brakes all the way and upon reaching 65-70% TQ or so; we started sliding again. I rejected the run-up and the airplane found itself on top of the chocks placed by the main landing gear. I shut down both engines. The operations personnel could not remove the chocks since they were underneath the landing gear. I called Maintenance and the Maintenance Supervisor told us to start the engines and back the aircraft off of the chocks. I told him that is prohibited in our manuals and he stated that it is approved under maintenance direction; and told me that this is the only way to correct the situation. I suggested that we get a push from the tug to get us down. We both agreed to that; we told ZZZ operations our problem and they got a heavy duty tractor of some sort and pushed us off of the chocks. We called Dispatch and Maintenance Control and told them of the outcome. After receiving a remark from dispatch asking us if 'we planned to take this aircraft out of ZZZ this winter' and telling us they 'were going to tell the Chief Pilot of this'; I got annoyed. I asked to speak with the Chief Pilot and we set up a conference call with; I believe the Coordinator. The Coordinator agreed with me that he was not comfortable with a test flight under these conditions and asked if I could do a test flight if conditions improved. I said yes to this; and that was the agreement. The Mechanic with us signed off the open write-up as an informational write-up. We went to the hotel for the overnight. End of Day 1 Day 2 conditions improved the next morning enough that I felt comfortable conducting the ferry flight. Still convinced that the problem was notaddressed correctly; my First Officer and myself briefed a beta lock-out failure emergency checklist and had a plan set for this. After takeoff at about 50-100 feet AGL we had engine TQ surging and prop surging. We completed the beta lock-out failure; declared an emergency; requested CFR; completed a VFR traffic pattern and landed probably less than 5 minutes later. We went back to the gate and called Dispatch and Maintenance and they MEL'd the beta lock-out system which resulted in an uneventful ferry flight. My biggest concern here is the issue of pilot pushing. This event brought me to the brink of questioning my own judgment and had me thinking I should take this aircraft into the blizzard conditions to accomplish what they want. That almost happened. I'm concerned that someone else might have done this; fallen victim to their pushing; especially new Captains that may have only been here two or three years. Questions raised are why? Why did I have such a bad experience with dispatch and Maintenance Control? They are supposed to be my 'teammates' not my opponents. It seems they'll put safety aside in order to move aircraft and keep the system moving. What is causing this mentality within an airline?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.