Narrative:

After initiating a go-around due to a general aviation aircraft that did not clear the runway as instructed; we experienced a flap failure at 30 degrees while configuring for the second approach. We performed a go-around and declared an emergency. We determined that our destination airport runway was sufficient for landing per the QRH and dispatch; and returned for landing. Upon landing we had 2000 pounds of fob. During the go-around; after performing the QRH and after takeoff checklist; the gear was inadvertently left down. Factors contributing to this were the absence of the flap retraction call due to failure; absence of the positive rate call as no climb was required; the fact that the flaps failed at a high drag position; omitting items per SOP on the after takeoff checklist for a go around; landing distance/diversion considerations; and low fuel. I would suggest verbally announcing call outs in the profiles even if they do not apply in an attempt to keep things standard; not rushing through checklists; and looking at every item on the checklist even if you think it does not apply.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-200 Captain reported a flap failure during a Tower directed go-around. The after takeoff checklist items were not completed and because the flaps were at 30 and the gear not retracted; the flight landed with 2;000 LBS of fuel.

Narrative: After initiating a go-around due to a General Aviation aircraft that did not clear the runway as instructed; we experienced a flap failure at 30 degrees while configuring for the second approach. We performed a go-around and declared an emergency. We determined that our destination airport runway was sufficient for landing per the QRH and dispatch; and returned for landing. Upon landing we had 2000 LBS of FOB. During the go-around; after performing the QRH and after takeoff checklist; the gear was inadvertently left down. Factors contributing to this were the absence of the flap retraction call due to failure; absence of the positive rate call as no climb was required; the fact that the flaps failed at a high drag position; omitting items per SOP on the After Takeoff Checklist for a go around; landing distance/diversion considerations; and low fuel. I would suggest verbally announcing call outs in the profiles even if they do not apply in an attempt to keep things standard; not rushing through checklists; and looking at every item on the checklist even if you think it does not apply.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.